FRENCH POLYNESIA

Formal Name	Territory of French Polynesia
Political Status	Overseas territory of France
Capital	Papeete
Population	159,000 (1984 midyear estimate)
Land Area	4,000 square kilometers
Currency	Cours du Franc Pacifique franc (CFPF)
Major Islands and Island Groups	Society Islands, including Tahiti, Moorea, and Raiatea; Marquesas Islands; Austral Islands; Mangareva Islands (Îles Gambier); Tuamotu Archipelago

French Polynesia, an overseas territory of France since 1958, is located in the south-central Pacific Ocean. The territorial capital, Papeete, on the island of Tahiti, is about 6,600 kilometers northeast of Sydney, Australia, and 4,400 kilometers southeast of Honolulu. The Pitcairn Islands lie to the southeast, the Cook Islands to the west, and Kiribati to the northwest. Although the territory is in the eastern Polynesian cultural area, its population also includes Europeans, Asians, and people of mixed blood. Land is scarce, and agriculture is poorly developed; principal export crops are copra and coconut products. Tourism is an important component of the local economy. France's Pacific Test Center (Centre d'Expérimentation du Pacifique) continued to maintain a nuclear testing site at Mururoa Atoll in the Tuamotu Archipelago in 1984. A reform of French Polynesia's territorial statute, under discussion in mid-1984, was designed to provide a greater measure of self-government while still maintaining a link with France.

Physical Environment

French Polynesia comprises some 130 widely dispersed islands and islets, of which the largest, Tahiti, has an area of 1,042

Figure 18.   French Polynesia, 1984

square kilometers (see fig. 18). The distance from Rapa in the south to Eiao in the Marquesas Islands in the north is 2,400 kilometers; that from Bellingshausen Island in the west to Temoe Island in the east is 2,440 kilometers.

The French government enforces a territorial limit of 12 nautical miles in its territories, including French Polynesia. Enabling legislation passed in 1976 provided for an EEZ (see Glossary) of 200 nautical miles, which by an unofficial reckoning would make French Polynesia's sea area 5.03 million square kilometers.

French Polynesia is composed of five distinct island groups that include most of its islands. The Society Islands, numbering 14, are divided into the Windward group and the Leeward group. The principal islands are Tahiti and Moorea in the Windwards and Raiatea, Bora Bora, and Huahine in the Leewards. To the northeast of the Society group, about 1,500 kilometers from Tahiti, are the Marquesas, having 10 major islands, including Nukuhiva, Hivaoa, and Uapou. The Austral Islands group, consisting of five major islands, is located to the south of the Society group, while the Mangareva Islands, numbering four principal islands, are found to the southeast. The extensive Tuamotu Archipelago, located between the Society and Marquesas groups, contains 76 islands, most of which are very small.

Geologically and topographically, the islands of French Polynesia can be classified as either "high islands"—volcanic formations—or "low islands"—coral formations, most of which are atolls. The Society, Marquesas, Austral, and Mangareva groups are high islands, interspersed with a small number of atolls. The Tuamotu Archipelago consists of coral low islands, all but one of which are atolls.

The contrast between the volcanic and coral formations is striking. The high islands have steep relief. Their sharp peaks, precipitous cliffs, and deep valleys, usually green with vegetation, struck early European explorers and modern tourists alike as a fitting landscape for an earthly paradise. The soils, particularly in the coastal areas, are comparatively rich, and the islands are generally well watered with streams, small rivers, and waterfalls of great beauty. Tahiti derives its form, reminiscent of a gourd turned on its side, from the juncture of two ancient and much eroded volcanic cones. Its highest peak is Mount Orohena (2,241 meters). Other important peaks are Aorai (2,066 meters) and La Diadème (1,322 meters). One side of La Diadème is a steep cliff more than 300 meters high. Mount Tohivea, on Moorea (also an ancient volcanic cone), is 1,207 meters high, and the most elevated point on Raiatea is 1,038 meters above sea level. On

Nukuhiva in the Marquesas group, the Ahui waterfall, the highest in French Polynesia, drops 350 meters. There are no active volcanoes in the territory.

Because of the abundance of water and the suitability of the volcanic soils, the vegetation is lush. On Tahiti coconut trees, pandani (screw pines), banyans, and flame trees are found along the coasts, while vegetation on the mountain slopes consists of brush and thickets. Rain forests are found in the valleys and the more humid windward slopes of the island. Fruit-bearing trees grow in abundance, providing traditional dietary staples, such as breadfruit, bananas, and Tahitian chestnuts. Tahiti's vegetation pattern is common to most of the volcanic islands, although periodic drought makes the Marquesas less bountiful.

Except for the Marquesas, most of the high islands, including Tahiti, Moorea, Raiatea, Huahine, and Bora Bora, are surrounded by coral reefs. The reefs contain colorful and abundant marine life, but ships approaching the islands must navigate with care through passes in the coral barriers.

The low islands are small and have little relief. During high tides or in violent storms, considerable portions of their area may be submerged. Vegetation is scanty, owing to poor limestone soils and lack of water.

French Polynesia has a humid, tropical climate. The average yearly temperature at Papeete is 27°C and the hottest, in January and February, is 32°C. The prevailing southeastern trade winds serve to moderate temperatures. Most precipitation occurs during the rainy season between November and March. The average annual rainfall in Papeete is 1,750 millimeters. Severe cyclones sometimes occur during the early months of the year.

There is significant variation in climate because of latitude, elevation, and position relative to prevailing winds. The Marquesas, lying closer to the equator, have a warmer climate than the Society group, which in turn is more tropical than the Austral and Mangareva islands. The mountain regions are cool and wet, and on Tahiti the *hupe*, a breeze that blows down from the mountains, cools the coastal areas. The southeastward-facing windward sides of the island are wetter and have denser vegetation than the leeward sides.

French Polynesia has no native land mammals because of its isolation from continental landmasses, but there are 90 species of birds. The Polynesians brought dogs and fowl to the islands, and the Europeans introduced horses, sheep, goats, and cattle. There are freshwater fish in the inland waters of the high islands.

Historical Setting

The Polynesians did not have their own written language, which makes it difficult to trace the evolution of their society and culture before the coming of discerning European observers in the. late eighteenth century. Archaeological ethnographic evidence indicates that the indigenous people of what is now French Polynesia came. from Tonga or Samoa. Archaeologist Peter Bellwood suggests that a distinct eastern Polynesian culture developed first in the Marquesas Islands beginning around A.D. 300 and was later diffused to the Society, Tuamotu, Mangareva, and Austral islands. For geographic and economic reasons, the center of this cultural region gradually shifted to the Society Islands, particularly Raiatea and Tahiti, though the Marquesas group had a flourishing culture of its own and a population as high as 30,000 as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century.

In eighteenth-century European eyes, traditional Polynesian society affirmed philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau's notion of the "noble savage" untainted by the artifices of modern civilization. The beauty, generosity, and good nature of the people were real enough, but below idyllic appearances lay a complex society having a strong sense of hierarchy and its own characteristic tensions. In the Society Islands the population was divided into three strata: the *arii* (ruling chief), the lesser chiefs, and the commoners, who formed the great majority. These categories were strictly hereditary, and any infringement by the lower orders on the privileges of their superiors was severely punished. All chiefs, particularly the *arii*, were believed to possess a superior measure of mana (supernatural power). Prohibitions prevented contact between persons having different degrees of mana, perpetuating social distinctions. Because sexual intercourse between chiefs and commoners was forbidden, children who were products of such unions were usually killed. The power of the *arii* extended over an entire territory while that of the lesser chiefs was confined to well-defined subdivisions. Although chiefs of both kinds had control over the land, resources, and goods produced by commoners, their rule in most cases was not oppressive. There were abundant resources, particularly on Tahiti, and well-established customs of redistributing wealth. Workers and craftsmen, however, could be organized in large numbers for the building of temple enclosures, elaborate war canoes, and extensive offshore fishing traps.

The islands were divided into a number of states, often wedge-shaped territories defined by steep-walled valleys, which were ruled by an *arii* and his family. Warfare between these chief-

doms was constant but not particularly bloody. A balance of power was maintained, no single *arii* gaining permanent hegemony.

Polynesians traced the descent of their chiefs from the gods in myths that established claims of superior mana transferred through the generations. By the eighteenth century, Oro, the god of war, was the most venerated deity in the Society Islands. Oro's cult had its birthplace and center on the island of Raiatea, and its priests enjoyed a special status. A striking feature of Polynesian religion was the *arioi* society, groups of actors and singers dedicated to Oro that traveled through the islands giving performances and receiving tribute from the local populations. In the temples—open-air structures that commonly contained a raised stone platform in a truncated pyramid shape—priests conducted ceremonies that occasionally involved human sacrifice. The most sacred temple was found on Raiatea.

The society of the Marquesas Islands was less complex and hierarchical than that of the Society Islands, having only two ranks: chiefs and commoners. The power of the former was relatively limited, and there were a number of small chiefdoms cut off from each other by steep valley walls. Like the states of the Society Islands, the chiefdoms were constantly at war. Frequent droughts, lack of arable land, and limited opportunities for fishing led to periodic food shortages, and cannibalism was widely practiced.

European Intrusions

The first Europeans to visit Polynesia were members of the expedition of Ferdinand Magellan, who landed on Pukapuka in the northeastern Tuamotu group in 1521. In 1595 Spanish navigator Álvaro de Mendaña de Neira reached the Marquesas Islands, which he named in honor of the Spanish viceroy of Peru. His men treated the local inhabitants with great cruelty, killing several hundred. Fortunately for the Polynesians, the remoteness of their islands precluded frequent visits by Europeans until the late eighteenth century.

Improved shipbuilding and navigational methods, the search for an elusive southern continent, and the scientific curiosity of the "Age of Reason" brought European voyagers in significant numbers to the islands in the eighteenth century. The first Europeans to see Tahiti were the men of the H.M.S. *Dolphin*, a British ship on an expedition around the world commanded by Captain Samuel Wallis. On June 18, 1767, the *Dolphin*, finding

Harbor of Papeete
Courtesy Tahiti Tourist Promotion Board/Tini Colombel

anchorage in Matavai Bay in the island's northwest coast, was surrounded by hundreds of canoes whose occupants sought to drive away the intruder by showering it with stones. After Wallis ordered his crew to sink the canoes with cannon-shot, causing a large number of casualties, the Polynesians changed their tactics and began a lively trade, giving the British much needed food in exchange for iron tools and trinkets. The islanders valued iron nails because they could be bent into fishhooks, and lonely British sailors were happy to discover that the companionship of young ladies could be won by offering them these inexpensive items. A commerce sprang up that was discourged only when the officers of the *Dolphin* found to their distress that the ship's structure was being weakened by eager sailors in search of nails. Tahiti and the other islands of the region soon gained a perhaps undeserved reputation for sexual license. Louis Antoine de Bougainville, the French navigator who landed in eastern Tahiti in 1768, named the island Nouveau Cythère after the island near Greece where the love goddess Venus was supposed to have risen from the sea.

Of the British, French, and Spanish navigators who landed at Tahiti and the other Polynesian islands in the eighteenth century,

the most important was Captain Cook, who visited three times, in 1769, 1773, and 1777. Cook's voyages had scientific objectives. The first was to map the transit of the planet Venus across the sun in order to gauge the distance of the sun from the earth. For this purpose, he established an observatory at "Point Venus" off Matavai Bay but failed to get a precise measurement. Cook's second and third visits to Tahiti took place during voyages of exploration that included a search for a southern continent and a northwest passage connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. He stopped not only at Tahiti but also at Moorea and the Leeward, Austral, and Marquesas islands.

Cook established friendly relations with Tahitian rulers, especially Tu, ruler of the state of Pare in the northwestern part of the island, where modern Papeete is located. The states were, as always, at war. Tu was able to take advantage of his relationship with Cook and other Europeans, who mistakenly regarded him as the "king" of Tahiti, to obtain tools and weapons. This upset the delicate balance of power between the states. Hatchets and chisels could be used to make war canoes more quickly and efficiently than the old method of using fire to hollow out logs. Although Cook opposed such trade, later European arrivals were willing to supply firearms. By the turn of the century, a ragged assortment of beachcombers and deserters from ships' crews, including some from the H.M.S. *Bounty* who had mutinied in 1789, were serving Tahitian rulers as mercenaries. Tu, who now called himself Pomare, benefited most from their services. He was able to defeat his rival chiefs in campaigns more brutal than traditional island combat.

Eighteen members of the London Missionary Society and their wives landed at Matavai Bay in 1797. Although they had enjoyed Pomare's hospitality, the ruler and his subjects were unmoved by their preaching and continued to venerate Oro, the god of war. Long sermons on Calvinist themes of sin and salvation were evidently less attractive than the lively song and dance of the *arioi*. The missionaries failed to persuade the Tahitians to end the practices of human sacrifice and infanticide. By 1800 all but five had left Tahiti. One missionary who had landed in the Marquesas had also left without making any converts.

When Pomare died in 1803, his name passed to his son, who was referred to by Europeans as Pomare II. A drunken despot whose depredations earned him the hostility of chiefs and commoners alike, Pomare II sought to conquer all Tahiti in 1807. He was at first successful, but in 1808 the other chiefs combined against him and forced him to flee to the neighboring island of

Moorea. By this time the fortunes of the remaining missionaries were also at a low ebb, and they were obliged to leave Tahiti. By 1809 practically all had quit the islands in deep discouragement.

Pomare II's misfortunes had apparently induced in him something of a theological crisis. Despite his sacrifices to Oro, his enemies had been able to defeat him, and the ruler began to think that the Christian God might make a more effective supernatural patron. In 1812 he suddenly announced his intention to become a Christian and asked one of the remaining missionaries to baptize him. Most of his subjects on Moorea followed his example. Three years later Pomare II, now a Christian "king," sent his troops back to Tahiti, where they defeated his pagan adversaries, rendering him ruler of all Tahiti and some of the outlying islands.

Under Pomare II's rule, the missionaries brought about a kind of cultural revolution. The Ten Commandments were made the legal basis of the government, and the Sabbath was strictly observed. Supernatural images (tiki) and other objects sacred to the old religion were burned, and the temple enclosures were forsaken. Except for hymn singing, the missionaries banned all singing, a pastime that had been dear to the old Tahitians. Men wore castoff European clothes and women "Mother Hubbards"—long garments that reached from the neck to the ankles and combined modesty with discomfort. The missionaries established a kind of "morality police," which surveyed the population to root out instances of drunkenness, game playing, dancing, or sex outside the bounds of Christian marriage, an institution the Tahitians only imperfectly understood.

Although the missionaries are accused of having ruined an earthly Eden with their stern Calvinist moralism, the old society was dying even before the first Protestant missionaries arrived in the islands in 1797. The best estimate of Tahiti's population before the coming of the Europeans is 40,000. By the end of the eighteenth century, it had declined to around 16,000 and by the mid-nineteenth century had reached a low of 8,000 (excluding Europeans). The Polynesians had developed few immunities to the diseases carried by European sailors, and the population was ravaged by smallpox, scarlet fever, measles, dysentery, influenza, and venereal infections. Rum and other strong drink contributed to rapid social disintegration. The Marquesas were a popular stopping-over place for whaling ships—which had notoriously undisciplined crews—and the population there had declined from 30,000 to around 4,000 by the end of the nineteenth century.

The islands were gradually drawn into the world economy

during the first half of the nineteenth century. Salt pork was exported to the newly established British penal colony in Australia; other products included coconut oil, pearls, mother-of-pearl, sandalwood, and arrowroot flour. Local chiefs became involved in this trade. Fortunately for the Polynesians, no serious attempt was made by outsiders to set up a large-scale plantation economy such as that which developed in Hawaii and led to the large-scale expropriation of native lands. Decimation of the population left the survivors with ample land on which they could carry out subsistence farming and grow cash crops, such as citrus fruit, vanilla, and coconuts, on small plots.

Pomare II died in 1821, and his infant son, Pomare III, lived only until 1824. The next ruler was Pomare II's sister, who assumed the throne as Queen Pomare IV. During this period the missionaries remained in a dominant position, one of them, George Pritchard, serving not only as adviser to the queen but also as British consul. A royal palace was built at Papeete west of Matavai Bay, and that settlement soon developed into a modern seaport complete with brothels and bars for transient sailors and churches for local believers.

French Catholic missionaries came to the islands in 1836, and Pritchard, sensing a challenge to Protestant—and British—influence, persuaded the queen to have them expelled. France at this time saw itself as the patron of Catholic missionary activities abroad and sent a warship to Papeete harbor in 1838 to demand reparations. Pritchard in turn made urgent requests that Britain annex Tahiti. In 1842 French rear admiral Abel Aubert Dupetit-Thouars, on orders from the French government, took possession of the Marquesas and then sailed to Papeete, where he forced Queen Pomare to sign an agreement making her country a protectorate of France. At Pritchard's urging she renounced the agreement a year later, whereupon French troops occupied Papeete, and she fled to the safety of a British warship. The British government, however, did not wish to go to war over such a remote and economically unpromisiing group of islands and accepted the French annexation. A determined resistance by Tahitian chiefs and their subjects continued until 1847, when the queen finally accepted the status of a ruler "protected" by the French.

French Colonial Rule

Queen Pomare died in 1877. Three years later her son, Pomare V, abdicated, and his kingdom became a colony ruled directly by France. Through the protectorate and early colonial

periods, French power was extended from Tahiti and the Marquesas, which served as a naval station, to the other island groups that form present-day French Polynesia. One consequence of French rule was the decline, but not the disappearance, of British Protestant influence as Catholic missionaries came in increasing numbers.

During and after the imposition of French influence and control, a number of Western authors were inspired to write of the beauties of the islands and romanticize the traditional way of life. These included Herman Melville, whose semifictional work *Typee* describes his adventures among the Marquesas Islanders of Nukuhiva; in *Omoo* he related his experiences on Tahiti at the time of the French takeover. Others included Scottish novelist Robert Louis Stevenson, French writer Julien Viaud (Pierre Loti), and British poet Rupert Brooke. Paul Gauguin, who had abandoned the staid life of a Paris stockbroker to become a painter, came to Tahiti in 1891. Although best known for his remarkable depictions on canvas of the Polynesian people, he also wrote a book about Polynesia, *Noa Noa*, and wrote weekly articles for a Papeete newspaper criticizing the hypocrisy of French rule and the government's lack of interest in the people's welfare.

A new society was developing, principally in Papeete but also in the rural districts of Tahiti and in the other islands. Chinese immigrants had been brought to Tahiti in the 1860s to work as laborers on cotton plantations that were set up to exploit world cotton shortages during the American Civil War, but these enterprises went bankrupt after 1865. Some of the Chinese workers stayed on and, joined by later groups of compatriots, came to occupy an important role in the island economy as shopkeepers and moneylenders. By World War II they numbered more than 5,000. Although Chinese intermarried with Polynesians, their community remained quite distinct and supported Chinese schools and associations that preserved close ties with the home country.

The old system of local chiefs had largely disappeared by the late nineteenth century. Colonial society consisted of a small group of French officials, military officers, and businessmen at the apex. Below that were other Europeans, the Chinese, a population of persons of mixed European and Tahitian parentage, and the indigenous people.

The islands, known as French Oceania, remained outside the mainstream of world events through the first decades of the twentieth century. However, a contingent of Polynesian soldiers served in the Pacific Battalion of the French army in France and

the Balkans during World War I, and Papeete was damaged by shelling from German cruisers in 1914.

Although the colonial administration was subordinate to the collaborationist regime of Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain following the fall of France in June 1940, the local population supported the Free French movement of General Charles de Gaulle and forced the resignation of the pro-Vichy governor. A new Pacific Battalion was organized to fight on the Allied side. The Japanese, in their attempt to seize control of the South Pacific, never threatened Tahiti and the other islands of what is now French Polynesia, but the island of Bora Bora in the Leeward group of the Society Islands was used as a base for United States military forces and as a staging area to send men and equipment westward to the front.

The Postwar Period

French colonial domination of the political system and the general breakdown of traditional Polynesian institutions precluded the development of strong political movements among Polynesians before World War II. Popular affection for the memory of the independent Tahitian kingdom under the Pomares and discontent with French rule, however, were strong. In 1947 Marcel Pouvanaa a Oopa, a World War I veteran who had led national revival movements between the wars, established the Pouvanaa Committee, later known as the Tahitian People's Democratic Party, to demand a greater measure of self-government for the indigenous people. In April 1958, on the eve of elections held in all French overseas possessions to determine whether they would remain in association with France, Pouvanaa a Oopa campaigned for full independence. Sixty-four percent of the electorate, however, chose to retain the islands' status as a French overseas territory in which a measure of local power was vested in a popularly elected legislature. Shortly after the referendum Pouvanaa a Oopa and some of his followers were arrested on charges of attempted murder and arson, and he was exiled to France.

Pouvanaa a Oopa's associates, Francis Sanford and John Teariki, carried on the struggle for greater political rights, and in 1977 the French government granted a new statute giving the overseas territory a larger measure of autonomy. Pouvanaa a Oopa had returned to the islands in 1968 and served as French Polynesia's representative to the French Senate between 1971 and his death in 1977.

One development of importance for society in French

Town of Papeete
Courtesy Tahiti
Tourist Promotion Board
Tini Colombel

Polynesia in the postwar period was the promotion of tourism. In 1960 an international airport capable of handling jet airliners was built at Faaa, near Papeete, and during the following two decades a system of international hotels and resorts was established. By the late 1970s more than 90,000 tourists a year on average were visiting Tahiti and the outer islands, providing considerable employment in the service sector of the local economy.

A development of even greater significance was the French government's decision to establish the Pacific Test Center on the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa in the Tuamotu group. In the period between 1966, when the facility was opened, and 1974, when atmospheric testing was halted, France exploded 41 nuclear bombs at the site. Because of strong protests from countries in the Pacific region, such as New Zealand, Fiji, and Australia, nuclear tests were limited to underground explosions after 1974. Critics have charged that nuclear fallout and seepage from the underground test site have contaminated the environment and caused an increased incidence of cancer and other illnesses among French Polnyesia's inhabitants (see The Nuclear Issue, ch. 5). For most Polynesians, however, the most visible effects of the test center have been economic, stimulating further rapid expan-

sion of the service sector—largely at the expense of agriculture—and leading to increased salaries and changed living standards.

The Social System

The population of French Polynesia experienced an average annual growth rate of 2.1 percent in the 1975–80 period. The rate of growth has been slowing since the 1965–70 period, when it attained a post-World War II high of 4.1 percent average annual increase. The 1977 census revealed that 53 percent of the population was below 20 years of age.

The population is concentrated in and around the territorial capital of Papeete on the island of Tahiti. Papeete and environs (including the townships of Faaa and Pirae) had a population of approximately 85,000 in 1983, or 54 percent of the total. In 1981 the population of the Windward group, including Tahiti, was 101,401 (68.1 percent of the total). The Leeward group had 25,042 (16.8 percent of the total), the Marquesas 6,116 (4.1 percent), the Austral Islands 5,628 (3.8 percent), and the Tuamotu Archipelago and the Mangareva Islands 10,768 (7.2 percent). At that time the average number of persons per square kilometer in the territory was 37, ranging from 84 per square kilometer in the Windwards to eight persons per square kilometer in the Marquesas.

Ethnic Differentiation and Social Structure

At the time of the 1977 census, there were 15,338 Europeans resident in French Polynesia, or 11.2 percent of the total population. Estimates for 1983 place the number at approximately 25,000. Europeans lived primarily in urban areas, although a small number could be found in almost every outlying community. Many were men married to Polynesian women. A substantial number of the Europeans were French civil servants or military personnel sent to the territory for specified tours of duty. Others were permanent residents, including families who have lived in the islands for two or more generations. Most Europeans, however, came to the islands during the 1960s and 1970s.

The Asian community, practically all Chinese, numbered 7,356 in 1977, or 5.4 percent of the total population. They were estimated to number 12,000 in 1983. The Chinese have retained a virtual monopoly on retail trade. Although the large majority lived in Papeete, most rural communities had a general store run by a Chinese family. A few Chinese continued to cultivate cash crops, such as vanilla or garden vegetables, owning as much as 15

percent of the territory's arable land. Often they leased plots to other cultivators.

The degree of Westernization of the indigenous Polynesians of the territory varied, a phenomenon that was explicitly recognized by the people themselves and was reflected in census statistics. In 1977 about 23,700 people (17.2 percent of the population) classified themselves as *demis*, meaning persons of half-European extraction. The remainder of the indigenous population regarded themselves as *maohi*, or traditional Polynesians. In 1977 they numbered 90,160 persons (65.6 percent of the population).

The distinction between *demis* and *maohi* is to some extent an ethnic classification in that the *demis* are assumed to be of part European descent. Multiethnic ancestry, however, has been highly prevalent in French Polynesia for almost two centuries, and many persons regarded by themselves and others as unambiguously Polynesian have some European ancestry. Differentiation between *demi* and *maohi* categories is not clear-cut, and French government officials in charge of compiling the 1977 census confessed that in many cases the people themselves could not make a clear distinction. In general, however, compared with *maohi*, *demis* have more modern skills, more years of schooling, and higher incomes. They are also more comfortable speaking French and have pursued a standard of living that more closely approximates that of Europeans.

The cutoff point along the scale of Westernization that determines whether a person is *demi* or *maohi* is a matter of individual judgment, and the criteria keep changing as the entire indigenous population becomes progressively Westernized. As of mid-1984 the *demis* filled the lesser administration posts, were well represented in the Territorial Assembly, operated business enterprises and plantations, and filled some professional and many clerical and skilled labor jobs. The *maohis* were characteristically wage earners or cash croppers who supplemented their livelihood by subsistence farming or fishing. They formed the great majority of the rural and the outlying island population.

Few traces remained of traditional Polynesian social organization and its hierarchical distinctions between chiefs, lesser chiefs, and commoners. Within some indigenous communities where the London Missionary Society had been active, village social organization patterns derived from mission institutions have survived. In particular, the *pupu*, a subdivision of the mission parish for purposes of Bible reading and carrying out church activities, has developed into a meaningful unit for community organization in secular areas as well.

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The children of Polynesian and Chinese parents formed a group distinct from the *demis*. There were also small numbers of people whose origins can be traced to other parts of the Pacific, including Wallis and Futuna, Fiji, and Western Samoa, as well as Africans and people from French possessions in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean.

Political and economic power and the social position that derived from it tended to correlate with ethnic and cultural identification. The Europeans, the most Westernized Chinese, and the *demis* were generally in the higher echelons of a modernized, urban society, and the least Westernized Polynesians formed the base of the society. There was some reluctance on the part of tradition-minded Polynesians to emulate the others, whom they regarded as rich and powerful but lacking in the highly valued qualities of generosity and conscientious reciprocity. The infusion of tourist and French government money into the island economy, however, has tended to make these values less important to the younger generation.

French is the official language of the territory, used in administration and taught in the school system. The mutually intelligible indigenous languages of the different island groups are dialects of Polynesian. The dialect of Tahiti reflects that island's past association with British sea captains, missionaries, and mercenaries. Many words, such as the greeting *ia orana* (your honor) and the term for a local leader, *tavana* (governor), are derived from English.

Religion, Health, and Education

Although traditional religious beliefs largely died out during the nineteenth century, they have retained a certain minimal influence in contemporary Polynesian culture. From 1823 to 1835 the Mamaia sect, combining traditional religious themes with those borrowed from Christianity, gained adherents on Tahiti because its leader promised the expulsion of Europeans. Since then, however, indigenous religious movements have had very limited influence. The two largest religious communities in the territory were the Evangelical church of French Polynesia, having 45,000 members in 1980, and the Roman Catholic church, having 36,000 members. The Evangelical church traced its origins to the London Missionary Society. After the imposition of French colonial rule, however, its congregations were taken over by French Protestant missionaries. Smaller religious groups included Pentecostalists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mor-

mons. Folk religions combining Taoist, Confucianist, and Buddhist themes were practiced by some Chinese people.

The French government maintained a system of hospitals and clinics throughout the territory, and military physicians attached to the Pacific Test Center assisted in medical emergencies. In 1947 the Louis Malarde Institute for Medical Research was established in Papeete to conduct research into endemic diseases and such health hazards as toxicity in certain species of fish found in local waters. Tuberculosis, dengue fever, and elephantiasis remained problems but have been largely brought under control. Life expectancy, according to the 1977 census, was 60 years for males and 63 years for females.

The French government has published reports asserting that the nuclear tests carried out by the Pacific Test Center posed no health hazard to the inhabitants of French Polynesia or the neighboring islands. Critics both inside and outside the territory, however, have alleged that the incidence of certain varieties of cancer can be linked to the tests and have recommended that they be halted before the fracturing of the geological structure of Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls causes large quantities of radioactive material to contaminate the ocean and the fish that form an important part of the local food supply.

There was both a state- and a church-run system of primary and secondary education. Primary schools received support from the territory, while secondary schools were financed by the French government. In the early 1980s education was compulsory to age 14 and free in government schools. The school system was organized in a manner similar to that of metropolitan France, having five years of elementary education, four years of lower secondary school, and a division of upper secondary school into academic and vocational or technical tracks. More than 200 scholarship students pursued university courses in France in 1984, there being no university in French Polynesia as of mid-1984. The proportion of literate persons above age 15, according to the 1977 census, was 98 percent.

The Economy

Beginning in the early 1960s French Polynesia's economy was transformed from one in which agriculture accounted for the major portion of GDP and employment to one in which services have become the most important area of economic activity. In 1962 agriculture and fishing employed 46 percent of the labor force, and services, including public administration, employed 35

percent. By 1977 the proportion was 18 percent and 64 percent, respectively, industrial activities employing 19 percent. By 1976 agriculture and fishing contributed only 4 percent to total GDP. Nonadministrative services contributed 47 percent of GDP, industrial activity 17 percent, and public administration 32 percent.

The islands' status as an overseas territory of France has been a primary factor in economic development. The metropolitan French government has provided French Polynesia with social services, including support for the territory's secondary schools, grants for capital investment, and direct subsidies to the territorial budget. The presence of substantial numbers of French civil servants and military personnel and the requirements of the Pacific Test Center have stimulated considerable economic growth. The most spectacular growth was during the 1960–70 period, when GDP quadrupled and average wages increased twelvefold. In 1980 per capita income for the territory was US$6,780, significantly higher than that of neighboring island groups.

Although the urban areas of the territory in and around Papeete have been most deeply affected, changes in living standards could also be perceived in rural and outlying areas. Traditional outrigger canoes have been replaced by motor launches, thatched dwellings by houses made of imported materials such as tin for roofing, and customary staples such as breadfruit, bananas, and fish by a Western-style diet. The rapid depletion of fish in the lagoons and inland bodies of water led one local leader to suggest during the 1960s that it would not be long before people would have to subsist primarily on imported canned goods. By the early 1980s about 85 percent of all food consumed in the territory was imported. Trucks that had been converted into buses continued to provide cheap public transport, but the demand for imported oil increased as ownership of private vehicles, both motorcycles and automobiles, grew sharply.

Critics have charged the French government with fostering the growth of a superficially modern economy that was excessively dependent on imports, subsidies from France, and the uncertainties of international tourism. The French government, in turn, has stressed the importance of developing the productive sectors of the economy in its economic planning. Huge trade deficits have been common. In 1980 imports totaled CFPF42 billion and exports CFPF2.3 billion (for value of the CFP franc—see Glossary). Two years later imports had grown to CFPF62.3 billion, while exports were only CFPF3.3 billion. Principal exports were copra, oil, and cultured pearls. Dependence on imports and

the difficulty of transporting goods to far-flung islands have con-
tributed to high inflation. Observers believed in mid-1983 that
the official figure of 15 percent a year was greatly understated.

The Service Economy

Government establishments, particularly the Pacific Test
Center, and tourism were the most important components of the
economy in terms of revenues generated. According to official
statistics, the test center accounted for CFPF2.7 billion in cus-
toms duties and employed over 3,000 local workers in 1981 at its
installations on Tahiti and in the Tuamotus. The metropolitan
government also paid a sum, equivalent to around US$30 million
annually, to the territory for the use of the test facilities. Employ-
ees of the test center from metropolitan France, customarily paid
high salaries and allowances, have stimulated the local economy,
although some observers have pointed out that many of the newly
created jobs in the territorial economy were taken by immigrants
from metropolitan France.

French Polynesia's natural beauty and reputation for hospi-
tality have made it a prime tourist destination. A number of large
hotels have been built in and around Papeete, as have resorts in
more unspoiled parts of the territory. The number of tourists, av-
eraging between 90,000 and 100,000 a year between 1977 and
1981, grew to 114,000 in 1982, and income from the tourist sector
in that year was US$66 million. The hotels and resorts employed
an unspecified number of local workers, although most of the op-
erations serving tourists were managed by expatriate French or
foreigners.

Agriculture and Manufacturing

The most important commercial crop was coconuts. Al-
though a portion was consumed domestically as food or made into
soap, oil, or cattle feed, the major part was exported as copra or
oil. Large areas on the islands and, in some instances, entire atolls
were planted in coconut trees. Production was mostly on
smallholdings; few large-scale plantations were in operation in
the early 1980s. Some 50,000 hectares, however, or more than 13
percent of the total land area, were planted in coconut trees in
1982. The devastating series of tropical storms that struck the is-
lands in the first months of 1983 destroyed a large number of
trees.

Prices for copra and copra oil exported from the islands have

been unstable, dependent in large part on the output of the world's largest producers—Indonesia and the Philippines—and on uncertain markets in importer countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Between 1977 and 1981 the price for a kilogram of copra varied from CFPF1.66 to CFPF3.35 and for a kilogram of copra oil produced at local refineries, between CFPF2.40 and CFPF5.27.

Vanilla was grown on numerous islands by families, many of whom were Chinese. Because of the careful and time-consuming effort required to grow the plant and process beans for shipment, vanilla did not lend itself to large-scale planting. Between 1977 and 1981 total vanilla production declined from 29 to 13 tons of green, unprocessed vanilla and from nine to one ton of black, prepared vanilla beans. In 1982 the totals were 13 tons and 3.8 tons, respectively.

Other primary products included coffee, vegetables, and fruits for domestic consumption. Livestock were also raised, particularly in the Marquesas, where there was adequate pasturage.

Fishing by indigenous Polynesians has remained a domestic enterprise carried on for the local market or as a supplement to individual food supplies. Aquaculture projects, particularly the raising of freshwater prawns, have been carried out on an experimental basis. Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese fishing fleets were authorized in the early 1980s to operate in the territorial waters of French Polynesia, extracting 2,153 tons of fish in 1982. Black cultured pearls were raised in beds around the islands of Bora Bora and Manihi; more than 32,000 grams were exported in 1982, worth CFPF98.7 million.

Phosphates, mined on Makatea Island, were the only significant mineral resource in French Polynesia, but the deposits were exhausted in 1966, and the mine was closed down. Over the long term the government's National Marine Research Center and private firms have drawn up plans to recover mineral resources from the seabed, including nickel, cobalt, managanese, and copper nodules located at a depth of over 4,000 meters.

All manufacturing was for local consumption or for the satisfaction of tourists. Industries included textiles, food processing, breweries, and handicrafts, all on a small scale. The construction sector has grown with the building of installations for the Pacific Test Center and other government facilities and tourist hotels.

There were in the early 1980s about 750 kilometers of surfaced roads in the territory, principally located along the coastlines of islands. The principal port was Papeete, which had a harbor protected by a 1,500-meter seawall built on the adjacent

Marketplace in Papeete
Courtesy Tahiti Tourist Promotion Board

coral reef. The international airport at Faaa, five kilometers from Papeete, had a runway of 3,900 meters and was capable of handling wide-bodied jets. There were 26 other commercial airports handling domestic air traffic in the territory.

The Political System and Security

In early 1984 the people of French Polynesia were French citizens. Adults of both sexes had the right to vote for two deputies to the French National Assembly and a member of the Senate. French Polynesia also sent a representative to serve on the metropolitan government's Economic and Social Council, a consultative body that gave its opinion on government bills from the perspective of its members' occupational expertise.

French Polynesia's government institutions in early 1984 were defined in accordance with a revised territorial statute enacted by the French metropolitan government in 1977. Designed to give the territory enhanced autonomy, the statute granted augmented powers to the locally elected Territorial As-

sembly and the seven-member Council of Government, which was similar in function to a cabinet.

In 1984 the Territorial Assembly had 30 members, who were elected by popular vote in 1982 to serve a five-year term. Citizens over 23 years of age and in full possession of their civil rights were eligible to run. The Territorial Assembly was responsible for selecting the Council of Government, except for that body's non-voting president, who was appointed by the metropolitan government. The Council of Government could be dissolved by a vote of censure in the Territorial Assembly, but the Council of Ministers in Paris retained the power to dissolve the Territorial Assembly.

The metropolitan government retained responsibility in such areas as foreign affairs, defense, monetary policy, and justice. Local matters, such as primary education, public works, and land policy, fell within the jurisdiction of the Territorial Assembly, which was also consulted by the high commissioner on budgetary matters. A consultative body, the Economic and Social Committee (analogous to the French government's Economic and Social Council), provided additional advice on matters relating to the occupational groups its members represented.

The territory was divided into five administrative subdivisions that corresponded to the major island groups. District officers, appointed by the high commissioner, were in charge of administration in all subdivisions, which were further subdivided into townships (communes). In the late 1970s there were 48 townships, each having a mayor, a township or municipal council, and a local administration. Census figures for 1977 revealed that the townships varied in size from Papeete, having 22,967 inhabitants, to Pukapuka, having 95 inhabitants.

The administration of justice followed standard French practice and procedures. The secretary of state for overseas departments and territories of the metropolitan government appointed the principal officers of the courts and the presidents of the Court of Appeal, the Court of First Instance, and the Civil Court. The secretary also appointed the chief of the Judiciary Service (the attorney general) and the magistrates.

Political Groups

In contrast to New Caledonia, France's other major Pacific territory, strong sentiments for full independence were lacking in French Polynesia during the early 1980s. The call for self-rule voiced by Pouvanaa a Oopa in the late 1950s did not sustain a popularly based political movement through the following decades.

Various historical factors contributed to a relative lack of political activism. Despite the cultural and demographic calamities that accompanied the establishment of European influence and control in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, relations between Polynesians and Europeans were generally peaceful. The *demi* population served as a social and cultural bridge between the two communities, and the *maohi* were not deprived of their lands by aggressive European settlers as had been the case in New Caledonia. Moreover, economic dependence on France, particuarly the income derived from the Pacific Test Center, persuaded many that full independence would result in a drastic decline in the standard of living. A local observer suggested that out of a population of 156,000 only around 500 persons were politically active in late 1983. Although apprehensions over the threat of radioactive degradation of the environment were widespread, this was a less urgent issue for most of the islands' inhabitants than was the Pacific Test Center's contribution to the economy. At public ceremonies the red and white flag of the Pomares' independent Tahitian kingdom flew alongside, rather than in place of, the French tricolor.

Political parties were largely personal followings, although the Tahoeraa Huiratira party of Gaston Flosse had ideological affinities with the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République) in France. The party has modified its platform of continued close associaton with France and in mid-1984 favored limited autonomy. In the Territorial Assembly election held in May 1982, it won 13 out of the 30 seats contested and 30 percent of the popular vote. In mid-1984 the party maintained a ruling coalition within the Territorial Assembly with the Pupu Here Aia Te Nunaa Ia Ora party of John Teariki, which had six seats in the legislature. Teariki had proposed in 1978 an orderly transition to independence but in September 1982 joined Flosse in issuing a joint statement declaring that an "evolution of the territory's status" and a "programme of economic and social development" were necessary, implying a continued association with France. The coalition chose Flosse to serve as vice president of the Council of Government.

The May 1982 elections represented a victory for political figures advocating continued association with France. The previous ruling coalition, the United Front for Internal Autonomy (Front Uni pour l'Autonomie Interne), including the Pupu Here Aia Te Nunaa Ia Ora party, the Te E'a Api (United Front) party of Francis Sanford, and the Social Democratic Movement (Mouvement Social-Démocrate—MSD), had proposed substantial inter-

nal self-government approaching full independence. Sanford's party won only one seat and the MSD, none. Other parties represented in the Territorial Assembly included the Ai'a Api (New Land) party, having three seats; the Marxist, pro-independence Ia Mana Te Nunaa party, three seats; and the Taatiraa Polynesia party, one seat.

In the early 1980s extremist groups remained on the periphery of political life and had committed only sporadic acts of violence against the French administration or persons perceived to be associated with continuing French rule. A terrorist group, Te Toto Tupana (The Ancestors' Blood), was implicated in the murder of a French business leader and the bombing of a post office in Papeete in 1977. Two years later seven alleged members of this group were given prison sentences, although these were overturned by the Court of Appeal because of procedural irregularities. One of the suspects, Charlie Ching, headed Te Taata Tahiti Tiama, a radical party committed to immediate independence. In August 1982 Mai Tetua established himself as president of a "Maohi Republic Provisional Government" but was arrested by the authorities along with 40 of his followers after they had abducted and briefly held two local police officers.

A New Autonomy Statute

In December 1982 the French government proposed a new statute for French Polynesia that would give local elected officials a greater measure of control over territorial affairs. The plan was submitted to the Territorial Assembly for advice on how it could be best modified to suit local conditions. A basic institutional change would be the establishment of a "territorial government" headed by a president who would be elected by the Territorial Assembly and have the power to appoint and dismiss members of the Council of Government. The high commissioner's responsibilities would be reduced to serving as head of the national civil service in the territory and overseer of the legality of government enactments. Other proposals associated with the new autonomy statute included granting the territorial government the power to authorize foreign investments up to a sum of CFPF1 billion, exploit the territory's 200-nautical-mile EEZ (though the French state would retain ultimate ownership), take a part in new negotiations for air and sea links to French Polynesia, and set up a territorial lending authority. Another measure would empower the territory to enter into cultural, technical, and economic agreements with neighboring countries in the Pacific region, subject to

approval by the metropolitan government. The territory would also assume control of secondary education within a five-year period.

In September 1983 the Territorial Assembly voted to approve the autonomy statute but posed a number of serious reservations pending further negotiation. These were related to issues such as control of the EEZ, foreign affairs, and the territory's right to impose restrictions on immigration from France. Serious crimes involving persons having criminal records in France had brought the immigration issue to public attention.

Critics pointed out that the autonomy statute was still restrictive when compared, for instance, with the free association agreement worked out between Cook Islands and New Zealand or those being negotiated between the United States and the island polities of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The statute left extensive powers in the hands of the high commissioner as representative of the French republic and its interests. Some observers suggested that France's determination to maintain the nuclear testing facility necessitated, in its view, substantial limits on territorial self-government.

In early 1982 France maintained about 5,000 military personnel in French Polynesia, chiefly connected with the nuclear testing facilities. An interservice command comprised army, navy, and air force contingents.

The French National Gendarmerie maintained a single division in the territory. It was composed of 22 units, each comprising between four and 15 men. The gendarmerie was organized along military lines, strictly disciplined, and highly mobile. Most of its personnel, including all officers and noncommissioned officers and most of the lower ranks, were recruited and trained in France. However, vacancies may have been filled by inducting local personnel. In addition to the gendarmerie, the townships organized local police forces.

NIUE

Previous Name	Nieue, Savage Island
Political Status	Self-governing, in free association with New Zealand
Capital	Alofi
Population	Under 3,000 (1984 midyear estimate)
Land Area	258 square kilometers
Currency	New Zealand dollar ($NZ)

Niue (pronounced Nee-u-ay) is one of the world's largest coral islands, having a circumference of 58 kilometers. The topography has been likened to an inverted soup plate. In the interior lies a plateau, slightly depressed in the center, giving way rather abruptly to a slope running to the coast. The coast is formed by steep limestone cliffs that make landing difficult. A fringing coral reef surrounds the island. Primary forests, including stands of banyan, Tahitian chestnut, and *kafika* trees, cover approximately one-fifth of the land area, while much of the remaining area is covered by secondary growth. There are no rivers or streams, owing to the porous nature of the predominantly limestone soil, but fresh water is obtained from artesian wells. Caves and blowholes are found in abundance.

Niue, a solitary island, is located due west of the Cook Islands and east of Tonga. Its sea area, defined by a 200-nautical-mile EEZ (see Glossary), is 390,000 square kilometers. The indigenous people are Polynesians, who arrived on the island from the Samoa Islands as early as the ninth or tenth centuries A.D. and from Tonga around the sixteenth century. The Niuean language has affinities to both Tongan and Samoan. Captain Cook landed on Niue in 1774, naming it Savage Island in recognition of the people's fierce behavior. After unsuccessful attempts to land preachers on the island in 1830 and 1842, the London Missionary Society succeeded in establishing a mission headed by a Niuean convert in 1846. By the mid-nineteenth century several hundred people had been converted to Christianity, and traditional beliefs were waning.

During the 1860s blackbirders and Peruvian slave traders seeking laborers for plantations on other islands kidnapped a number of Niuean men and women. In 1876 Mataio Tuitonga was chosen king of the island. His successor, Fataaiki, requested the establishment of a British protectorate, which was granted in 1900. The next year Niue was annexed to New Zealand and became administratively a part of the Cook Islands. In 1960 an island assembly was established. In October 1974 New Zealand granted the island self-government.

The population at the time of the 1979 "mini-census" was 3,578—1,823 males and 1,755 females. By 1984 it was estimated to have declined to under 3,000, largely as a result of migration to New Zealand, where approximately 5,600 Niueans lived in the early 1980s. The main center of population was the island administrative complex of Alofi, having 960 persons in 1979. The nonindigenous population at that time, comprising Europeans and Polynesians from other islands, was 244.

Most Niueans were Congregationalists belonging to the Church of Niue founded by the London Missionary Society, although there were smaller communities of Roman Catholics, Seventh-Day Adventists, and members of the Church of God in Jerusalem. Primary- and secondary-level education was provided by the government and was compulsory between the ages of five and 14.

The economy has remained stagnant in large part owing to the lack of land and resources and to the migration of the most active members of the population to New Zealand. About 200 square kilometers of the island were considered arable, and principal crops in mid-1984 were fruits (especially limes, papaw, and passion fruit) and copra. Other primary products included honey and reconstituted milk. Exports went to New Zealand but on average earned only one-tenth the amount spent on imports during the late 1970s and early 1980s. More than four-fifths of the labor force was employed in government jobs and paid from subsidies made by the New Zealand government. An important source of revenue for the government was the sale of postage stamps.

There were approximately 128 kilometers of all-weather roads on Niue and 106 kilometers of supplementary roads in the mid-1980s. Port facilities were at Alofi. Hanan International Airport, having a runway of 1,650 meters, was located three kilometers to the south.

The 1974 Constitution granted Niue self-government, though New Zealand remained responsible for foreign relations and defense, and a special New Zealand representative was

posted in the territory. Niueans are New Zealand citizens. The Legislative Assembly in mid-1984 contained 20 members. Fourteen of these were elected from each of the island's 14 villages and six from a common roll. The assembly chose the government, consisting of a premier and three other cabinet ministers. Local government was the responsibility of the 14 village councils. The judiciary system was integrated with that of New Zealand and the chief justice, who established the High Court when he arrived, and the Land Court judge visited Niue once every three months. In their absence, judicial authority was vested in a commissioner and justices of the peace.

PITCAIRN ISLANDS

Official Name	Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie, and Oeno Islands
Political Status	Colony of Britain
Capital	Adamstown
Population	45 (1983)
Land Area	36.5 square kilometers

Pitcairn Islands, in mid-1984 the only British colony remaining in the Pacific, is located to the east of the Mangareva Islands in French Polynesia. Pitcairn Island, the only inhabited island in 1984, is a volcanic formation having steep elevations, a rocky and cliff-formed coastline, and no fringing coral reef. Its area is five square kilometers. The volcanic soil is poorly formed, allowing only subsistence cultivation for a small population. Henderson Island (Elizabeth), 30 square kilometers in area, is an uplifted coral formation, while Ducie and Oeno islands are very small, low, coral atolls. The three uninhabited islands are arrayed along a roughly east-west axis approximately 600 kilometers in length, while Pitcairn is located about 150 kilometers southeast of Oeno, the westernmost island.

There are traces of pre-European human habitation on Pitcairn Island, including tombs, rock drawings, stone tools, and breadfruit and coconut trees that earlier residents brought to provide food. However, the island was uninhabited when it was first discovered by the British in 1767. Except for a handful of latecomers, the people of Pitcairn are descended from the crew members of the H.M.S. *Bounty* who mutinied against its master, Lieutenant William Bligh in April 1789, as well as from Polynesians brought by the mutineers from Tahiti. Bligh had come to Tahiti to gather breadfruit trees, part of an ultimately unsuccessful plan to make this the staple food of African slaves on British plantations in the West Indies. The *Bounty* laid over several months at that island, and the mutiny, depicted numerous times in narrative and on film, was apparently the result of Bligh's attempts to impose a minimum of discipline on sailors besotted with Tahiti's earthy delights once the *Bounty* returned to sea. Fletcher Christian, Bligh's first mate, and 17 crew members seized the ship, set Bligh and loyal crew members adrift, and returned to Tahiti. Bligh and

the others eventually reached the island of Timor in what is now Indonesia after crossing 5,820 kilometers in an open boat. Christian and eight other mutineers, accompanied by 19 Polynesians, then departed Tahiti in search of a permanent home. After visiting several other islands, they chose Pitcairn, hoping that its isolation, the fact that it was mismarked on navigation charts of the period, and the inaccessibility of its high-cliff coasts would provide protection against the British navy, which was sure to pursue them.

Although the mutineers longed for an easygoing Polynesian style of life, the early years of the settlement were marked by demoralization, jealousy, and murderous violence. By 1800 only one of the original mutineers was still alive. There were, however, nine Polynesian women and 19 children. By the mid-nineteenth century, their descendants had grown to around 200, and the British government proposed moving the entire population to the larger and more fertile Norfolk Island, lying to the northwest of New Zealand. This was accomplished in 1856. By 1864, however, 43 persons, homesick for Pitcairn, had returned to that island. In 1883 the entire population on Pitcairn became Seventh-Day Adventists, forswearing alcohol and pork and celebrating their Sabbath on Saturdays.

Although the twentieth century has witnessed the introduction of conveniences such as electricity and radio communication to the island, life for its people in the early 1980s remained simple. Rough seas and jagged coasts, as much as geographic distance, isolate Pitcairn. During 1983 severe storms made it almost impossible for ships to unload supplies upon which the people were dependent. There was no airfield, although equipment had been dropped by parachute to the island by the Royal New Zealand Air Force.

The population has been slowly declining as families departed for Norfolk Island, a territory of Australia, or New Zealand, falling from 65 persons in 1976 to 45 in 1983. The only settlement was Adamstown, located on the cliff tops above Bounty Bay. Subsistence agriculture and fishing were practiced, although the settlement could not survive without supplies brought in by ship. Social life revolved around families and the Seventh-Day Adventist church. The people speak English as well as their own special dialect, which is a blend of English and Tahitian. Most carried the surnames of the original mutineers, such as Christian and Young. Barter, rather than the exchange of currency, was prevalent.

As a British colony, Pitcairn Islands in mid-1984 was under the authority of the British high commissioner in New Zealand,

who acted as the colony's governor. Internal affairs were the responsibility of an island council consisting of an island magistrate and nine other members.

TOKELAU

Previous Name	Union Islands; Tokelau Islands
Political Status	Territory of New Zealand
Capital	None, but is administered from the Office of Tokelau Affairs based in Apia, Western Samoa
Population	1,572 (1981)
Land Area	10 square kilometers
Currency	New Zealand dollar ($NZ); Western Samoan tala also circulated
Major Islands	Atafu, Nukunonu, Fakaofo

Tokelau, a territory of New Zealand, is located north of the Samoa Islands and east of Tuvalu. It consists of three coral atolls strung along a northwest-southeast axis lying across approximately 200 kilometers of ocean. Nukunonu, the largest atoll, has an area of 5.4 square kilometers, while Fakaofo and Atafu have 2.9 and 2 square kilometers, respectively. On December 2, 1980, the governments of the United States and New Zealand signed the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Tokelau and the United States. One provision of this treaty was the United States renunciation of any claim to the three atolls. The sea area, defined by the EEZ (see Glossary) of 200 nautical miles, is 290,000 square kilometers.

Little is known of the origins of the indigenous Polynesian people, although local traditions point to migration from the Samoa Islands, Rarotonga in the Cook Islands, and Nanumanga in Tuvalu. European navigators first encountered the atolls in the late eighteenth century. In 1841 the atolls were described in some detail by ethnologist Horatio Hale, who was taking part in United States naval exploration of the Pacific. At that time there were only some 700 inhabitants on the atolls. Disease and raids by Peruvian slave traders reduced this number to some 200 by the

late 1860s, though the population had been augmented by the arrival of European beachcombers and Polynesians from other islands. In 1889 a British protectorate was formally established over the atolls. In 1916 they were incorporated into the Gilberts and Ellice Islands Colony. Administrative responsibility was transferred by Britain to New Zealand in 1925, and New Zealand assumed full sovereignty in 1948. In 1974 the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed control over Tokelau's administration.

The census of 1981 revealed a total population of 1,572. The most populous island was Fakaofo, having 650 persons, followed by Atafu and Nukunonu, having 554 and 368, respectively. The total population in 1976 had been 1,575. In the early 1980s about 2,000 Tokelauans lived in New Zealand. Protestant adherents of the Congregational Christian Church in Samoa were located in the early 1980s on Atafu, Roman Catholics on Nukunonu, and adherents of both churches on Fakaofo. The New Zealand government provided primary education in the islands, and scholarships for secondary and higher education were offered for attendance at institutions elsewhere. Health services were provided by local medical officers and those visiting the atolls on a regular basis from Western Samoa. English and the Tokelau dialect of Polynesian are the languages spoken.

The economy consisted primarily of subsistence agriculture and fishing. In addition, a small amount of copra was exported. The economy was heavily dependent on subsidies from the New Zealand government, although the sale of postage stamps to world philatelists provided some revenue. The currency was the New Zealand dollar, but the Western Samoan tala was also used. In 1978 Tokelau minted its first coin.

The Office of Tokelau Affairs, since 1974 under the New Zealand foreign ministry, was based in Apia, Western Samoa, in the early 1980s. Its establishment there in 1925 was the result of considerations of the large distances involved, and the office remained in Western Samoa even after that country obtained its independence in 1962. This arrangement has strengthened economic and cultural ties between the two island groups. There was limited self-government, headmen *(faipule)* and village mayors *(pulenuku)* being elected by the people for three-year terms. The High Court of Niue in mid-1984 had jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases. The territory did not have any prisons, and only about seven police officers were on duty. The people of Tokelau are New Zealand citizens.

TONGA

Official Name	Kingdom of Tonga
Political Status	Independent state (1970)
Capital	Nuku'alofa
Population	104,000 (1984 midyear estimate)
Land Area	670 square kilometers
Currency	Tongan pa'anga (PT)
Major Islands and Island Groups	Tongatapu Group, including Tongatapu and 'Eua; Ha'apai Group; Vava'u Group, including Vava'u; Niuatoputapu, Niuafo'ou

Flag: Red cross in white square on red field

Physical Environment

Polynesia's oldest and last surviving kingdom consists of some 170 islands, of which 45 are inhabited (see fig. 19). Tonga is divided into three main regions: Tongatapu ("sacred Tonga") and its nearby islands in the south; the Ha'apai Group, some 100 kilometers to the north; and the Vava'u Group, yet another 100 kilometers farther northward. Niuatoputapu, Niuafo'ou, and their surrounding islands (called the Niuas for short) lie some 600 kilometers to the northeast of Tongatapu, which alone accounts for 35 percent of the land area and is the major population center. Except for a chain of smaller islands along the western edge of the country, which are of recent volcanic formation, the islands are raised limestone or coral limestone structures that have few, if any, hills or valleys. They spread over an expanse of ocean that gives the country a potential EEZ (see Glossary) of about 700,000 square kilometers.

The temperature ranges from highs of around 26°C in February to lows of 21°C in July and August, but the southern islands may have cooler weather. Rainfall averages about 2,600 millimeters per year in the north and 1,700 millimeters in the south; more than one-half of the rain falls during the wet season from January to April. Southeast trade winds predominante from May to November and easterlies for the remainder of the year. During February and March, however, moist winds from the north may

Figure 19. Tonga, 1984

bring hot weather and violent squalls. In March 1982 a major hurricane devastated the islands.

The indigenous animal life consists chiefly of birds and insects, although there is one native species of bat. Tongan waters are renowned for their abundance of fish. Pigs, fowls, and rats were introduced before the coming of the Europeans. Small pines and low-lying plants make up most of the plant life. The good quality of the soil and the dense population have led to the cultivation of most of the arable land with coconut trees, bananas, and other crops.

Tonga is one of the most densely populated countries in Oceania; nearly all of the population live on about 432 square kilometers of territory. According to estimates for 1983, about 65 percent of the people lived on Tongatapu (one-half this number in the capital), some 5 percent on nearby 'Eua, another 16 percent in the Vava'u Group, about 12 percent in the Ha'apai Group, and the rest in the Niuas.

Historical Setting

Archaeological evidence suggests that the first people settled the islands some 3,000 years ago, probably arriving from the Samoa group or Fiji. Tongan legend, however, preserves no tale of these migrations, claiming rather a special creation of the islands and its peoples. The early settlers were members of the Lapita culture, characterized by its beautifully incised pottery (see Prehistory, ch. 1). Over the centuries their pottery skills disappeared.

The origins of the Tongan nobility are shrouded in myth. The first king, called the Tu'i Tonga, was supposed to have descended from a Polynesian god of the sun or sky some time in the tenth century A.D. Some 500 years later the twenty-fourth king, who feared the fate of assassination that befell many of his predecessors, had his brother take over political power, creating a new line of Tu'i Ha'atakalaua. The seventh king in this line, likewise transferred temporal responsibility to his brother, setting up the Tu'i Kanokupolu title. Some conventional histories suggest that the transitions in leadership were natural and smooth and that responsibilities were clearly delineated among the three lines. Others have pointed out the political and military rivalry that persisted throughout this royal history. These rivalries resulted in a civil war that lasted from 1799 to 1852.

The war doomed the efforts of the first Christian missionaries sent from the London Missionary Society in 1797. In the 1820s,

however, Wesleyan missionaries had more success, although many of the Tongan chiefs resisted their efforts. One chief in particular proved to be an important convert. In 1831 Taufa'ahau, a brilliant soldier and leader, was christened King George, after the British monarch. Consolidating his power over the Ha'apai and Vava'u groups by establishing strategic alliances and converting the local rulers to his new-found faith, King George succeeded his uncle as the holder of the Tu'i Kanokupolu title in 1845. Overwhelming his opponents, he eventually made himself undisputed king of all Tonga and became known as King George Tupou I. In 1862 he instituted a legal code that freed the commoners from forced labor to the nobility and gave them some control over the land they farmed, including the right to own designated parcels. In 1875 the king promulgated the Constitution (still in effect), which not only backed up these laws but also gave him extensive powers.

The king's principal adviser, Wesleyan missionary Shirley Baker, had drafted the Constitution, but in 1880 he resigned from his ministry and became virtual dictator of the country, ruling in the king's name. Angered by the requirement to send a large proportion of the weekly church offerings to the Wesleyan headquarters in Australia, Baker persuaded the king to establish the Free Wesleyan church, which became the official church of Tonga. Baker's alleged persecution of those who remained faithful to the old Wesleyan church and his inefficient and heavy-handed rule caused the British high commissioner resident in Fiji to demand his deportation in 1890. A Tongan took over Baker's position as premier, and a British administrator was appointed to aid him. In 1893 the king died and was succeeded by his great-grandson.

The reign of King George Tupou II (1893–1918) was marred by his inattentiveness to state affairs and by his reneging on a pledge to marry a particular nobleman's daughter. Complaints from Tongans and foreign residents alike prompted the British to declare a protectorate over the kingdom in 1901. In 1905 Britain obtained the power to review all official appointments and dismissals. Nonetheless, the king retained his basic autonomy.

Queen Salote Tupou III, the only child of the previous king, ruled from 1918 to 1965, ascending the throne when she was only 18 years old. Her marriage to a direct descendant of one of the competing royal lines ensured that her issue would have unquestioned legitimacy in the eyes of the nobility. Greatly adored for her unabashed love of the Tongan people and for her devout religiousness, she was able to achieve the reunion of the Free Wes-

Former Queen Salote High School,
in the form of a traditional Tongan house,
on Nuku'alofa; destroyed by a hurricane
and scheduled to be rebuilt as a monument
Courtesy Cathleen Curtin

leyan church and its predecessor. Under her direction public health and education services expanded greatly, and the economy diversified. Her government made primary education mandatory in 1927, provided scholarships for overseas study beginning in 1929, and established a teachers college in 1944. During World War II Tonga established, with Australian assistance, a defense force of some 2,000 men, and some of these troops fought in the Solomon Islands.

Salote's son, King Taufa'ahua Tupou IV, was prime minister during much of her reign and ascended the throne after her death he remained king in mid-1984 at 66 years of age. King Tupou IV was the first Tongan to earn a college degree and has established himself as a scholar of the traditional Tongan calendar and Tongan music. He continued the social development programs begun while he was premier and moved to make the country completely independent of Britain, a milestone achieved in 1970, when the

protectorate was ended. The country remained dependent on Britain and other countries, however, for economic aid.

Some social problems emerged during this reign. As Tonga's population grew, more and more people migrated to Tongatapu in search of modern employment, and many emigrated or went overseas as guestworkers to improve their incomes. The government was unable to stop the breakdown of the traditional family-oriented system, the growing restlessness of its youth, alcoholism, and other concomitants of modernization. Most importantly, there were signs of growing resentment over the rights of the monarchy and the nobility, who, despite their general benevolence, retained the ownership of much land.

The Social System

Over 98 percent of the population, according to the 1976 census, were indigenous Polynesians who spoke a common language and had a shared cultural heritage for many centuries; the remainder included Europeans (a census category referring to all whites), part Europeans, other Pacific islanders, and Chinese minorities. About 40,000 Tongans resided overseas in mid-1984. Tongan culture has absorbed many elements of European and American culture, but because the kingdom has been ruled by the same royal family for so long, it has preserved many traditional elements as well.

The basis of social organization remained the extended family, although the nuclear family was typically the basis for the organization of single households. Although males dominated political and economic affairs, they deferred to their sisters on most important social occasions, and social ranking was based on complex bilateral kinship relationships. The eldest sister presided at family functions; she and sometimes her children were called *fahu*, a term connoting special status. Children, especially sons, received favors from their maternal uncles that proved invaluable in their quest for status. Before the establishment of the current royal line, it was generally the case that the three separate royal lines would intermarry to establish intertwining *fahu* relationships.

Tongan society was highly stratified. At the top were the royal family and the nobility, in the middle a group of *matapule* (titled servants to the nobility), and at the bottom the commoners. There were 33 noble families that traced their origins to the first Tu'i Tonga or to ancient Fijian chiefs. Their relationship to the royal family was not always clear, and several of the chiefs first

titled by King Tupou I were chosen for political reasons. The highest ranking male in each noble line usually held the title and managed the family's hereditary estates. Often, however, succession to the title was a matter of intricate legal debate, and lawyers who specialized in this type of case formed an elite group of commoners. There were six titled *matapule* lines that also owned hereditary estates. The commoners, who under the Constitution are entitled to allotments of land and are free of the servitude to the nobles practiced in ancient Tonga, nonetheless retained their identification with individual nobles and *matapule*. The leader of a commoner family was usually the male having the closest kinship relationship to a noble family.

Economic modernization has changed the roles of Tongan women. More and more women were becoming involved in marketing activities and even formal employment away from home. Some, however, deplored the fact that money rather than genealogical ranking determined the management and control of family affairs.

Tongans have been devout Christians almost since the conversion of King Tupou I. The Constitution declares it unlawful to work, play, or trade on Sunday, and the Sabbath has become a day of relaxed strolling, visiting friends and neighbors, and feasting. The Free Wesleyan church, of which the monarch is the official head, claimed the allegiance of about 30 percent of the population in 1983. This church, however, has been losing affiliates to the fast-growing Seventh-Day Adventist, Assembly of God, and Mormon churches.

Most of the schools in Tonga were originally set up by the churches, but the government has taken over the provision of primary education to about 92 percent of the students. Primary education from age six to age 14 was compulsory and free of charge. The three government secondary schools taught only about 11 percent of the student body; some 44 church-related and one private school educated the remainder in 1981. Attendance was virtually universal. Government assistance was not available to the private schools as of early 1984, but the government was considering changing this policy. Some 90 to 95 percent of all adults were literate in Tonga, a Polynesian language, and many secondary-school students spoke English, which was the principal second language.

About 85 percent of the government teachers and 72 percent of the private instructors in the primary-school system had received what the government considered adequate training in 1980; only 31 percent of secondary-school teachers were in this

category. There were government-run training schools for teachers, nurses, police officers, and public works officers, as well as a private business school and an extension center of the University of the South Pacific; together these were capable of handling 500 to 600 students each year. In the 1980s the government hoped to establish a center for community development training, a maritime school, a rural development center, an administrative training center, a cultural center, and community centers in the outer islands.

Government health services, provided free to those able to get to the centers, have greatly improved living conditions, and the country has one of the lowest death rates in the world. The government operated one hospital on each of the three major islands and numerous dispensaries and rural clinics. Only seven of the 35 medical officers employed in 1983, however, had full medical degrees, and plans for their further training overseas would cause the number of people per physician to rise to about 3,800 in the mid-1980s. The health service had to cope with cases of influenza, pneumonia, typhoid, and gastrointestinal infections caused by improper hygiene and sanitation. The government was implementing a program to rebuild latrines after the destruction caused by the 1982 hurricane. Another program to promote rural water supplies aimed to provide access to safe water by 1985 to all but the 9 percent of the population located in the most remote areas.

The major problems associated with the modernization of the economy and social services were the effects of internal and external migration, the breakdown of the extended family, landlessness, and unemployment. According to the 1976 census, about one out of every five people living on Tongatapu had migrated there from other parts of the country, attracted by better opportunities for education, health services, and employment. The low wages available in the capital area, however, were often below what would constitute a subsistence level in the outer areas. Others have migrated overseas, stretching their kinship ties to the limit, although the high volume of remittances back into Tonga showed extreme loyalty to those remaining at home. The skewed distribution of land has been closely linked with income inequalities, and the rising number of landless people created social as well as economic stresses.

The Economy

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing activities accounted for

*New Mormon church on Nuku'alofa demonstrates
the popularity of one of the fastest growing churches in Tonga.
Courtesy Cathleen Curtin*

some 41 percent of GDP in fiscal year (FY) 1980—the fiscal year
beginning July 1, 1980—and for about 44 percent of the labor
force in 1976. Agriculture's role in the economy diminished sig-
nificantly in the 1970s, however, as manufacturing, construction,
wholesale and retail trade, and other urban industries expanded.
Behind this upswing in industrial development lay a major shift in
government policy to invest in industries that reduced the coun-
try's dependence on imports and remittances. The per capita
GDP in FY 1980 was equivalent to about US$560. Government
calculations two years earlier showed that the per capita GDP in
the Tongatapu Group was 68 percent higher than in the Ha'apai
Group, some 39 percent higher than in the Niuas, and 32 percent
higher than in the Vava'u Group.

Foreign remittances were equivalent to 20 percent of GDP
in FY 1978 and had more than doubled by 1983 to PT7 million (for
value of the Tongan pa'anga—see Glossary). This massive inflow,
along with the income from tourism and travel services, has more
than offset the persistent trade deficit. Tonga's economic
policymakers, however, have been concerned that merchandise
exports were unable to keep pace with imports. From 1981 to
1982 imports jumped in value from PT31 million to PT41 million,
while the adverse effects of the hurricane halved the export earn-
ings from tourism and coconut products—the two major items.

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Other exports included root crops, fruit, and fish. The principal markets were Australia—whose share jumped from 6 percent in 1970 to 35 percent in 1980—New Zealand, the United States, and the European Economic Community (EEC). Imports were mostly of consumer goods and raw materials, although capital goods were rising in importance. New Zealand was the principal supplier, followed closely by Australia, Japan, the United States, Fiji, and Britain.

The inability of Tongans to earn and save as much at home as abroad was owing in part to the poor domestic resource base and in part to the low level of productive investment in the past. It was also likely that the government's labor policies have caused the expatriation of many skilled workers. A maximum-wage law, having sharply progressive taxation rates, has been in effect for government workers and influenced wage negotiations in the private sector. The wage legislation has discouraged the formation of unions, of which there were none as of mid-1984. Other stumbling blocks to increasing domestic productivity included the traditional abundance of land and the ease of cultivating root crops for subsistence. Both conditions, however, were fast being overwhelmed by the growing population. Even with the maximum-wage law, unemployment, for which there were no official estimates, was a major concern.

Seeking to turn around these adverse economic trends, the government increased its development spending from about 7 percent of GDP in FY 1972 to nearly 14 percent of GDP in FY 1980, raising the level of investment for the economy as a whole from 19 to 31 percent of GDP. If quasi-governmental bodies such as the public utilities were included, the public sector's share of total investment rose from 25 percent in FY 1973 to 52 percent in FY 1979. About 27 percent of public sector investment went to agriculture, forestry, and fishing; some 25 percent to social and community services; another 19 percent to transportation, communications, and storage; about 12 percent to electric and water utilities; some 10 percent to nonresidential construction; and the rest to other sectors. Spending priorities as outlined in the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, 1980–85, suggested a marked increase in the share devoted to agriculture—especially fisheries—as well as to transportation and communications.

Government current spending increased from 17 to 23 percent of GDP from FY 1973 to FY 1980, bringing total government spending up to 37 percent of GDP. Revenues—chiefly from import duties—rose only to 27 percent of GDP. The deficit had to be financed by foreign capital inflows. During the period from FY

1975 to FY 1979, development assistance both in cash and in kind was equivalent to about 30 percent of GDP, or PT47.7 million. One-quarter of the assistance came from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), about 21 percent from Australia, 18 percent from New Zealand, and 8 percent form Britain. Multilateral donors, such as the Asian Development Bank, the EEC, and the United Nations, made up the rest. The loan component of this aid amounted to about PT17.1 million by June of 1981, but the country's debt-service payments were low. Only PT1.9 million of debt had been contracted locally. Projections for the FY 1980–84 period suggested that foreign aid would remain at about 30 percent of GDP. Committed development aid for FY 1983 was equivalent to US$9.4 million, excluding aid in kind.

In order to increase the revenue base, the minister of finance considered levying a tax on remittances to Tonga in 1983 but put that option aside for fear of curtailing the much needed inflow. Instead, the government was trying to rebuild from the devastation of the 1982 hurricane and a drought in 1983, promote tourism by introducing duty-free stores for visitors, and diversify the export base as much as possible. The government also planned to raise the wages of civil servants sharply in FY 1983 to entice skilled workers to remain at home. The key to the economic revival of Tonga, however, lay in the nation's rich soil and abundant waters.

Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry

At the end of 1979 the government estimated that 70 percent of the population depended on agriculture for their livelihood and that about 87 percent of all households cultivated at least some of their subsistence needs. In addition, most smallholders harvested some coconut to meet their cash requirements. Despite the good quality of Tonga's resources and long experience in agricultural production, however, agricultural imports have increased more rapidly than domestic production. In 1980 food imports alone cost more than the country's entire merchandise exports.

In 1980 about 53,000 hectares of land were used for crop cultivation, of which coconut palms covered some 40,000 hectares. There were about 4,000 hectares of permanent pastures and meadows; forests covered only 8,000 hectares. Banana trees were planted on some 810 hectares, vanilla on over 200 hectares, and kava, yams, taro, watermelons, tomatoes and other food crops on the remaining area and between coconut trees. Except for the tree crops, however, shifting cultivation (see Glossary) predomi-

nated, and much of the agricultural land area was left fallow each year. Government estimates suggested that if intensive farming methods were used, about 7 percent of the agricultural area could produce the country's needs.

The land tenure system was a major impediment to farming modernization. According to the Constitution, every male Tongan is entitled to an allotment of up to 3.34 hectares of agricultural land and from 0.08 to 0.16 hectare of town property when he reaches the taxable age of 16 years. However, the population had grown so fast that the proportion of eligible males actually receiving an allotment decreased from 42 percent in the 1966 census to 35 percent in the 1976 census and was probably less than one-third in mid-1984. Land could not be sold but could be leased with government approval.

In 1979 commoners owned about 47 percent of registered allotments and some 26 percent of unregistered allotments. Estates owned by hereditary nobles made up 8 percent of the area; land leased to the government, churches, foreigners, and private citizens constituted about 7 percent of the area. The government held the remainder, which was made up of the uninhabited islands, forest reserves, and other public areas. Only 1 percent of the land area was officially leased to Tongans, but illegal tenancy arrangements were common. Many of the Tongans who have gone overseas to work owned land at home that either went fallow or was used under an informal rental agreement.

The king has so far refused to take over these lands for reapportionment. As a result, only lands owned by the government or released with the consent of the hereditary nobles could be allotted to the commoners, and these areas were both scarce and of marginal productivity. Advocates of land reform have suggested that the government take over the hereditary nobility's lands. In 1984 the public was awaiting the results of a royal commission of inquiry, made up of three noblemen in the cabinet and two legal specialists, which was investigating this delicate issue. The Free Wesleyan church had proposed such a commission some 16 years earlier.

The coconut palm was the mainstay of the agricultural sector. A survey conducted in 1979 showed that 48 percent of the nearly 5 million coconut palms were located on Tongatapu, 25 percent were in the Vava'u Group, about 19 percent in the Ha'apai Group, and the rest on 'Eua. About 12 percent of the trees were senescent, and another 14 percent were approaching senility; by contrast, 29 percent were young or immature trees that had been planted since the beginning of a special program in 1967. All but 5

percent of the trees were on allotments smaller than 20 hectares. During the FY 1975–79 period, the government spent about PT80,000 per year to replant some 4,700 hectares of palms over-all. The government hoped to maintain this momentum in the 1980s, cutting down all the senile trees and replanting them with new, improved plants. Tonga produced over 100,000 tons of coconuts in 1980 and 1981, but production declined in 1982 and 1983 because of the adverse weather.

The banana industry, which catered almost exclusively to the New Zealand market and boomed in the 1960s, seriously declined during most of the next decade. Locally funded investment in ag-ricultural chemicals and fertiliers had halted the deterioration by the late 1970s, and the government planned to expand the re-habilitation program to areas outside of Tongatapu in the 1980s. In 1983 New Zealand assisted Tonga in setting up containerized delivery of quality bananas, a move that was expected to boost ex-ports significantly beyond the 2,700 tons shipped in 1981.

Vanilla was first planted in the 1950s, but it was not until the 1970s that the crop began to expand rapidly. Most of the plantings were on smallholder farms in the hilly areas of the Vav'u Group—often intercropped on coconut farms. In 1982 vanilla accounted for about 15 percent of the value of all exports in spite of the bad weather. The high financial return per hectare of planting would probably make it easy for the government to reach its target of adding more than 100 hectares a year in the FY 1980–84 period. Other commercial crops included kava, fruits, and vegetables. About 94,000 tons of root crops were produced in 1981 for the staple diet.

The livestock population grew rapidly in the second half of the 1970s, but the country still had to import about 74 percent of its meat requirements and 70 percent of its dairy needs in 1980. Pig raising was a traditional farming activity, and there were over 100,000 head scavenging on subsistence farms. Cattle raising has been accepted as a part of smallholder farming; some 10,000 head were distributed on 600 to 700 farms in 1980. Plans to establish a large-scale ranch on 'Eua have been delayed. Most of the dairy in-dustry was set up by church organizations.

Agricultural research and extension took place at one re-search farm, several demonstration farms, and agricultural advi-sory centers. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture maintained machinery pools around the country that offered the services of 38 tractors—20 of them on Tongatapu. The lack of qualified staff and the need for a detailed agricultural census were two major prob-lems that the government hoped to address in the 1980s.

Fishing has received special attention in the 1980s. The inner-reef areas supported a local catch of about 1,600 tons of bottom fish in 1981; estimates suggested that the catch could be increased by at least 1,000 tons per year by exploiting pelagic species, such as tuna, sardines, and mackerel. The outer-reef areas—at depths of from 75 to 365 meters—were believed able to produce an annual catch of about 1,000 tons of bottom fish and 2,000 tons of other fish, but local fishing vessels caught only 300 tons in 1981. Foreign vessels caught about 4,500 tons of fish in the deep-sea areas, and the use of purse seine vessels could probably boost the sustainable yield to some 10,000 tons per year. There were about 250 motorized dinghies, 50 sailboats, 450 outrigger canoes, and 20 inboard motorboats in the private fishing fleet. The latter had just begun to work the outer-reef grounds in 1981. The government operated a number of small open boats and a 200-ton longline tuna boat that suffered low catches and financial losses. The government opened a boat yard in 1979 to build vessels up to 8.5 meters long. The government and the cooperative federation were setting up ice plants around the country and were investigating the establishment of a fish-freezing plant; the development of a cannery was a more distant goal.

Forestry production has been minimal, and Tonga imported about 81 percent of its timber needs. A new government sawmill on 'Eua cut about 720 cubic meters of native hardwood species in 1980, but the government has had trouble establishing a forest reserve there to prevent the ruin of the island's dwindling native resources. The government was establishing a pine forest plantation on the island, but at rates well behind schedule because of the poor performance of the seedlings. The strategy for the FY 1980–84 period was to utilize the coconut timber resources; only 690 cubic meters were cut in 1980.

Industry and Services

Industry was concentrated around the capital and depended almost exclusively on the domestic agricultural sector or imported materials. In 1980 there were six government-owned, seven quasi-government, 30 incorporated, and 29 unincorporated manufacturing companies producing commodities such as coconut oil, paper and paper products, rubber products, wood products, and food and beverages.

Mining was limited to the quarrying of sand and coral for use in roadbuilding and construction; offshore oil prospecting since 1976 has uncovered no exploitable deposits. Liquid fuel imports

increased by over 13 percent per year from 1975 to 14.9 million liters in 1980. The only domestic sources of energy were wood and coconut husks burned for cooking and copra drying. Electric power was available through the government utility only on Tongatapu and Vava'u, where 4,125 kilowatts and 110 kilowatts of installed capacity were located, respectively, in FY 1979; the main island had an emergency capacity of 300 kilowatts. The government established small generators in the Ha'apai Group and on 'Eua in the early 1980s.

The increased level of investment in the 1970s brought about a boom in the construction industry. However, there was an undersupply of skilled workers, equipment, and material to accomplish the projects begun. Residential housing had the largest share in construction activity. The 1976 census showed that the nation had some 13,900 houses, and about 600 houses a year were added through 1980. In 1976 some 61 percent of the houses were of the European style, made with concrete block and wood; 10 percent were Tongan style, having metal roofs and wooden walls. The rest were thatched or made of a mixture of materials, and these have been most susceptible to storm damage.

Transportation services improved only slowly during the 1970s and have been beset by the effects of bad weather. The road network extended about as far as was practical—973 kilometers in 1980—but poor drainage and surface conditions caused them to deteriorate; there were only 54 kilometers of sealed (surfaced with low-grade asphalt) roads in 1980. There were some 2,500 vehicles in use in 1979, mostly on Tongatapu. Shipping transportation was hurt when two of the three wharves at Nuku'alofa were incapacitated first by an earthquake in 1977 and then by the 1982 hurricane. In mid-1984 both had been reconstructed, and the third wharf was being extended to triple the capital's berthing capacity by 1985. Two large ferries dominated most of the interisland trade; an average of 176 international ships, excluding warships and yachts, put in at the main port each year during the 1975–80 period. The major airport, on Tongatapu, was capable of handling small jets, and the government planned to extend the runway and the terminal in the 1980s. Tonga Air, a privately owned airline that ran six flights each week to the nation's other three airports, suffered a setback in 1983, when it lost one of its two small planes in a landing accident.

Communications services were most developed in Nuku'alofa, where an automatic telephone exchange came into operation in 1979; there were 1,500 telephone lines. Interisland communications were by radio or telegraph. In 1978 an interna-

tional firm installed an earth satellite station that greatly improved international communications. The Tonga Broadcasting Commission operated the single AM radio station, broadcasting in English and Tongan some 10 hours each day; the station's equipment was obsolete. In 1983 an enterprising Tongan set up an informal television station that broadcast irregularly to the 100 or so sets located in the capital. Two years earlier another private company had begun distributing videotapes and video tape recorders.

Tourism in Tonga was less developed than in the other Pacific islands; about 52,000 cruise ship passengers and 12,500 airline passengers visited the country in 1980, the latter including nontourists. There were only 400 hotel rooms in 1983, yet the annual occupancy rate was only 50 percent. Cruise ship passengers, however, made a large number of purchases from the handicraft industry. The government hoped that the opening of duty-free centers would attract greater numbers of visitors in the 1980s.

Commercial services were well developed. Wholesale and retail trade of imported items was in the hands of private traders—in particular, two firms based in Fiji. Commercial banking took place at the Bank of Tonga, which was 40 percent owned by the government and 60 percent owned by three foreign banks. The Tonga Development Bank, a government-run institution, lent long-term development funds to private and official agencies alike. Cooperatives were important in the rural areas and often acted as the purchasing agents for agricultural commodities; there were 81 registered cooperatives in 1980, having a membership of 2,600. The government controlled the purchase price of coconuts, vanilla, and bananas.

The Political System and Security

A constitutional monarchy in name, Tonga's political system barely circumscribes the monarch's powers. The Constitution was promulgated in 1875 and has been amended little. It creates a government headed by the monarch and, in decreasing order of power, the Privy Council, the cabinet, and the Legislative Assembly. The cabinet is appointed directly by the monarch, and its members, including the premier and the govenors of Ha'apai and Vava'u, keep their positions until they retire or are shifted by the monarch. When the monarch and the cabinet sit together, they constitute the Privy Council. The premier heads the government and makes all appointments at the district and town levels. In mid-1984 the king's younger brother was premier, and his eldest

son and heir apparent was minister of foreign affairs and defense. The rest of the cabinet consisted of two barons and a European minister of finance.

Members of the cabinet also belong to the Legislative Assembly, while the monarch appoints the Speaker to lead the legislature. The nation's 33 nobles and commoners elect seven representatives each to the Legislative Assembly, which is elected every three years. All tax-paying and literate male citizens and all literate female citizens over the age of 21 are eligible to vote for the commoner representatives.

As of mid-1984 local government was accomplished through appointed town and district officers. Town officers were in charge of the larger villages and district officers of agglomerations of smaller villages. In addition, Ha'apai and Vava'u each had a governor of cabinet rank. The crown ruled directly over the capital city.

The Supreme Court is the premier legal institution in the country, having original jurisdiction over all major cases. The chief justice and the Privy Council, however, sit together as the Court of Appeal when needed. Eight magistrate's courts—four on Tongatapu—and the Land Court are responsible for lesser crimes, civil proceedings, and land cases.

Tonga had no political parties as of mid-1984, there being little utility in organizing to win the seven commoner election seats in parliament. Church organizaions, however, have become increasingly political and have been the only institutions having the confidence to criticize the government. Church leaders have most commonly spoken out against the government's neglect of land reform and the use of capital punishment. Private access to the local media was difficult; the royal family set up and owned both the *Tonga Chronicle* and the radio station.

The need for economic aid, the long association with Britain, and the conservatism of the monarchy have influenced Tonga's foreign policy. Tonga has tended to work quietly behind the scenes in its support for the initiatives of the South Pacific Forum (see Appendix B). The country has tried to steer a neutral course between the world's superpowers, although it shocked the Western countries in 1976 when it established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Spurious rumors circulated at the time that the nation had agreed to let the Soviets establish a permanent mission and a fishing base in return for the construction of an international airport. Tonga's high commissioner in Britain—equivalent to an ambassador—was accredited to the EEC and was pehaps the only ambassador accredited to both the United States

and the Soviet Union as of mid-1984. Ships of both nations were allowed to dock in Tongan ports. Tonga was, however, one of the few nations of the world that had yet to recognize China and continued formal relations with Taiwan.

Having a noncontroversial foreign policy and few valuable economic resources, Tonga faced no real external threat in mid-1984. The Tongan Defense Services were small—17 officers and 208 other ranks in 1979. There were three branches: infantry, royal guard, and maritime. The first two branches had responsibility for internal security matters, including the protection of the sovereign. The maritime force was charged with patrolling Tongan waters, which as of mid-1984 extended 12 nautical miles. The nation had yet to declare an EEZ (see Glossary), although the government stated that it would not hesitate to do so should significant underwater mineral resources be discovered. Tonga was a signatory to the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea. As of 1983 the maritime force had two small patrol craft, one transport craft, and a yacht. In addition to the armed forces, Tonga maintained a police force of around 300 personnel. The minister of police had cabinet ranking and was also the chief immigration officer and chief warden of the nation's five prisons.

TUVALU

Previous Name	Ellice Islands
Political Status	Independent state (1978)
Capital	Funafuti
Population	8,200 (1984 midyear estimate)
Area	26 square kilometers
Currency	Australian dollar ($A)
Major Islands	Funafuti, Vaitupu

Flag: British flag and nine yellow stars on blue field

Tuvalu is among the newest, smallest, and poorest nations of the world. In mid-1984 its sixth anniversary of independence was yet to come. Although a 200-nautical-mile EEZ (see Glossary) around its nine coral islands and atolls incorporated some 900,000 square kilometers of ocean area, its land area totaled only 26 square kilometers. Labor skilled in traditional agricultural, hand-icraft, and maritime occupations and extensive stands of coconut palms were its significant resources.

Weak external transportation and communications links left it even more geographically isolated than many countries in Oceania. Among its closest neighbors were Kiribati to the north and northeast, Western Samoa to the southeast, and Fiji to the south. It had shared a colonial experience under British rule with the Gilbert Islands, which later became part of Kiribati, and it shared close cultural links with Western Samoa. A majority of its people are Polynesians, and their language, Tuvalu, has many Samoan loanwords.

Physical Environment

Tuvalu, meaning "eight standing together," takes its name from its eight inhabited coral islands and atolls, the ninth being uninhabited. Formerly called the Ellice Islands, the group extends in a winding line from about 5° to 10° south latitude and from 176° east longitude to the international dateline (see fig. 20). Few land areas are more than four meters above sea level. Vaitupu is the largest island; Funafuti, the site of government, is the most densely populated.

Figure 20.   Tuvalu, 1984

Life can be sustained on these physically unfavored coral for-
mations—if only by the exercise of consummate skill in conserv-
ing resources—because of the presence of small patches of arable
soil and shoreline vegetation. Rainfall must be collected for drink-
ing water. Before the coming of the Europeans, 4,000 or more is-
landers may once have lived in the archipelago; nevertheless,
overpopulation was a constant threat, and emigration provided a
safety net. At times, however, the inhabitants probably resorted
to infanticide.

The climate is hot, but prevailing easterly trade winds mod-
erate the high temperatures between March and October.
November through February bring westerly gales and consider-
able rain. The sandy, rubbled coral soils are particularly suited to
coconut palms, and some pandani (screw pine) are found; other
vegetation, however is limited. Vaitupu has a closed-off, fish-
filled lagoon.

Estimates since the mid-twentieth century show a steady rise in the population, from 4,700 in 1950 to 5,800 in 1970. A census taken in May 1979, soon after independence, indicated a total population of 7,300. Official sources report an average annual growth rate for three five-year intervals beginning with 1965–70 of 0.9, 1.3, and 3.9 percent, respectively. A growth rate for 1980–85 of 1.6 percent is projected, based on the recent census and average annual growth rate.

Historical Setting
Island tradition has it that the inhabitants emigrated from the Samoa Islands in the sixteenth century. Based on the physical and cultural characteristics of Tuvaluans today, there is some reasons for subscribing to this belief. Over the centuries the islands came in contact with traders and navigators from other parts of the world.

Europeans discovered some of the Gilbert and Ellice islands in 1568 and had come across all of them by 1824. Other than a few copra traders, however, Europeans did not become involved in local affairs as heavily as others were to become on more richly endowed Pacific islands. Blackbirders, who rounded up scores of islanders to work in mines and on plantations in Latin America, and whalers, who visited the islands for rest and recreation, provided the most significant contact with the outside world. The population was decimated by the new diseases introduced by the visitors and by the depredations of the blackbirders.

In the final quarter of the eighteenth century, the Ellice Islands became linked to Britain. In 1877 they were placed with other groups under the British-administered Western Pacific High Commission. In 1892 a British protectorate was declared over the Gilbert and Ellice islands, and in 1916 the protectorate was reorganized as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony (GEIC).

The Gilberts were occupied by the Japanese in 1942, but the Ellice Islands escaped occupation. The capital of the GEIC was moved temporarily to Funafuti. Thousands of Americans were stationed on Funafuti and elsewhere in the Ellice Islands during the war, and islanders working for them gained new skills and earned valuable revenues. After World War II the colony was slowly prepared for eventual self-rule through the evolution of a series of advisory and legislative bodies. In October 1975 a popular referendum brought about the severance of the Ellice Islands from the GEIC, and they emerged as a separate dependency, renamed Tuvalu. Three years later Tuvalu became an independent

country. As such, it continued relations with Britain as a "special member" of the Commonwealth of Nations, without representation at the heads of government sessions of that body.

The Social System

Traditionally, social organization was based on a system of clans, whose chiefs held the positions of leadership in island society. The system was supported by sanctions based on customary belief and practice. Much of this changed rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth century, however, owing to the influence of Congregationalist pastors from the Samoa Islands aided after 1870 by the London Missionary Society. By 1900 the overwhelming majority of the population had become Protestant. Within a short time the Samoan missionaries fully usurped the authority of the clan elders and undermined the traditional social order and belief system on which it was based.

In mid-1980 about 95 percent of the population professed Christianity; the leading institution was the Tuvalu Church, founded in 1861. There were about 200 Roman Catholic believers, but anti-Catholic sentiment prevented the building of Catholic churches on some islands.

In other aspects of education and culture, Tuvaluans showed a marked degree of uniformity and homogeneity as well. The Micronesian inhabitants of Nui speak a dialect of Gilbertese, which is a Micronesian language spoken in Kiribati. On each of the other islands, however, the inhabitants speak one or another of seven mutually intelligible Tuvalu dialects. Among the various dialects, Vaitupu is the most widely spoken and most prestigious, more widely disseminated than the others because of its use in the local press and radiobroadcasts. English is also used throughout the islands. Most Tuvaluans were literate, and by the early 1980s primary schools existed on all the islands. Motufoua School on Vaitupu provided secondary education to several hundred students. A few islanders attended secondary schools, colleges, and universities outside the country. Vocational education was offered at a maritime training school, established with aid from Australia.

The Economy

Tuvalu ranked among the low-income countries fo the globe. According to a report published in *Business America* in late 1982, its gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) was the equiva-

lent of US$1 million; its exports were about US$67,000, and its imports US$2 million.

Not surprisingly, agriculture was the predominant sector of the economy, and within agriculture the harvesting of coconuts and the production of copra for export were the paramount activities. The Tuvalu Copra Cooperative Society took responsibility for its production and marketing. Coconut production varied significantly from year to year owing to fluctuating weather and world market conditions. Hurricanes posed a major threat to crop cultivation. Vegetables, pigs, and poultry were also raised by subsistence farmers. Fishing was only moderately developed, although its potential for the economy was increasingly recognized.

Although most of the population was engaged in subsistence agriculture, there were several hundred members of the labor force involved in the cash economy at home and perhaps double that number working abroad as wage earners in phosphate mining or abroad foreign ships. Remittances from these migrants provided needed foreign exchange for import purchases. One issue of concern to some islanders was the growing group of foreign technicians, economists, and advisers employed in the public and private sectors. In particular, civil servants were reportedly uneasy about foreigners in senior government posts who occupied positions that a number of Tuvaluans felt could be handled by islanders themselves.

Fiji, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain were important trading partners. Exports of copra, the main export commodity, were valued at $A29,200 in 1981; imports in the same year totaled $A2.5 million (for value of the Australian dollar—see Glossary).

Commonwealth countries were also important aid sources. In 1983 proposed current expenditures amounted to $A3.5 million, of which $A950,000 was British grant-in-aid. Development funds furnished—among others—by Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Japan, West Germany, and the United Nations Development Programme for the same year amounted to an additional $A7.1 million.

The Political System and Security

The 1978 Constitution, the supreme law of the country, guarantees the protection of all fundamental rights and freedoms and provides the basis for government organization. It establishes a parliamentary democracy under the titular sovereignty of the British monarch, who is represented by a governor general. The governor general, whose powers are largely ceremonial, must be

a Tuvaluan and is appointed on the advice of the prime minister, with whom, as head of the government, the major portion of everyday responsibilities rests.

The unicameral legislature, the parliament for Tuvalu, is popularly chosen on the basis of universal, free, adult franchise to serve a normal four-year term. The islands of Funafuti, Vaitupu, Nanumean, and Niutao elect two members each and the other four inhabited islands one each, for a total of 12. Members select the prime minister from among themselves, and he in turn is assisted by a cabinet of four whose members are drawn from parliament and serve at his pleasure.

The legal and court system bears the imprint of British legal philosophy and experience. The court hierarchy in the early 1980s included the High Court, magistrate's courts, and island courts; a system of appeals operated upward through courts in Fiji and Britain. The eight island courts had limited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters, but the level of public order and internal security was high on the islands, and most offenses were minor infringements of the law.

Although Tuvalu had no organized political parties in the Western sense, there was political competition. Elections were held in August 1977 and, in the first postindependence experience, again in September 1981, after which Tomasi Puapua succeeded Toalipi Lauti as prime minister.

Tuvalu had diplomatic relations with more than 15 countries, including Australia, Britain, Fiji, New Zealand, and the United States. The governments of Tuvalu and the United States signed a treaty of friendship in February 1979, under which the latter relinquished its claims to Funafuti and three other Tuvaluan islands.

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

Official Name	Territory of the Wallis and Futuna Islands
Political Status	Overseas territory of France
Capital	Mata Utu
Population	11,800 (1983 estimate)
Land Area	255 square kilometers
Currency	Cours du Franc Pacifique franc (CFPF)
Major Islands	Wallis Island (Uvea), Futuna Island, Alofi Island

The French overseas territory of Wallis and Futuna consists of two island groups: Wallis Island, which is surrounded by 22 small islets, and the islands of Futuna and Alofi, which lie 160 kilometers to the southwest and are separated from each other by the narrow, about three-kilometer-wide, Sain Channel. The territory is found in the western region of Polynesia. Western Samoa lies to the east, Tonga to the southeast, Fiji to the south and west, and Tuvalu to the north and west. Futuna should not be confused with an island of the same name in Vanuatu.

Wallis, which has an area of 96 square kilometers, is surrounded by a barrier reef that is broken only in places by passes through which ships can navigate. The resulting lagoon is full of rocky patches, coral formations, and islets large enough to support coconut plantations. Although Wallis is of volcanic origin, its highest elevation is only 143 meters above sea level.

The combined area of the two islands of Futuna and Alofi is 159 square kilometers. Both are volcanic islands, elevations reaching 760 meters above sea level on Futuna and 365 meters above sea level on Alofi. Along the west coast of Futuna and the northwest coast of Alofi lie fringing reefs.

In mid-1984 the French government enforced a territorial limit of 12 nautical miles in its dependencies. The recognition of a 200-nautical-mile EEZ (see Glossary) gave the territory an estimated sea area of 300,000 square kilometers.

The climate of the island is warm and humid. There are two

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well-defined seasons: a hot, rainy season from November to April, during which tropical storms sometimes occur, and a drier, cooler season from May to October, when the trade winds blow from the southeast. Cultivated plants, such as coconut trees, breadfruit, and bananas, are found in the coastal areas. Upland areas, quite steep in some parts of Futuna and Alofi, often contain forests, while relatively arid interior regions, known locally as *toafa*, have sparse vegetation.

Historical Setting

The two island groups of Wallis and Futuna and Alofi had largely separate histories before the imposition of French colonial rule, although the people of both are Polynesian and trace their origins to Tonga or the Samoa islands. According to local tradition, Wallis was settled by Tongans around 1500. The first European to encounter the island, in 1767, was the British captain Samuel Wallis, after whom it was named. Europeans did not return again until 1825 but subsequently often behaved violently toward the local population. In 1837 a French Catholic missionary of the society of Mary, Father Pierre Bataillon, arrived. Although competing with Protestant missionaries from Tonga, Bataillon succeeded in converting the most powerful of the native chiefs to Catholicism and arranged for the island to become a French protectorate in 1842.

Local traditions in Futuna and Alofi tell of the arrival of a "Chinese" ship whose crew left numerous descendants. Scholars believe it may actually have come from the Marshall Islands. European discovery of the islands was accomplished by the Dutch navigators Jacob Lemaire and Willem Cornelius van Schouten in 1616. A Marist missionary, Father Pierre Chanel, came to the islands in 1837. He was killed by a local chief on Futuna in 1841, but the conversion of the people to Catholicism had to be carried out by his successors. (Chanel was later canonized, and in 1976 his remains were brought back to Futuna.) In 1984 the rulers of Futuna and Alofi agreed to a French protectorate.

The two island groups were administered under a single budget by France, beginning in 1909. In 1913 Wallis was made a colony of France, although its ruler was allowed to retain his traditional status, as remained the case in mid-1984. The French also recognized the status of the rulers of Alo and Sigave on Futuna. although outside the zone of battle between Allied and Japanese forces, Wallis served as a military base for United States forces

during World War II, and two airfields were built. In 1959 Wallis and Futuna became an overseas territory of France as a result of a referendum in which the inhabitants voted on whether to maintain the connection with that country.

The Social System

There are no significant urban settlements. The town of Mata Utu, the territorial capital, had around 600 inhabitants in the early 1980s. About two-thirds of the total population lived on Wallis in mid-1984 and the remaining one-third on Futuna, while the other large island, Alofi, was uninhabited. About 11,000 persons from the territory, mostly from Wallis, lived in New Caledonia and another 1,000 in Vanuatu. The territory's population grew by 3.8 percent per year during the 1978–80 period.

Despite the migration of the youngest and economically most active members of the population to New Caledonia, which had greater economic opportunities, it was estimated in 1977 that 57 percent of the total population was less than 20 years of age. Life expectancy in the 1974–78 period was 63 years for men and women.

Except for a small minority of Europeans, many of whom are French government officials, the people are Polynesian, speaking Wallisian and Futunan dialects of the Polynesian language. French was used as the official language in mid-1984. Practically the entire population, 99 percent, was Roman Catholic. Church schools, consisting of seven primary institutions in the early 1980s, provided the only educational opportunities in the islands, although there was a state junior secondary school at Lano on Wallis Island. The adult population was estimated to be 95 percent literate.

During the French colonial period, the influence and power of the Catholic clergy in many cases exceeded that of the civil authorities. Until 1970 the Catholic bishop of the territory bore, along with the traditional rulers, the title of "co-prince" and could punish persons for failing to attend mass. Since then, however, the temporal power of the church has declined, and the influence of European clergy has diminished with the growth of an indigenous Catholic clergy.

The Economy

Wallis and Futuna's economy in the early 1980s was essentially one of subsistence, exports being of negligible value. Some

4,000 hectares of coconut trees were grown on the islands, but the copra of only about one-half of these was collected for domestic use as food, forage for animals, soap, or oil. Other crops included taro, yams, breadfruit, and bananas. Some fishing was carried out in the lagoon around Wallis Island, the coastal waters of Futuna, and in deep waters.

The ravages of the rhinoceros beetle on stands of coconut trees caused copra production to fall, stimulating the first migration of the territory's inhabitants to New Caledonia during the late 1940s. Emigration continued through the 1970s, though it slowed singificantly when the nickel "boom" in New Caledonia ended in 1974–75 (see New Caledonia, ch. 2). Wallisians and Futunans in New Caledonia sent back to their relatives in the territory a stream of remittances that sustained the local economy. By the early 1980s, however, poor economic conditions in New Caledonia and the attenuation of ties between islanders developing new roots abroad and those still in the territory resulted in a significant diminution of the payments.

Outside Mata Utu there were no paved roads in the early 1980s. The airport on the northwest coast of Wallis served flights to and from Nouméa in New Caledonia, Nauru, and Apia in Western Samoa. Limited port facilities were located at Mata Utu and Halalo on Wallis and Sigave on Futuna.

The Political System

In early 1984 the people of Wallis and Futuna were French citizens. Adults of both sexes had the right to vote for a deputy to the French National Assembly and a member of the French Senate. They also voted for the 20-member Territorial Assembly. Executive authority was vested in a high administrator (administrateur supérieur) appointed by the French state, who ruled with the assistance of the traditional ruler of Wallis, the two traditonal rulers of Futuna, and the Territorial Assembly. In the March 1982 Territorial Assembly election, a majority of seats were won by candidates led by Benjamin Brial, a member of the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République).

WESTERN SAMOA

Official Name	Independent State of Western Samoa
Political Status	Independent state (1962)
Capital	Apia
Population	159,000 (1983 estimate)
Land Area	2,394 square kilometers
Currency	Western Samoa tala (WS$)
Major Islands	Upolu, Savai'i

Flag: White constellation of Southern Cross in blue rectangle on red field

Although the Samoa Islands have been divided into two separate political entities since colonial rivalries resulted in their partition in 1900, residents of Western Samoa and its neighbor to the east, American Samoa, have continued to share close kinships ties and a common culture known as *faa Samoa* (the Samoan way). Although it is therefore possible to differentiate Western Samoa from American Samoa in political and geographic terms, *faa Samoa* pertains in both, making ethnic, social, cultural, and linguistic matters all indivisibly Samoan.

Physical Environment

Western Samoa lies in the tropics between 171° and 173° west longitude and 13° and 15° south latitude, about two-thirds the distance from Honolulu to Auckland, New Zealand. Its eight islands are of volcanic origin. Of the four that are inhabited, the second largest, Upolu (1,100 square kilometers), is home to 75 percent of the population; the capital and only town, Apia, is also located there (see fig. 21). Most of the rest of the population live on Savai'i (1,820 square kilometers). Between the two large islands lie Manono, within the reef system of Upolu, and Apolima, outside the reefs in the strait of the same name. Savai'i rises to a height of 1,858 meters and experienced its most recent volcanic eruption in 1911. Upolu is less rugged and more fertile, its central ridge peaking at 1,100 meters. On Upolu's north-central coast, where the Vaisigano River has created an opening in the reef, lies the town of Apia (population 35,000), which developed as the country's port and became its capital.

The climate is tropical, having wet and dry seasons. The

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
Figure 21.   Western Samoa, 1984

mean daily temperature is 27°C. Average annual rainfall is about 287 centimeters, of which 190 centimeters fall between October and March. The islands lie on a slightly inclined northwest/southeast axis, which causes the prevailing trade winds to drop proportionally heavier rains on the eastern ends of the main islands. The Samoa Islands lie outside the usual track of hurricanes, but severe storms do occasionally strike.

These rocky, volcanic islands have only a thin covering of moderately fertile soil, and there is little level land except for a thin band along the coast. The country nonetheless produces taro, bananas, cocoa, breadfruit, and coconuts for internal consumption and some exports. One is seldom out of sight of the sea, which was in the past and must be in the future a major source of food.

Because of the traditional orientation toward the sea and the hot, humid environment of the interior—which is either thickly vegetated or rocky—almost all Western Samoan villages were built along the coast. An extensive system of fringing reefs provides protection from storms and a safe fishing ground. Beyond the reef, larger species of fish are available, although Western Samoa's fisheries zone is not particularly rich.

In recent years the influence of the urban economy of Apia has caused a drift of population to the town in search of jobs. Over one-half the population resided along the northwestern coast of Upolu in the area bounded by the town and the airport at Faleolo, where the interisland terminal was also located. This was the first area of the country to receive electricity and paved roads. The ability of Samoans to move to another village where they have relatives makes significant shifts of population relatively easy.

Historical Setting

It is generally accepted that the Samoa Islands were among the first in Polynesia to be populated. A legend in Polynesia has it that all of its people originated from a common homeland, Hawaiki, quite similar to the name of Western Samoa's largest islands, Savai'i. The Samoa Islands maintained contact with the relatively nearby island of Fiji and with Tonga, which had a language similar to Samoan. Lacking a written language, Samoans developed an extensive oral history that extended back to about A.D. 1250. The enthusiastic embrace of Christianity, however, caused a repression of previous beliefs and loss of information about the islands before the arrival of the Europeans. A noted anthropologist, Peter Buck, who presumed the origin of the Polyne-

sians to be Southeast Asia, was dismissed by a Samoan orator, who informed Buck that the Samoans originated in the Samoa Islands. Some clue of the Samoan world view is revealed by the meaning of the term *palaga*, first applied to the European discoverers, who were believed to have "burst" through the "sky."

After Roggeveen's sighting of Manua in 1722, the islands were next visited by Bougainville in 1768, by French navigator Jean-François de Galaup, Compte de la Pérouse (who was the first to land) in 1787, and by the H.M.S. *Pandora* in 1791 while searching for the *Bounty* mutineers. In the wake of these early explorers came whalers (mostly American, but some British, French, and German), traders, and missionaries. In July 1830 John Williams of the London Missionary Society arrived in the Samoa Islands, and within a few years the islanders had converted to Christianity. Roman Catholic missionaries arrived in 1845.

Williams' arrival on Savai'i occurred just as a violent internal struggle was ending. The victorious chief, Malietoa Vai'inupo, welcomed the missionaries, there being no organized priesthood to oppose Christianity. In any case, the new religion fitted in well with the Samoan taste for ceremony. The Malietoa title held by the chief had originated during earlier wars with Tonga and is regarded by Samoans as one of four highest titles of Samoan rank, the others being Tupua Tamasese, Mata'afa, and Tuimalealiifano. The church developed in the context of each village. *Matai* (chiefs) would have their families join and then would become church elders. Because there were not enough missionaries to go around, Samoan teachers had to be employed, causing the church to become Samoanized rapidly. Church support for education— Malau College was established in the 1840s—and commerce brought into being an educated class that provided the staffs of clerks and secretaries for the developing economy.

Throughout the mid-century, trading contact with the Europeans increased, the son of Williams becoming one of the biggest traders. German involvement in the islands began before that nation's own unification upon establishment in 1856 of the firm of Johann Cesar Godeffroy and Son for the purpose of trading coconut oil. By 1860 over 100 Europeans had settled at Apia and were engaged in various businesses. Cash incomes enabled islanders to obtain Western goods, breaking down the country's self-sufficiency.

As the Europeans settled around the harbor and islanders from outer villages were attracted to the town area, an urban center developed on Beach Road, where a system of administration evolved in which the Europeans were increasingly drawn

into mediation of local conflicts. Western influence was also evident as the islands' government began to evolve toward centralization. In 1868 the *matai* of a number of districts established the first central government at Mulinu'u, near Apia.

During the 1870s Western trading companies began to acquire land to establish large-scale plantation agriculture. Islanders were eager to sell, often without permission of the rest of the family or village and often to acquire firearms for use in the intermittent warfare of the era. The outrage over the sale of so much land has continued into recent times, resulting in a prohibition—still in force as of mid-1984—on alienation of land held according to custom. Landholding brought the foreign settlers and their governments increasingly into internal politics.

The United States, Britain, and Germany were most active in the islands. In 1873 a United States Department of State official, Albert Steinberger, arrived and quickly established a reputation as a trusted adviser to the islanders. Through Steinberger, who, in addition to his official duties, became involved in a number of conflicting business enterprises, the islanders sent a request to Washington for United States protection in regional power rivalries. An informal agreement with the United States had already been reached in 1872, which the islanders, but not the United States, considered to have constituted a treaty. Both the United States and Britain, however, favored maintaining the independence of the Samoa Islands.

Germany had different ideas, and while Steinberger was away in Washington in 1874, a German warship intervened in a local dispute to support a land claim of the Godeffroy company. When Steinberger returned the next year without official backing and began to associate himself with Samoan interests, he became involved in a number of intrigues, including one in which he successfully sought support from the Godeffroy firm for a Samoan government he was attempting to put together. Steinberger's lack of real support from the United States and involvement in conflicting areas of interest eventually led to his downfall, however. By connivance of the United States and British consuls, Steinberger, who had become the premier of the Samoa Islands government, was deported on trumped up charges and taken to Fiji, never to return to the islands again.

Internal instability and external involvement in island affairs continued as Britain, Germany, and the United States established treaties with the islands' Samoan government to protect trade and military rights in 1878–79. An agreement in 1879 establishing a municipal authority in Apia gave control to the consuls

and foreign residents, undermining an already weak government. By the 1880s German influence was mounting. In 1887 an official of the Deutsche Handels-und Plantagen-Gesellshaft (successor firm to Godeffroy) was appointed premier of a government that the Germans had established, which was led by the holder of the Tamasese title. The Germans had replaced the former government and exiled its leader, Malietoa Laupepa.

The move was designed to weaken United States and British influence but sparked a revolt within the islands, and all three powers ended up sending warships to Apia harbor. There, on March 15, 1889, three German, three American, and one British vessel lay at anchor, unwilling to surrender position even as the barometer dropped steadily. War was probably averted by the arrival of a violent hurricane. All the ships were wrecked except the British *Calliope*, which barely escaped to the open sea. To save his crew the captain of the German ship *Adler* cut the anchor cable just as a huge wave was lifting the ship toward the reef. The *Adler* was thrown on top of the reef, where it lay on its beam for many years as a reminder of the storm. When the *Calliope* was broken up some 60 years later, the British Admiralty presented its steering wheel to Western Samoa.

The natural disaster calmed the political situation, and the three powers agreed to a partition of the country at the Berlin Conference, which began on April 29, 1889. Any thought of independence for the Samoa Islands had vanished. Although order and harmony had been restored to the rival factions, leadership of the government again came into dispute when Malietoa Laupepa, whom the Germans had returned from exile, died in 1898. To solve the matter, in April 1899 the three external powers assumed joint responsibility for government. A German, Wilhelm Heinrich Solf, was assigned as executive officer of the new government; but attempts to maintain it soon ended, and a German proposal to partition the country was accepted. The United States took the large island, Tutuila, in the eastern Samoa Islands which had a fine harbor at Pago Pago, as well as the isolated Manua group. Britain withdrew in return for recognition of claims elsewhere in the Pacific and Africa, leaving Germany in control of the western Samoa Islands. On March 1, 1900, the German flag was raised at Mulinu'u, and the Samoa Islands were divided, a split that continued in the mid-1980s.

German administration brought stability and prosperity, but at the cost of undermining island institutions. Under Governor Solf economic development projects were implemented and Chinese workers imported to augment Solomon Islanders previ-

ously brought in to bolster the labor force. The power of indige-
nous institutions, which were more highly developed than else-
where in Oceania, was reduced. Solf abolished traditional royal
offices and reduced to an advisory status the traditional consulta-
tive body, the Fono a Faipule. This motivated a monarchist resto-
ration movement, the Mau a Pule (Mau movement). Solf broke
up the Mau movement by exiling its leaders to Saipan in the
Mariana Islands and other German possessions, but the move-
ment was to reemerge after World War I. German attempts to es-
tablish the complete authority of the kaiser eventually provoked a
reaction, and by 1910 the business community was pressing for
greater control of local affairs. In the villages locally selected
figures were contesting the authority of the government agents
assigned to each village.

Meanwhile, in December 1889 Robert Louis Stevenson had
arrived in the Samoa Islands, where he lived and wrote for several
years before his death on December 3, 1894. He was buried on
the summit of Mount Vaea overlooking Apia. His house, Vailima,
where such works as *A Footnote to History* were written, was
later made the official residence of the head of state.

The German period left a contradictory legacy. Although
bent on a policy of breaking cultural barriers to their authority,
the Germans nonetheless studied that culture thoroughly. Erich
Schultz, who succeeded Solf, had been chairman of the Land and
Titles commission and compiled a thorough study of Samoan cus-
tomary law. Both men were skilled at exploiting the islanders'
political differences. Under the Germans, islanders were in-
volved in the European economy chiefly as producers of copra on
village land. The large plantations were worked by Melanesians
(some from the Solomons) and Chinese from Hong Kong. By 1909
there were enough Chinese to warrant a Chinese consul, and by
1914 the number had risen to 2,200. Most Chinese were eventu-
ally repatriated, but some married local women, and their de-
scendants were prominent members of the professional merchant
class in the mid-1980s.

At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, New Zealand forces
landed, taking over the country on behalf of Britain. New Zealand
had maintained some ambitions toward the Samoa Islands during
the latter part of the nineteenth century. During the occupation
years of World War I, there was little that war-pressed New Zea-
land could do except act as a caretaker. Confusion caused by ex-
propriation of German property and repatriation of the Chinese,
which hampered the planters, were among the problems con-
fronted.

On November 7, 1918, a major tragedy commenced upon the arrival of the ship *Talune* from Auckland, which carried influenza on board. In the next few months over one-fifth of the population died. Especially hard hit were the older members of the population. Seventeen of 24 members of the Samoan advisory council perished. The disaster reflected badly on the competence of the New Zealand administration. The ship had not been quarantined as it had been in Fiji, even though the medical officer at Apia was aware of the influenza. American Samoa avoided the epidemic by strict quarantine measures; offers of medical assistance from American Samoa were ignored, however, and efforts to treat the sick were poorly handled. The disaster provoked long-lasting bitterness toward New Zealand. By eliminating so many older, traditional leaders, the epidemic also had the side effect of increasing the power of part-Samoans and Samoans who had a knowledge of European society.

Although New Zealand's administration was benevolent, that nation was on the whole unprepared for its responsibilities, despite its experience with the Maori at home. Its administrative style clashed with the growing assertiveness of the part-Samoan merchants and impinged on traditional custom. New Zealand officials had little appreciation for the islands and their people and reported to superiors in Wellington who had no background in the area.

By this time the Mau movement had reemerged, its members including many titleholders as well as part-Samoans who for various reasons objected to the policies of the New Zealand administration. Among its leaders was a part-Samoan, O.F. Nelson, the most successful merchant in Western Samoa, who also had accepted an important Samoan title. New Zealand exiled Nelson and other leaders for their activities. Tension reached a critical point on December 28, 1929, when New Zealand police attempted to arrest several members of the Mau movement who had gone to welcome home another exiled leader. Shots were fired, and 11 Samoans, among them holders of several of the highest titles, were fatally hit, including Tupua Tamasese Lealofi III. Poor relations between the two countries continued for some time.

In 1935 the victory of New Zealand's Labour Party brought a change. The Mau was no longer outlawed, Nelson was returned from exile, and much of the paternalism of the previous administrations was eliminated, although many of the same officials remained in office. Pressures for greater autonomy continued, but the distractions of World War II interrupted further political de-

velopment. The war brought American troops in great number to Upolu, but the Japanese advance was halted short of the islands, which saw no fighting. During their stay the Americans constructed the air field at Faleolo.

In 1946 the western Samoa Islands became a United Nations trust territory under New Zealand administration, its request for self-government being denied. The presumption was for eventual self-rule, however, and the New Zealand government was more sympathetic than previously toward the islanders' aspirations, although that attitude was not completely shared by seconded officers in Apia. In 1947 a legislative assembly, the Fono, was established, and other changes gave greater local control over most legislative matters and finance. The New Zealand administrator became the high commissioner, and the term "Government of Western Samoa" came into use.

In 1954 a convention began work on a national constitution. The task was completed by another convention in 1960. Cabinet government was inaugurated in October 1959, the Mataafa titleholder becoming prime minister. In May 1961 a plebiscite overwhelmingly approved independence, which the UN General Assembly confirmed in November. Independence was attained on January 1, 1962, to be celebrated—with considerable pragmatism—in June to avoid the congestion of holidays around the New Year.

The Social System

During the 1839–1930 period the population fluctuated between 40,000 and 46,600. According to the 1976 census the Western Samoan population was 151,983, of which 48 percent were under the age of 15. The crude birth rate of 3.7 percent was partially offset by a death rate of 0.7 percent and net out-migration of 1.3 percent. About 25 percent of the population lived in the urban areas. The latest estimate available for 1983 put the population at around 159,000—71 percent living on Upolu and 28 percent on Savai'i. On Upolu about 34,000 lived in Apia and another 38,000 in the area west of the town. The population was divided into 27,150 households having approximately 5.8 persons each. About 89 percent of the people were categorized as Samoan and another 10 percent as part-Samoan.

Samoan culture was similar to that of other Polynesian peoples. Traditional authority was vested in the *matai*, who were selected by a process of consensus by each extended family. They exercised control over customary land, which by law may not be

alienated. *Matai* belonged to one of two categories, *ali'i* (high chief) or *tulafale* (orator). The *ali'i* was the titular leader and ultimate repository of decisionmaking. The *tulafale* was the executive agent who performed a variety of duties for the *ali'i*. *Matai* of both categories held chiefly titles, of which there was a complex hierarchy in Samoan culture. Titles were conferred in elaborate ceremonies and did not necessarily pass along hereditary lines. Most *matai* were males, but a substantial number were females, including holders of some of the most high-ranking titles.

There were 362 villages and 12,600 *matai* in the early 1980s. Within each village the women's committee was active both in protecting health and in certain other village development matters. The pastor of the church, of which there was at least one per village, was also very important in the village social life. Villages were largely autonomous but were grouped with other villages to form administrative districts or subdistricts. The culture was one of collective communalism in which family welfare took precedence over individual rights. Individuals were obligated to assist a family member whenever assistance was requested. Samoans as a rule tried to avoid direct conflict, and disputes were usually discussed in an indirect fashion.

Although the system had inherent rigidity, certain practices worked for flexibility. Titles could be split, new ones created, and old ones subside in importance. Adoption is common. Respect for age is tempered by a recognition of the ability of younger, better educated members to support the family, which has led to a marked number of young and well-educated chiefs. The ability of a *matai* to discipline is moderated by the ability of a family member to move in with another branch of the family in a different location, including overseas.

Population and language are virtually homogeneous within the nation. There is a minority of part-Samoans, who are mixed Europeans, Chinese, Fijians, and Tongans, but this distinction is not of social importance. There are also some people living in Samoa from nearby Tuvalu and Tokelau, closely related Polynesian groups.

Samoans are very religious. The motto "Faavae i le Atua" (founded on God) appears on the national emblem. The largest denomination in mid-1984 was the Congregational Christian Church in Samoa, which was begun by the London Missionary Society and accounted for half the population. Another 25 percent were Roman Catholic, while the rest were Methodist, Mormon, and Seventh-Day Adventist.

Christian institutions have fused with indigenous culture.

*Children performing the service at a Congregational church
in southeastern Upolu as a part of White Sunday,
or Children's Sunday, festivities held each October
Courtesy Steven R. Pruett*

Church ritual has accorded well with the formalism of Samoan culture, but concepts of individual responsibility and private prayer and study have not been well accepted. Many aspects of Samoan culture, such as beliefs in the supernatural causes of disease and standards of sexual behavior, have not been affected. As an element of social control, shame is more important than guilt among Samoans living in the traditional culture.

Education was administered through the Department of Education in mid-1984. Paralleling the New Zealand system, there were primary, intermediate, and secondary levels. A teacher's training college and technical training center also existed. The School of Tropical Agriculture at Alafua became affiliated with the University of the South Pacific in 1977. There were also a number of church-run schools. In 1979 about 51,800 pupils were in the school system. The Congregational church established the University of Samoa in 1979, but it had not yet received much recog-

nition. The churches operated theological seminaries that have produced a surplus of pastors, some of whom have been sent to serve as missisonaries in Papua New Guinea. Education, although not costly, was neither free nor compulsory. The great effort that families exerted to pay school fees, however, was indicative of the value placed on education.

The Economy

In the traditional culture, land was allocated by the *matai*, who distributed the fruits of agricultural production to the family. The arrival of the Europeans, however, broke the self-sufficiency of the islands by initiating production for export and creating a desire for Western goods. Improved health measures resulted in an increasing population and a high percentage of dependent children. Lack of sufficient employment opportunities caused many islanders to migrate, principally to New Zealand in search of jobs, where for many years the labor market was characterized by a shortage of workers. Slow overall economic growth in recent years, however, has limited the amount of labor New Zealand could absorb from Western Samoa and other Pacific islands.

Some 80 percent of the land was held in accordance with Samoan custom. Village land was usually fragmented into small plots and produced little surplus above local subsistence. Approximately 70 percent of the total was suitable for cultivation, but only 32 percent, or some 65,000 hectares, was under production. The Western Samoan Trust Estates Corporation (WSTEC), which had its origin in the reparation estates seized from Germany during World War I, farmed 7,000 hectares.

Coconuts were the most important cash crop, and copra historically was Samoa's main export. In 1982 a crushing mill was established to increase local value added. Copra production has stagnated in recent years, export volume in 1981 barely equaling that of 1973. Low world prices and bad weather have discouraged production. Problems were compounded by the trees being of high average age and requiring extensive replanting. Moreover, the rhinoceros beetle has destroyed some 20 to 30 percent of the crop.

Cocoa exports, of which 34 percent came from the WSTEC, have also been stagnant, reaching only 70 percent of 1973 levels in 1983. Here also disease and low prices have discouraged production. Taro exports have increased over threefold during the 1973–81 period, amounting to over one-half of the value of copra exports. Taro was reportedly shipped to Polynesian communities

abroad. Bananas were a major export crop in the 1960s, but pests and bad weather affected the trees. Export markets were lost, although bananas continued to be an important domestic staple. Recent improvement in export volume has resulted from the establishment of a government-owned 80-hectare plantation.

There has been success in improving fishing through the use of modern equipment and facilities. Enough fresh fish was being landed during the mid-1980s to meet local demand, but even during a glut on the tuna market the price was still too high to replace imported canned fish of lower quality species. Increased storage facilities and local production of fishing boats able to operate in the deep water beyond the reef promised a larger catch. Western Samoa's maritime zone was more limited than most Pacific island countries, being constrained by the EEZs (see Glossary) of neighboring islands.

Some success has been achieved in establishing a livestock industry, often on coconut lands, but production has not kept pace with population growth, and low-quality meat must be imported. Chicken and pig production has not been commercialized, and the animals produced by village agriculture were allowed to roam free.

A major problem has been the inefficient operation of the WSTEC, which had some of the country's most productive land and should function as a model of modern agricultural practice. Efforts were under way, financed by the Asian Development Bank, to streamline the WSTEC operations.

The industrial sector was small, accounting for around 5 percent of GDP. The 1980–84 development plan called for increased light manufacturing and food processing. Local manufacturing in the early 1980s provided clothing, food processing, beer and soft drinks, paint, cigarettes, and matches. Dependence on imported materials and lack of foreign exchange has caused shortages of some of these products. The Development Bank of Western Samoa was established in 1965 to promote industry, but industrial development has been constrained by lack of raw materials and the necessity to import both raw materials and plant equipment. In common with many developing countries, the services sector, including government, was very large, accounting for 70 percent of the paid work force.

Tourism has long been looked upon as a promising industry, although there has been concern about possibly disruptive effects on the culture. Hotel facilities have nonetheless been expanded, and the airport was being improved to accommodate larger aircraft. In 1981 some 42,000 foreign visitors arrived by air and

cruise ship, of which 44 percent came for business or pleasure. The local airline, Polynesian, has formed a joint venture with an Australian firm to improve the operations. During the early 1980s the airline flew to Tonga, New Zealand, Fiji, Vanuatu, American Samoa, Cook Islands, and Tahiti, and rights had been requested to operate to Honolulu. In addition, Air Pacific, which was based in Fiji, flew to Faleolo from Suva, Air New Zealand from Auckland and Tonga, and Air Nauru from that country.

Western Samoa was hard hit by the rise in energy costs in the 1970s. The nation did not have any deposits of fossil fuel, but in 1981 some 80 percent of electricity was diesel generated. Some development of hydroelectric power was taking place, however, and two hydro plants had been completed; another was set for completion in 1985. To discourge fuel consumption, a high price was being set on energy. In 1981 fuel absorbed 22 percent of the import bill.

New Zealand remained Western Samoa's most important trading partner, taking 34 percent of its exports in 1981. The Netherlands was next at 17 percent and American Samoa third at 15 percent. West Germany accounted for 9 percent and Japan and the United States for about 6 percent each. Samoa benefited from the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA—see Glossary). It also benefited from the Lomé Convention (see Glossary). New Zealand provided between one-fourth and one-third of Western Samoa's imports over the 1975–81 period. Australia, Singapore, and Japan were also important sources of supply. In 1981 some 22.6 percent of import spending went to food, 21.5 percent for minerals, 21.3 percent for manufactured goods, and 20.1 percent for machinery and transport.

The trade balance has continued to worsen, climbing from WS\$6.4 million (for value of the Western Samoa tala—see Glossary) in 1970 to WS\$47.3 million in 1981 as exports stagnated and imports continued to rise. This deficit has in the past been somewhat offset by earnings from tourism and by remittances from Samoans working abroad, but in 1981–82 severe balance of payments difficulties required the imposition of austerity measures. In June 1982 an International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) mission recommended a number of steps, and another mission arrived in October. Changes in the cabinet prevented action until the new government of Tofilau Eti Alesana came to power in December 1982, whereupon the currency was devalued and restrictive budgetary measures were introduced. Dependence on external assistance was unlikely to change for some time to come,

however. Action taken to limit public service employment and compensation and devaluation have not been popular but were necessary to restructure the economy.

New Zealand remained the most important source of foreign aid, providing WS$4.2 million of the WS$16 million received in 1982. Australia actually provided more that year—some WS$5.2 million—but has not provided as steady assistance as has New Zealand, Australian aid being only WS$1.9 million in 1981. Other important aid sources were Japan (WS$2.8 million), the United Nations Development Programme (WS$1.5 million), and the EEC (WS$1.4 million). The United States provided US$358,000 of assistance through private and voluntary agencies in 1983.

The Political System

The government is modeled on the parliamentary system and has specific modifications incorporating the Samoan culture. The highest office is that of head of state. At independence it was decided that the office would be held jointly for life by holders of two of the four highest titles, the *tama aiga* (royal sons): Tupua Tamasese Mea'ole and Malietoa Tanumafili II. The former died in 1963, leaving Malietoa as sole head of state. On his death the head of state will be elected by the Fona (parliament), most likely for a five-year term—though there is no formal requirement—from among the four *tama aiga* titleholders. The Council of Deputies, having not more than three members elected by the Fono, would act as head of state in the event of the head of state's absence or incapacity.

Governing power is vested in a prime minister, who is formally appointed by the head of state after selection by the newly elected Fono. The prime minister selects his own cabinet of eight ministers. The Fono is composed of 45 *matai* of each district. Two members are selected by individual voters who live outside the traditional culture. There have been proposals for universal suffrage, but thus far the only election in which all Samoan adults voted has been the plebiscite approving independence.

The Executive Council is composed of the head of state and the cabinet meeting jointly. The council is not a decisionmaking body, nor does it take any part in the formulation of policy. Its power is limited to discussion of particular cabinet decisions if the head of state or the prime minister so requests. It acts as a formal body for the issuance of regulations and the making of important apppointments. Decisions of the cabinet are subject to review by the council, but the cabinet retains power of decision.

Although in mid-1984 the prime minister headed a loose alliance called the Human Rights Protection Party, politics in Western Samoa has not developed along party lines. The first prime minister was Fiame Mata'afa, who died in office in 1975. His tenure had been interrupted once in 1970, when he was unseated by Tupua Tamasese Lealofi II, who later became health minister when Fiame Mata'afa regained the prime ministership in 1973. Tupua Tamasese Lealofi II became prime minister again on Fiame Mata'afa's death but was defeated by his cousin Tupuola Taisi Efi in 1976, whereupon he retired from politics and was appointed deputy head of state. Tupua Tamasese Lealofi IV died in 1982.

Efi is the son of Tupua Tamasese Mea'ole, who was co-head of state in 1962–63. The Tamasese title had then passed to Efi's cousin, who died in 1982. Efi served in parliament from 1965 to 1967, when he lost his seat, but returned in 1970 and served as minister of works, marine, transport, and aviation. He won the prime ministership in 1976 and was reelected in 1979. His choice was a departure from selecting the prime minister from among the four highest titleholders, although his title at that time, Tupuola, was ranked very high. In 1984 he succeeded to the Tupua Tamasese title. In 1982 Vaai Kolone, a successful planter and businessman, defeated Efi, but Kolone's election was challenged in court, and he lost his seat. The head of state reappointed Efi in September 1982, but his government was replaced in December by that of Tofilau Eti, Kolone's deputy in the Human Rights Protection Party. Eti, a prominent businessman, was a former health minister and was chairman of the Congregational church as of mid-1984.

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary. The chief justice of the Supreme Court and any other judges deemed necessary are appointed by the head of state acting on the advice of the prime minister. In 1983 the first Western Samoan was named chief justice; previous officeholders had been New Zealanders.

Despite efforts by New Zealand to provide training to Western Samoans, the public service was inadequate when Western Samoa received its independence, and the nation continued to be dependent for administrative staff on seconded personnel from the ordinary ranks of the New Zealand public service. The Constitution established the Public Service Commission, which superseded a similar office abolished by the Samoa Amendment Act of 1959. The Public Service Commission, headed by a chairman who was assisted by two other commissioners, was responsi-

ble for the general administration of the public service and issuance of regulations pertaining thereto.

There was no formal system of local government. Apart from the administrative officer on Savai'i, who was a member of the prime minister's department, there were no district or regional officers in Western Samoa. Administrative districts, based mainly on geographical regions, were established at the end of 1965 but were used only in the operation of government services such as health, education, police, and agriculture. Although both the district and village board ordinances passed by the Fono as early as 1953 provided the framework of a local government system, the traditional *matai* system continued to dominate all fields of local government.

In this system the village *(nu'u)* was the basic territorial unit of political organization at the local level. However, there were also several subvillages (or *pitonu'u*) that increasingly have achieved administrative autonomy. The village was governed by its own *fono*, the structure and conventions of which reflected both the general characteristics of Samoan society and the particular characteristics of the individual village. Generally, the village *fono* was concerned with the relationship with other villages, the reception of important visitors, and major offenses against custom.

The political system has been remarkably stable. Although suffrage was limited to *matai*, the number of these has doubled since independence to around 12,000, representing a significant proportion of the adult population. An exception to the pattern of stability was a prolonged strike of public servants in 1981, which could be viewed as a challenge to the traditional attitude of respect for authority. This was the nation's first and only strike.

The treaty of friendship signed with New Zealand in 1962 formed the basis for the continuing close relationship with that country. In mid-1984 Western Samoa was a full member of the Commonwealth of Nations; the UN; the World Health Organization (a UN specialized agency); the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP); the South Pacific Forum; the South Pacific Commission; and the Asian Development Bank. The nation maintained diplomatic offices in Wellington and Auckland, New Zealand, and in New York. Australia, New Zealand, and China had diplomatic missions in Apia. Britain, France, the Republic of Korea, Nauru, West Germany, and the United States had honorary consuls in Apia.

Chapter 5.   Strategic Perspective

Fijian performing ceremonial war dance

A STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT part of the world by virtue of the sea-lanes of communication running through its vast maritime expanses, Oceania has remained relatively un-militarized and peaceful since the end of World War II. As of mid-1984 the armed forces operating there that had the capability to affect the regional security setting belonged to four Western nations: Australia, New Zealand, the United States—all three allied since 1951 under a security treaty—and France, which had territories in the region. Only United States forces in Hawaii and Guam were of strategic significance or could mount sizable operations; by and large they kept to areas above the equator. Below the equator French forces generally formed the largest military element in Oceania, excluding New Zealand.

Oceania was largely ignored by military analysts from the late 1940s until the mid-1970s, its status as a secure area for the Western nations active there being widely taken for granted. Reports in 1976, however, that the Soviet Union had made over-tures to Tonga and Western Samoa—and established diplomatic relations with the former—motivated Australia and New Zealand to ask the United States to expand its aid programs and diplomatic contacts in the South Pacific in order to foster stability and pre-clude the Soviet Union from gaining influence in the region. To the north of the equator, the United States was also very active during the late 1970s in negotiations over changing the political status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which it ad-ministered under a United Nations trusteeship arrangement. France continued to confine its activity to its own territories and to its nuclear testing program in French Polynesia.

Although the mid-1970s witnessed a reawakening of military interest in Oceania—especially by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States—this fell far short of catapulting the area into a position of prominence in geostrategic calculations. It was gener-ally agreed that the region, particularly that portion below the equator, continued to hold relatively little interest for the Soviet Union. Even above the equator, Soviet naval activity in the Pacific has been centered to the north or to the east of Oceania. Moreover, although during the late 1970s Australia, New Zealand, and the United States began to devote more attention to the security aspect of their relations with Oceania, those nations have continued to eschew exerting a more active military presence in the region, apparently in the belief that their interests could best

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be secured through nonmilitary means and that raising the military profile of Oceania might itself draw Soviet attention to the area.

As of mid-1984 the independent and self-governing states of Oceania, by virtue of their historic heritage, democratic institutions, and economic ties, were generally oriented toward the West and looked to Australia, Britain, France, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States for guidance and support. Intergovernmental relations among island states have been peaceful, the regional style of problem solving being characterized by cooperation and consensus building. The potential for internal disorder escalating to involve outside actors and disturb regional security was clearly present, however, most notably in the French territory of New Caledonia, where an independence movement has been growing more militant. In addition, although there were few outstanding issues of dispute between island states, relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia have repeatedly been strained by incidents on their shared border.

A matter of special strategic significance in Oceania was the widespread distaste for all things nuclear—be it testing, waste, weaponry, or even energy. Much of the antinuclear movement has focused on the French nuclear testing program, which—despite deep-seated and strongly expressed opposition from the island states—the French declare will continue indefinitely as long as it is vital to France's national security. There has been strong support in the island states, sometimes expressed through regional institutions, for declaring a nuclear-free zone in Oceania. Individual states have at times closed their ports and waters to nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels. This has proved troublesome for Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which wanted to ensure that such a zone would not interfere with the ability to communicate with each other and fulfill the responsibilities of their security alliance.

Historical Background

Although Oceania had long been an area in which Western nations rivaled for economic or political advantage—or, around the turn of the twentieth century, for coaling stations—it was not until after World War I that the area first came to be viewed as having a strategic significance in world affairs. The war itself had little effect on the area. At its outset, however, Japan occupied German possessions in Micronesia, New Zealand took over Ger-

man Samoa (Western Samoa), and Australia assumed control of Germany's holdings in northeastern New Guinea, the northern Solomon Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the island of Nauru. Conflict associated with these operations and during the rest of the war was minimal, but the elimination of German power in the region and, more importantly, the emergence of Japan as a major actor in Pacific affairs and a potential rival of the United States represented a fundamental realignment in the Pacific Ocean area.

In a nine-power conference held in Washington in 1921–22, Japan, Britain, France, and the United States agreed to respect each other's rights in the Pacific, and the United States, Britain, and Japan—which had the world's three largest navies—agreed to stop their naval arms race by capping battleship and aircraft carrier tonnage at a ratio of five each for Britain and the United States and three for Japan. The rationale for Japan's lower rate was that, unlike the navies of the other two nations, the Japanese navy operated only in the Pacific Ocean. Japan also agreed reluctantly not to expand its bases and fortifications in the Pacific beyond those already in existence.

Despite these measures, however, Japan's determination to increase its influence in Asia and the Pacific remained strong, and the Japanese navy was expanded and modernized at a faster rate than were United States or British naval forces in the Pacific. On withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 after that organization condemned the invasion of Manchuria, Japan declared its holdings in Micronesia—up to that time administered under a League of Nations mandate—to be an integral part of the Japanese Empire. The islands were then closed off to non-Japanese and began to be developed into a series of fortified bases. In 1935, after repudiating the Washington naval limitations treaty, Japan began openly to build up its naval forces on a scale unmatched by either the United States or Britain.

World War II

Relations worsened in mid-1941 after the United States took an increasingly stiff line in protest of continuing Japanese expansionism in China and Indochina, and the British, Dutch, and United States governments imposed an embargo on shipments of scrap iron, steel, and, most importantly, rubber and petroleum to Japan. Having virtually no other source for these commodities—all critical to the maintenance of a modern state and to the buildup of their offensive forces—the Japanese decided to seize control of

areas rich in these resources and exclude Western nations from the western Pacific. The seized areas, later to become part of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, were to include most of the East Asian and Southeast Asian mainland, the Philippines, and the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese planned to protect this territory by establishing a defense perimeter in the Pacific that would extend southward from the Kurile Islands in the northern Pacific, enclose Wake Island and the Mariana, Marshall, and Gilbert islands, then run west to Rabaul on the island of New Britain (see fig. 22).

In the Pacific the first of a string of Japanese attacks designed to attain these goals took place at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. Within a 24-hour period the Japanese had also struck Malaya, the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Wake Island, and elsewhere (see Appendix A). The Japanese had control of Guam, the Gilberts, and Wake Island by late December. In January they took Rabaul as well as the island of New Ireland to complete the defense perimeter. By the end of March, Malaya, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies had fallen, and Burma had been overrun. The fall of the Philippines in early May ended organized resistance by United States, British, Dutch, and Australian forces inside the perimeter.

Plans to extend the perimeter further had already been drawn up. As early as February 1942, Allied forces had begun to strike territory already seized by the Japanese, and on April 18 carrier-based planes were able to make a daring bombing raid on Tokyo and other Japanese cities. Although these attacks did not accomplish much materially, they did force the Japanese to take unanticipated defensive measures. The Japanese were also alarmed by the buildup of Allied forces in Australia and by preparations to set up a protected southern route from the United States to Australia. Accordingly, they decided to cut Allied communications lines to Australia and extend the defense perimeter outward to the western Aleutian Islands, Midway Island, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji, and the Samoa group. At the same time, air bases were to be established on the northeastern coast of New Guinea and at Port Moresby on the southeastern coast facing Australia to protect the new perimeter. Japan began occupying positions on the northeastern coast of New Guinea in March 1942 and entered the Admiralty and Solomon islands. Plans called for an invasion of Port Moresby via the Coral Sea in May.

Allied forces, under a command structure set up in March 1942, divided the Pacific into two major theaters. In the west

Figure 22. *Japanese Advances in the Pacific in World War II,*
1941–42

General Douglas A. MacArthur became supreme commander Allied forces, Southwest Pacific, which included New Guinea, Australia, the Bismarcks, the Solomons, the Philippines, and the Netherlands East Indies (not including the island of Sumatra). Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was appointed commander in chief, Pacific Ocean areas, which comprised most of the remainder of the western half of the Pacific. Allied forces were charged with resisting further Japanese advances, maintaining open lines of communication to Australia, and preparing for future counteroffensives against Japan.

The Japanese plan to launch a seaborne invasion of Port Moresby in early May had to be called off after a confrontation between Allied and Japanese forces in the Coral Sea. This was the first naval battle in which ships of the opposing forces never came within sight of each other, attacks on the adversary's vessels being carried out entirely by air. Although the battle resulted in a tactical victory for the Japanese, in strategic terms it represented a loss—too many Japanese airplanes were downed in the confrontation to provide adequate air support for the amphibious invasion force headed toward Port Moresby, which then had to be recalled.

The Japanese suffered another and far greater defeat in early June, when forces of the Imperial Navy advancing to attack Midway were met by a much stronger Allied naval force than anticipated. In the battle that followed, the Japanese lost their best trained naval pilots as well as most of their first-line aircraft carrier strength. For the Allies, the Battle of Midway represented a major turning point in the war in that it signaled Japan's loss of strategic initiative; brought Japanese naval strength down to a rough par with that of the Allies; gave the United States breathing space until its new class of Essex aircraft carriers became available; and forced the cancellation of Japan's plans to invade Fiji, the Samoa group, and New Caledonia.

Despite these setbacks, the Japanese advance continued in the southwestern Pacific. Japanese forces pushed southward through the Solomons, landing troops on Guadalcanal in early July 1942. In mid-July they also began an overland advance to Port Moresby via the Kokoda trail, for much of its way a very narrow and treacherous footpath crossing the steep slopes of the jungle-covered Owen Stanley Range. The very tough conditions encountered during the New Guinea campaign provided the first example of what the Japanese and Allied troops were to learn again and again, namely, that on many Pacific islands the natural environment could be at least as deadly as the opposing forces. By

mid-September the Japanese had advanced to within 50 kilometers of Port Moresby. There, however, they drew back to regroup and await the outcome of operations on Guadalcanal, where United States forces had landed in early August in the first stage of the Allied counteroffensive.

On Guadalcanal, United States forces, at first poorly supplied and vulnerable to air strikes, were repeatedly attacked by the Japanese, who were successfully reinforced by sea through October. By November, however, after several naval engagements in the area, the United States had been able to reinforce its own troops, who then expanded their hold on the island. After successfully preventing the Japanese from landing further reinforcements, by early February 1943 the Americans were able to compel the evacuation of Japanese troops from Guadalcanal. The campaign, however, had provided a foretaste of the fanatical and determined resistance Japanese forces were to exhibit throughout the war. Meanwhile, in the New Guinea campaign, Australian, in time joined by American, forces, had been able to push the Japanese back along the Kokoda trail. By early 1943 the Japanese had been forced to withdraw from the Buna area to positions farther north on the New Guinea coast.

Encouraged by the successes on Guadalcanal and New Guinea, the Allies launched a two-pronged drive against Japanese positions in which MacArthur's forces advanced northwestward from New Guinea and Nimitz forces moved westward across the central Pacific. Determined to hold territory already seized, the Japanese strengthened the base at Rabaul and tried to maintain positions on New Guinea and in the Solomons. All areas under Japanese control, however, had begun to suffer from ever growing problems of supply caused by Allied air and submarine attacks on Japanese merchant and naval vessels. This severely limited the ability of the Japanese to reinforce positions on New Guinea and elsewhere, and Allied troops were able to fight their way slowly up the New Guinea coast, establishing new air and supply bases as they went. The Allies were also successful in seizing islands off the coast of New Guinea and in the central Solomons, where additional air bases were built to support the continuing advance. By the end of March 1944 the major Japanese stronghold at Rabaul had been effectively isolated.

In the central Pacific the Allies kicked off their offensive in November 1943 in a series of bloody confrontations against heavily fortified Japanese emplacements in the Gilbert Islands. As soon as possible, the Allies established airfields in the Gilberts, from which they launched operations against Japanese positions,

first in the Marshalls and then in the Caroline Islands.

Pursuing a strategy of first making air strikes on certain Japanese fortifications and bases—including Rabaul and the Caroline islands of Yap and Truk (the latter a major Japanese naval base)—the Allies then isolated and leapfrogged some of the most heavily fortified Japanese positions. In this manner they advanced from the southeast into the western half of New Guinea and from the east to the northern Marianas, Guam, and the Palau Islands. The two forces joined in an offensive against the Philippines and then fought northward to Japan itself, already weakened by air strikes and supply shortages. Japan surrendered unconditionally on August 14, 1945, after the United States had dropped atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Devastation caused by World War II was obviously most extensive in areas within the combat zones, where assaults, military seizures, and liberation battles had turned settlements into rubble heaps and disrupted or destroyed local industries and communications systems. Thousands of islanders were wounded or killed in the process. Areas outside the combat zones were also greatly affected by the war, however. New Caledonia served as a major Allied naval base. On the Admiralty island of Manus, the Allies constructed a huge naval base, and advance air and naval posts were built on several islands in the New Hebrides. Fiji, Western Samoa, American Samoa, Tonga, the New Hebrides, some of the Cook Islands, and Bora Bora in French Polynesia were used as rest or assembly areas, training grounds, or fuel, service, or communications posts. Four uninhabited central Pacific atolls—Canton, Palmyra, Christmas, and Johnston—became air transport stations. French possessions contributed personnel for the Free French Pacific Battalion, which fought on the Allied side. Jungle scouts from Fiji and Tonga assisted the Allies in the northern Solomons. In both combat and noncombat areas, hundreds of thousands of islanders had been conscripted to serve on military bases or support military operations.

The Postwar Era: 1945–75

The defeat of Japan left six allied nations—Australia, Britain, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States—in uncontested control of almost all of Oceania. In the easternmost extension of Oceania, Chile also had the small province of Easter Island. Former Japanese-mandated islands in Micronesia had come under the administration of the United States, which was acting under a United Nations strategic trust

Remains of World War II bunker of Japanese Admiral
Yamamoto Isoroku in Rabaul, Papua New Guinea
Courtesy Steven R. Pruett

agreement after 1947. Each of the six allied Western nations had significant strategic interests in the area, centering mainly on protecting their own territories and maintaining open lines of communications to and through Oceania. These interests, however, were easily secured in the peaceful postwar Pacific setting without resort to military force. Accordingly, almost all military facilities built during the war were rapidly decommissioned or abandoned, and, as the focus of geostrategic rivalry shifted to more volatile parts of the globe, military interest in the islands of Oceania waned.

Two developments in the 1950s helped ensure that Oceania commanded only the most limited attention from strategic and military planners. Primary of these was the 1951 Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS), under which each signatory agreed to take necessary measures consistent with its own constitutional processes should the peace and security of any of the three be endangered by an attack on its territory or forces in the Pacific (see The ANZUS Treaty and Other Security Arrangements, this ch.). The treaty, which was seen by many to turn the Pacific Ocean into an "ANZUS lake," alleviated the concern of the two southern ANZUS partners over nearby islands and ocean areas; the focus of

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their strategic defense was then identified as lying far forward on the Southeast Asian mainland. In practice, the treaty also allowed the United States to focus attention on its territories lying to the north of the equator, trusting everything south of the equator except for American Samoa to its two ANZUS allies and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, France and the Netherlands. Even in the northern Pacific, however, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and Guam were situated well behind the lines of United States strategic defense, which under the containment policy lay on the Southeast Asian mainland, in Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Taiwan.

Technological advances in long-range aircraft and ballistics missiles also helped perpetuate Oceania's low profile in geostrategic affairs. Most of the World War II airfields, even if lengthened as far as topography permitted, were unable to accommodate the new and larger aircraft. Moreover, the extended range of planes and missiles greatly reduced the need for air communications way stations or for mid-range bases to support military operations in Asia.

Although Oceania continued to be perceived as a backwater in geostrategic affairs well into the 1970s, several developments having military relevance nonetheless took place there in the interim. For the most part, however, these were not related to the security or defense of Oceania itself but instead resulted from either the relative isolation of certain islands or the proximity of others to Asian states. The United States base at Guam, for instance, unlike other World War II bases, was kept open after the war. It was used during the Vietnam Conflict as a staging point for manpower and matériel and as a base from which B-52 bombing raids were launched. During the early 1960s the United States also established a facility on Kwajalein in the Marshalls (part of the TTPI) to monitor missile flight tests; unlike the base at Guam, however, Kwajalein had no combat role.

Oceania was also used as a testing area for nuclear weapons (see The Nuclear Issue, this ch.). From 1946 to 1962 the United States conducted numerous aboveground, underground, and undersea test explosions in the central Pacific. Testing resumed in 1966—meeting growing protest from within Oceania—after France transferred its nuclear testing program from the Sahara to French Polynesia in 1963. After 1974 French tests were limited exclusively to underground blasts.

One further event of military significance in Oceania was the 1960–62 confrontation between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the status of the Dutch colony of West New Guinea, now

known as Irian Jaya. The conflict ended when the Netherlands agreed to transfer provisional control of the colony to the United Nations to facilitate assumption of control by Indonesia in 1963. This marked the end of the Dutch presence in Oceania. Although military clashes associated with the confrontation were limited in scope and full-scale war was averted, Indonesia's forcible takeover of predominantly Melanesian Irian Jaya proved troublesome for some Pacific islanders. The issue was complicated by the existence of a guerrilla opposition movement there, which Indonesia alleged at times sought support and sanctuary in Papua New Guinea.

Security Setting since 1976

By the mid-1970s developments both within Oceania and outside it had helped transform the regional setting in very fundamental ways. To the south of the equator some of the most important changes were associated with decolonization; to the north they were augured by ongoing negotiations between the United States and the TTPI over modifying the trusteeship arrangement and accommodating greater internal self-rule. Both these developments had the potential to undermine security conditions in Oceania that Western nations previously could take for granted—namely, their ability to ensure strategic denial by preventing any hostile force from gaining access to resources or facilities having a military utility. The security situation had also been affected, at least indirectly, by several extraregional developments, including the winding down of the British presence "east of the Suez"; the enunciation in 1969 of the Guam Doctrine, in which the United States called upon its allies to contribute more to their own self-defense; and the general retrenchment of the United States military presence in Asia.

Until 1976 little attention had been paid to how these developments had affected the strategic setting south of the equator. The movement to independence in the South Pacific had progressed in an orderly and peaceful manner, and the new states shared a community of interests with the West and retained close and friendly ties with their former administrators. As the independent states grew more active in world affairs, however, they began to find common ground with each other. Using vehicles such as the South Pacific Forum, set up in 1971, the island states began to develop common approaches to regional problems and express positions on international issues in a collective voice that

often carried more weight than had each acted singly (see Appendix B). This had drawn diplomatic attention to the region but had prompted little in the way of military interest. Nonetheless, the potential impact on regional security was implicit in such developments as the 1975 endorsement by the South Pacific Forum of the concept of instituting a nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific.

Tonga's establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in April 1976 and reports that the Soviets had offered Tonga aid in exchange for the rights to build an international airport and set up a permanent fishing base spurred strategic planners to take a new look at the security ramifications of decolonization in the South Pacific. Reports that Western Samoa had received similar overtures soon followed. China's establishment of diplomatic missions in Fiji and Western Samoa in 1976 also helped raise the profile of security issues in the South Pacific, but it was generally agreed that the Chinese would be hard-pressed to project a military presence so far from their shores; thus, their initiatives did not provoke the same degree of alarm as did those of the Soviet Union.

In retrospect, the Tonga incident proved significant mainly as a catalyst that sparked an overdue reappraisal of security in the South Pacific. As it turned out, the Soviet Union was not permitted to open a mission in Tonga. In fact, as of mid-1984 the only Soviet resident mission in Oceania was located in New Zealand; representatives to other states in the South Pacific were accredited through New Zealand and Australia.

The purported Soviet initiatives in the region caused the greatest alarm in Australia and New Zealand. At ANZUS meetings in 1976 and 1977 the two nations undertook to persuade the United States to accept their contention that Soviet activity in the South Pacific was sufficiently threatening to ANZUS interests to warrant more attention to security matters. Neither Britain nor France reemphasized security in their dealings in the area. British responsibilities were being reduced to a minimum by decolonization. Although France still had important territorial, economic, and strategic interests in Oceania, the French showed no signs of considering these to have come under any threat.

The issue of security was also raised in the 1976 decision of the South Pacific Forum to introduce a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ—see Glossary) for each nation and the 1977 announcement that the South Pacific Forum would establish a fisheries organization to regulate maritime resources in those zones. For a time, at least, these decisions increased the level of

uncertainty over what form the postcolonial regime in Oceania would assume. The announcements predestined changes to nautical charts and maps in which the small land areas of many island states would be dwarfed by their vast ocean areas. They also promised to leave only a few pockets of high seas open to uncontrolled exploitation. The announcements drew world attention to the resources that could come under the control of the new states—resources that over the long term could greatly increase their stratregic importance. For the island states themselves the extension of the EEZs presented challenging and expensive tasks of developing a maritime surveillance and patrol capability.

Having had it brought to their notice that the strategic setting in the South Pacific was changing, the ANZUS allies determined to take active steps to protect their own security interests. According to Australian analyst Richard Herr, the subsequent incremental increase in the level of attention the ANZUS nations paid to the new and emerging states in the South Pacific during the late 1970s can be traced to a commitment, never made explicit, that was undertaken in August 1976 at a meeting of the ANZUS Council of Ministers and reaffirmed the next year. He contends that the three nations agreed that it was totally unnecessary for them to take a direct military response to the situation. Instead, they resolved to increase economic assistance to the South Pacific and upgrade support for regional institutions there. Provision of military aid and development of regional defense cooperation were to form only a minor part of this. Because Australia and New Zealand had the closest bilateral ties to the South Pacific area, it was agreed that they should properly take the leading role in implementing the new policy. Herr asserts that by increasing economic assistance to the South Pacific the ANZUS nations intended to ensure that none of the new states would have to seek aid from any adversary of ANZUS or from sources deemed likely to promote radical ideologies. Additionally, by encouraging regionalism it was hoped that peer pressure and the influence of ANZUS nations themselves—each of which was a member of one or more regional institutions—would constrain individual decisionmakers in the South Pacific from pursuing any "adventurist" policies.

The increased activism by ANZUS members in the South Pacific during the late 1970s represented a break with the past in that the newly perceived need to protect common interests helped prompt Australia, New Zealand, and the United States to upgrade the level of resource commitment to the area; there was no major discontinuity in policy direction. Australia and New

Zealand had initiated a reappraisal of their defense priorities during the early 1970s and had for the most part already retracted their lines of forward defense from the Southeast Asian mainland to concentrate on defending their own national territories and the surrounding maritime environment. The priority Australia assigned to the South Pacific showed the greatest change; aid to the region for the 1977–79 period was four times what it had been for the previous three years. As before, however, most of this went to Melanesia, primarily to Papua New Guinea. New Zealand, already giving about as much as it could afford, continued to build on its already strong diplomatic and economic ties to Polynesia and Fiji and upgraded its defense cooperation in those areas. For the United States the new stress on the South Pacific primarily entailed a gradual enlargement of diplomatic and development assistance contacts in the area.

The United States had long been far more active to the north of the equator than to the south, by virtue of its relationship with Guam and the TTPI. Contrary to the case in the South Pacific, the movement toward political transition in the TTPI and the attempt to address islanders' desires for greater self-rule had generated considerable analysis of related security matters. During the early 1970s the United States initiated a reappraisal of the situation in Asia and the Pacific in order to refine its definition of American needs and interests in the TTPI. Up to that time United States defense policy had been based on the idea that American blood had been spilled to win the islands and that it was necessary to hold them to prevent a repetition of the costly island-hopping campaigns of World War II. This attitude had been reflected in the postwar provisions of the United Nations trusteeship agreement, which had empowered the United States to build or use military facilities in the TTPI or to close off the entire area for security reasons. Despite these provisions, however, the TTPI had not figured significantly in any United States military operations.

The reappraisal of United States strategic needs in the TTPI was affected by the territory's proximity to Guam and by developments outside Oceania itself. Important in this regard was the growing strategic importance of the base at Guam in light of its use during the Vietnam Conflict and its use as a forward base for Polaris submarines. The fall of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and the United States decision to retrench its military presence in Asia had greatly upgraded Guam's significance as an element in the broader commitment of United States forces to Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Concern that the capability of the facilities at Guam might be overstrained and that they

were vulnerable to accident or conflict revived interest in retaining the option to use certain islands in the TTPI as support installations for Guam. Owing to limitations of size, topography, and location, only Tinian and Saipan in the Marianas and Babelthuap in the Palaus were identified as useful in this regard. Other United States defense requirements comprised the continued use of the Kwajalein missile range and the ability to ensure strategic denial in the entire TTPI area.

As negotiations progressed during the mid- and late 1970s and different portions of the TTPI expressed interest in becoming independent from each other, separate arrangements had to be worked out for each. Much of the subject matter of the status negotiations focused on ensuring that defense and security requirements of both parties would be protected under any new arrangement. By the early 1980s provisional agreement had been reached with four separate political entites: The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. Ancillary agreements had unique provisions concerning the future defense and security relationship with the United States (see the United States, this ch.). As of mid-1984 there were still matters to be resolved with Palau before the trusteeship agreement could be terminated.

By the early 1980s the initial urgency with which the Soviet threat to the region was viewed had subsided somewhat as observers subjected to sober analysis the capacity of the Soviet Union to expand into the region and its interest in doing so (see The Soviet Union, this ch.). Observers in the ANZUS nations and in island states nonetheless continued to be suspicious of Soviet intentions, especially in light of the rapid and steady expansion of Soviet military forces in Asia. The buildup had not directly affected Oceania as of mid-1984, but insofar as it could potentially threaten the existing military balance in Asia and the Pacific—which favored the ANZUS nations and their friends and allies—growth of Soviet military power was viewed with alarm. Wishing not to present the Soviets with an opportunity to establish a forward base in Oceania, the ANZUS nations as a matter of policy have encouraged island states to deny the Soviets any concessions. When necessary, the ANZUS nations have offered aid or other incentives to counteract or preempt a Soviet initiative. Indeed, it has been suggested that their demonstrated willingness to do so might tempt island states to "play the Soviet card" in order to reap the benefits of refusing a Soviet offer.

Although there did not appear to be an external threat to

Oceania as of mid-1984, several matters internal to the region had the potential to affect the overall strategic setting. The first and most important of these was the widespread support for establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific in which nuclear weapons and nuclear testing would be banned. In some states antinuclear sentiment has prompted efforts to close off the entire region or—with some success—certain portions of it to transit by nuclear-powered or -armed ships and aircraft (see The Nuclear Issue, this ch.). The issue had serious ramifications for the ANZUS alliance, especially as antinuclear sentiment appeared to have great potency in New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, in Australia (see Australia and New Zealand, this ch.).

Interstate relations within Oceania were relatively free of the sort of disputes that might escalate to affect regional security. One exception, however, was the continuing border problems experienced by Papua New Guinea and Indonesia (see Papua New Guinea, ch. 2). At times these have resulted in Melanesian residents of Indonesia fleeing across the border to Papua New Guinea for various reasons. The two nations have settled all disputes peaceably, but there was underlying sympathy in Papua New Guinea for fellow Melanesians who lived across the border and who were perceived as being numerically overwhelmed by Indonesian immigrants. The Papua New Guinea government has been very careful to do nothing to aggravate its powerful neighbor, however, and to avoid any appearance of giving support to the Melanesian insurgent group in Indonesia.

Although there were many sources of tension within various island states that could disrupt internal security, only in one instance—Vanuatu in 1980—has a problem escalated to a degree beyond an island government's capability to handle it. In that case, the situation was quickly brought under control after Vanuatu secured support from Australia and Papua New Guinea to put down a secessionist movement on the island of Espiritu Santo. This example of regional cooperation on security matters prompted the Papua New Guinea government to sound out its neighbors on the possibility of forming a regional peacekeeping force. That suggestion met with little favor, however, for most island governments were uninterested in devoting time and resources to development of a military or internal security capability beyond what they already possessed.

As of mid-1984 one particular source of regional disorder lay in New Caledonia, where the movement for independence has divided the population and received strong support from the South Pacific Forum (see New Caledonia, ch. 2). That support has

so far been confined to rhetoric, but should the movement be-
come radicalized, or the independence process move too slowly,
there was a strong possibility that the issue might escalate to in-
volve external actors, either from within Oceania or outside it. At
the same time, there was also a danger that forces opposed to in-
dependence or to rule by the Melanesian-based independence
movement might act in a manner that would disturb regional se-
curity. Support for the independence movement among the is-
land governments was grounded in their strong preference for all
territories to reach independence as expeditiously as possible.
Less directly, it also reflected anti-French sentiments aroused by
the nuclear testing program and by the perception that France
has only grudgingly acceded to decolonization. As in other parts
of Oceania, ethnic tension, landownership, and other issues com-
pounded the problems faced by New Caledonia.

The ANZUS Treaty and Other Security Arrangements

Although there were several bilateral security guarantees
and arrangements operative in Oceania during the early 1980s,
the most important mechanism underwriting security in the area

was the ANZUS treaty, which was signed in San Francisco on September 1, 1951, and became effective on April 29, 1952. In that treaty Australia, New Zealand, and the United States declare their common desire "to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area" (see Appendix C). In pursuit of that goal, the treaty commits all three to coordinating efforts for collective defense through consultation and mutual aid and to developing and maintaining their own capacity to resist attack. The treaty provides that the parties will consult with each other should any of their number believe its territorial integrity, political independence, or security to be threatened in the Pacific. Such a threat would encompass "an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific." In the event of such an attack, each of the parties agrees to meet the common danger in accordance with its own constitutional processes. The treaty continues in force indefinitely or until one year after any of the signatories gives notice of its intention to withdraw.

The sole organ of the treaty is the ANZUS council, which first met in 1952. The council comprises the foreign ministers of each of the three nations or their deputies. A military representative is designated by each member to assist the minister in an advisory capacity. The council has no permanent secretariat. It has met on an annual basis, the location rotating among the three capitals.

The treaty was originally formed pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security for the Pacific area. In the absence of this, the council has evolved into a forum for the discussion of common concerns and regional and international developments. It has also been used to coordinate policy, particularly toward the region. Outside the formal council framework, informal consultation and other forms of practical cooperation among ANZUS members have taken place on a regular basis. Such activities have included information and intelligence exchanges, joint military exercises, and naval visits to each other's ports.

In the years since the ANZUS treaty first went into effect, various newly independent states have expressed interest in ANZUS membership or in securing bilateral defense ties with ANZUS partners. Such guarantees had not been extended as of mid-1984. Most observers of the security setting in Oceania have noted, however, that the island states are to some extent covered by the ANZUS umbrella because the treaty partners would probably consider a direct attack on one of the island states of Oceania

a threat to their own national security. Any attack on an ANZUS partner's armed forces or vessels sent to aid a beleaguered state would also trigger the treaty.

In addition to the ANZUS security treaty, there were several bilateral security arrangements in Oceania. France had obvious responsibility for the defense of its overseas territories of New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia, as did Chile for its province of Easter Island, and Indonesia for Irian Jaya. Presumably, Britain continued to hold this responsibility for the Pitcairn Islands. The United States territories of American Samoa and Guam also enjoyed similar protection by virtue of being sovereign United States soil. As of mid-1984 responsibility for the defense of the TTPI continued to devolve to the United States pending the anticipated termination of the United Nations trust agreement. At that time separate arrangements between the United States and each of the four political entities to be created would come into effect (see The United States, this ch.).

New Zealand and Australia also had defense links with various island states. New Zealand exercised responsibility for the defense of the freely associated states of Cook Islands and Niue and for Tokelau, a dependent territory under its administration. New Zealand's treaty of friendship with Western Samoa had no defense aspect, but New Zealand has provided Western Samoa with security support assistance, as it has to Tonga and Fiji. Australia had no formal defense arrangements with any of the island states but retained close ties to the Papua New Guinea Defense Force and has also provided security support assistance to other island states, including Solomon Islands, Nauru, and Vanuatu.

Oceania in Strategic Terms

During the early 1980s the major actors affecting the strategic setting in Oceania were the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and France. The Soviet Union, by virtue of its potential to intervene in the area, was also an important shadow figure in the strategic equation. Britain and Chile retained security ties to the region, as to a greater extent did Indonesia, which also had a security stake in maintaining friendly ties with Papua New Guinea and other Melanesian states in order to preclude their support for Melanesian insurgents in Indonesia. The Chinese presence in Oceania was mainly confined to the diplomatic sphere, although that nation had small trade and aid links to the area. Japan had growing economic interests in much of

Oceania but, like China, showed no prospect of becoming militar-
ily involved in the region or otherwise affecting security there. As
of mid-1984 it appeared that Japan's stated interest in undertak-
ing increased responsibility for the defense of sea-lanes in the
Pacific would encompass areas "up to 1,000 miles" from Japan but
not impinge on the waters of Oceania.

The United States

From the end of World War II until the mid-1970s the
United States in effect treated Oceania as two separate regions:
one lying below the equator and, excepting American Samoa,
under the control of allies and needing no particular United States
attention, and another lying above the equator and comprising
Guam, the TTPI, and Hawaii, all areas in which the United States
had substantial interests. This distinction between the two reg-
ions began to be undermined during the early 1970s, however, as
the United States began to meet the increased opportunities for
involvement in the South Pacific and to move away from its
former policy of benign neglect toward that area. The process got
a noticeable boost after Australia and New Zealand importuned
the United States to take more active steps to offset potential
Soviet interest in the South Pacific, and security considerations
became one of a number of factors influencing United States ac-
tion below as well as above the equator.

In 1978 the United States outlined a framework for future ac-
tivity in the South Pacific, within which it proceeded to work
throughout the early 1980s. That framework called for "under-
standing and sympathy for the political and economic aspirations
of the South Pacific peoples" [and support for] regional coopera-
tion; particularly close and cooperative ties with Australia and
New Zealand; and continued cooperation with France and the
United Kingdom in support of progress of the South Pacific
peoples." Guided by these principles, the United States ex-
panded its diplomatic and economic contacts with the region, at
the same time insisting that there would be no attempt to usurp
the dominant position of Australia and New Zealand in the area. It
also began providing certain states, including Tonga, Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Fiji, with very modest amounts of
defense aid, much of which came under the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) Program during the early 1980s.

Part of the United States effort to pursue closer relations with
the South Pacific states entailed relinquishment of claims to cer-
tain islands also claimed by other states. This was accomplished

through four treaties, signed during the 1978–80 period and ratified by the United States Senate in 1983. Two of those four treaties—those with Tuvalu and Kiribati—had a defense aspect, containing clauses that provided for consultations with the United States in the event of a perceived threat to those states or prior to permitting any third party to use local bases.

At the same time that the United States outlined the policy dimensions of its increased attentiveness toward the South Pacific in 1978, it also announced its intentions to pursue above the equator "the Micronesian status negotiations with the goal of achieving a free association agreement between the United States and Micronesia and termination of the Trusteeship by 1981." The linkage of what theretofore had been treated as unrelated matters appeared to grant recognition to pervasive sentiments in the South Pacific—as well as the TTPI—that all territories in Oceania should proceed as quickly as possible toward some form of independence. Although difficulties surrounding the negotiations still had not been resolved entirely as of mid-1984, by the early 1980s the United States had increasingly come to treat Micronesia as part of an emerging "Pacific Islands Community." It was envisaged that the Micronesian states would in due time integrate more closely with those of the South Pacific, possibily through membership in regional institutions already in place.

United States policy toward Oceania as of mid-1984 continued to be based on the framework enunciated in 1978, emphasizing United States participation in the region on a partnership basis. The defense aspect of United States policy called for "maintaining, in conjunction with friends and allies in the region, military forces adequate to deter any acts hostile to our independence and integrity." To this end the United States has expressed its interest in retaining contingency access to portions of the TTPI. Beyond that, however, it was stated that existing bases on Guam and Hawaii and access to facilities at American Samoa were sufficient to accomplish its goals. Access to other ports for reprovisioning and shore leave would be beneficial but not essential. The United States emphasized, however, that to fulfill its obligations under the ANZUS alliance, its naval forces must be free to move through the entire Pacific. It strongly contended that closure of any waters to nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered vessels or aircraft would severely hamper its ability to respond to contingencies in the Pacific or to engage in military exercises with or support its ANZUS allies.

United States strategic interests in Oceania have long derived from several sources and have been territorial, political,

economic, cultural, and military in nature. The United States had a direct territorial interest in Hawaii, American Samoa, and Guam. Guam itself was an especially valuable asset because it was politically secure and ideally located for supporting allies and friends in Asia and the Pacific and acting as a forward defense base for Hawaii. An element of the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command was stationed on Guam. United States naval facilities located there provided repair and reprovisioning for United States naval craft, including strategic nuclear submarines. Guam was no longer a base for strategic nuclear submarines, however.

The United States had territorial interest in Wake and Midway islands, the latter being under the control of the United States Navy. Several other isolated islands in Oceania, some uninhabited, were also under United States jurisdiction, including Howland, Baker, and Jarvis islands, Kingman Reef, and Palmyra and Johnston atolls.

As of mid-1984 the United States remained responsible for the defense of the TTPI and was anticipated to continue to do so, although under different and varying terms, after termination of the trusteeship agreement. At that time, the United States was scheduled to incur an indefinite defense responsibility for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. The United States had leased land on Tinian and Saipan for possible future use by its armed forces.

United States defense requirements in the other three entities in the TTPI were contingent upon approval of the Compact of Free Association, a framework for future multifaceted relationships with the United States. The Federates States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands had both approved the relationship in their acts of self-determination, and their agreements were awaiting approval of the United States Congress as of mid-1984. The agreement with the Republic of Palau was more problematic. In a plebiscite held in February 1983, the compact was endorsed by 62 percent of Palau's population, but this was short of the 75 percent necessary under Palau's Constitution, which stipulates that margin of approval to contravene provisions on the Constitution that essentially establish a nuclear-free Palau in which access by nuclear-powered ships and the transit and overflight of nuclear weapons would be forbidden. These provisions were inconsistent with the defense responsibility and authority of the United States under the free association arrangement.

Under the free association agreements, the United States

*United States missile-tracking and -testing facility
at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands
Courtesy Patricia Luce Chapman*

would assume responsibility for the defense of the Marshall Islands and the FSM for a minimum of 15 years and of Palau for 50 years. During those periods the United States would retain the right to disapprove any act, after consultation with the relevant government, that would, in the United States view, compromise United States security. For the same periods the United States could also foreclose any third-party use of local territory for military purposes.

The United States also had separate agreements with each of the three covering military requirements. The agreement with the Republic of the Marshall Islands provided for the continued use of the Kwajalein missile range for up to 30 years. That with the FSM provided for transit rights and for the continued presence of a United States Coast Guard station on Yap but did not seek bas-

ing arrangements. Under the first Military Use and Operations Rights Agreement with the Republic of Palau, the United States, after consultation with the government of Palau, could make contingency use of various parts of the nation. This contingency right ran for 50 years and encompassed access to anchorage rights in Palau's main harbor, use of nearby land areas for support facilities, joint use of Palau's airfield, use of a further tract of land for logistics installations, and periodic access to other parts of Palau for training exercises. As of mid-1984 the United States apparently foresaw no need to exercise these contingency rights, however. As of mid-1984 a somewhat revised Compact and Military Use and Operations Rights Agreement had been negotiated with Palau, but neither government had formally approved it.

In addition to these territorial and other defense interests, the United States also had an important economic, political, and military interest in maintaining open sea-lanes of communication in Oceania. United States trade with its Asian and Pacific neighbors was estimated to constitute nearly 30 percent of the nation's total foreign trade in 1983, more than United States trade with Europe. A significant proportion of United States naval traffic was also borne over waters of the Pacific. In this regard Micronesia's critical geographic location has rendered it an especially vital strategic area for the United States. Although in peacetime the most heavily traveled sea-lanes in the Pacific run to the north of Oceania, connecting the west coast of the United States with Japan and East Asia, in the event of conflict those sea-lanes would move south, as they did during World War II, to pass through Micronesia. In peacetime Micronesia lies astride major trade routes connecting the United States with the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Naval traffic between the United States and the Philippines and the Indian Ocean also regularly transits Micronesian waters. Other sea-lanes in which the United States has an interest include routes used by friends and allies that run north-south through Melanesian states in the western Pacific and others that cross the South Pacific to connect Australia and New Zealand with the United States, the Panama Canal, and Latin America.

Beyond seeing to the well-being of its territories and maintaining open sea-lanes of communication, United States economic interest in Oceania primarily concerned securing non-discriminatory access to resources in the region. The only major problem it has experienced in this regard arose out of a jurisdictional dispute over the control of migratory species of fish, primarily tuna. United States law does not recognize the right of individual states to control such species, arguing that by virtue of

their migratory habits they live in the ocean at large and not in the waters of any one state and that a regional rather than a national approach was therefore the best way to manage and conserve these species. In contrast the Pacific island states have contended that tuna is one of the few resources available for their exploitation and that each state can exert control over any fish while in its EEZ. Although the issue has caused contention in Oceania, as of mid-1984 it had not disrupted regional security and appeared unlikely to do so.

Australia and New Zealand

Southern Oceania was first viewed as strategically vital to Australia and New Zealand during the nineteenth century, when groups in the British colonies located there urged Britain, with varying degrees of success, to annex several nearby islands as a security shield against non-British influence. Interest in the security of neighboring islands was also demonstrated by the prompt moves of both Australia and New Zealand to take over German possessions at the onset of World War I.

Events of World War II strongly reinforced the perception in both states that a direct relationship existed between their own security and that of maritime regions to the north. Partly in recognition of this, the two concluded the 1944 Australian-New Zealand Agreement, which, aside from providing a formal basis for defense cooperation with each other, called for the establishment of a welfare organization to promote the social and economic development of people living in the Pacific islands and a military alliance to oversee regional security. The former of these aspirations was realized in 1947, when the six Western nations having territorial interests in Oceania agreed to participate in the South Pacific Commission (SPC), an advisory body providing economic and other assistance to the island territories (see Appendix B).

It proved more difficult to develop an effective military alliance. The 1944 agreement had initially been drawn up to proclaim that any postwar policing role in non-Japanese island territories in the Pacific should be reserved for Australia and New Zealand. It very quickly became apparent, however, that this task was far beyond the capability of the two states, and any fear that the United States might usurp the two states' position in the South Pacific was rapidly replaced by a desire to involve the United States more closely in underwriting security there. Much of the turnaround was attributable to changes in the governments of both states and to fears of a resurgence of Japanese militarism.

During the late 1940s Australia led an effort to persuade the United States to involve itself in a regional security arrangement for the Pacific island area. That effort met with success in 1951 when the United States agreed to enter into the ANZUS alliance, at the same time securing the signatures of Australia and New Zealand to the peace treaty with Japan.

Confident that the security of Oceania was adequately protected by the ANZUS treaty, both states devoted limited attention to the defense aspect of their relations with the island states until the purported Soviet overtures to Tonga and Western Samoa in 1976. That motivated them to elicit an ANZUS commitment to increase emphasis on attending to security matters in Oceania as well as to upgrade bilateral efforts to promote a stable environment in Oceania that would serve their own security interests. There were important differences, however, between Australia's and New Zealand's strategic vantage point on Oceania and their defense postures toward the region.

Australia's strategic outlook on Oceania reflected the fact that its pivotal geographic location renders it vulnerable to a widely defined strategic environment in which historical circumstance has demonstrated it could not stand alone. Australia came under direct attack from the Pacific during World War II—a threat it was quite conscious could not have been turned back without United States assistance. That experience motivated Australia to place a higher emphasis on defense than was the case for New Zealand, which had not been directly threatened. That attitude was reinforced during the 1950s and 1960s as the nation perceived threats to its national security emanating from Southeast Asia. More recently, Australia has also expressed concern over its third flank, the Indian Ocean, and over long-term intentions of the Soviet Union, especially in the wake of its invasion of Afghanistan. In all these cases, Australian security interests were seen as broadly coinciding with those of the United States. These experiences have helped sustain in Australia a bipartisan commitment to the ANZUS alliance.

There has nonetheless been some controversy within Australia over reconciling antinuclear sentiments in certain elements of the population with requirements for supporting the ANZUS alliance. This has been expressed at times in reluctance to permit vessels to pay port calls unless they guarantee they are not carrying nuclear weapons. In one instance in early 1984, the British aircraft carrier H.M.S *Invincible* was refused access to dry-dock facilities in Sydney because Britain—like the United States—refuses as a matter of policy to confirm or deny whether

any of its ships carry nuclear weapons. Shortly after that incident, however, the Australian government approved a policy stating that friendly warships would not be required to make such assurances before entering Australian ports and that access to dry-dock facilities would be made on a case-by-case basis to ensure adequate safety standards.

Australia was the biggest aid donor to the South Pacific. Most of that assistance was targeted on nearby Melanesian states, particularly on Papua New Guinea, which was under Australian administration before becoming independent in 1975. Although it had no defense treaty with Papua New Guinea, or with any island state for that matter, Australia was responsible for the development of the Papua New Guinea Defense Force and has continued to provide training and support assistance to meet the nation's modest security requirements. Most of this support has been made available through a defense aid program initiated in mid-1977. Under that program Australia has also provided security support assistance to other island states, including Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.

Australian defense assistance has taken many forms. In 1980 Australia played an important support role for the Papua New Guinea forces deployed to restore central government control of the island of Espiritu Santo in Vanuatu. Australian military forces, albeit in decreasing numbers, continued to be stationed in Papua New Guinea to advise and support the Papua New Guinea Defence Force. Australia provided support and training to Fiji troops that were dispatched under United Nations (UN) auspices to Lebanon in 1978 and Zimbabwe in 1980. It also helped meet the costs for training the Vanuatu Mobile Force in Papua New Guinea (see Vanuatu, ch. 2). Military personnel from Papua New Guinea and other island states have also been offered training in Australia. One component of the defense aid package for the early 1980s funded a project to assess the maritime surveillance needs of the island states. There were suggestions in late 1983 that Australia might cooperate with certain island states to make regular trimonthly overflights of their extensive EEZs. Data collected under such a program would have a clear utility for keeping track of fishing craft as well as other vessels, including submarines.

Defense aid has generally constituted well under 10 percent of total Australian aid to the region. The combined civil and defense aid package, however, has been rationalized as a vehicle by which Australia can serve its own security interests through encouraging stability in its neighborhood. Some civil assistance has therefore been targeted on projects having a clear utility for se-

curity maintenance, including development of local police forces, coastal survey, and channel clearance.

In contrast to Australia, the South Pacific was the sole area of the world in which New Zealand considered itself to have a direct strategic interest. Official defense policy was predicated on the fact that New Zealand was a Pacific country having many citizens of Polynesian origin and that as such its national security depended on maintaining the goodwill and cooperation of neighboring states. Since the late 1970s that defense policy has been based on supporting the ANZUS alliance while pursing individual initiatives designed to advance regional security.

To this end, the nation provided aid to several South Pacific island states, one component of which focused on security assistance, primarily to Fiji and the Polynesian states. Defense relations with Fiji were particularly close. New Zealand helped develop the Royal Fiji Military Forces, and until December 1980 a New Zealand officer served on secondment as its chief of staff. New Zealand provided training in both Fiji and New Zealand for Fiji forces assigned to UN peacekeeping forces in the Middle East as well as to other Fiji troops. New Zealand army troops regularly conducted jungle-training exercises in Fiji.

New Zealand has also provided training for defense forces personnel from Tonga and Papua New Guinea, both in those states and at home. Military engineers and other support personnel have regularly provided disaster relief assistance and miscellaneous civil support, such as reef blasting, surveying, and bridge building, to these as well as other states. In late 1983 the New Zealand minister of defense announced plans to establish a battalion-sized unit—to be called the Ready Reaction Force—that would be deployed to South Pacific island countries to offer assistance where New Zealand's interests accorded with those of its neighbors.

As of mid-1984 New Zealand was the only nation in Oceania where the Soviet fishing fleet was permitted to pay port calls and maintain shore facilities. The Soviets were granted access in the late 1970s in part because it was believed that this would defuse Soviet efforts to secure similar facilities in smaller island states that had less ability to absorb a Soviet presence without cultural, political, and economic dislocation. In part, the decision also reflected New Zealand's dependence on foreign trade and its need to maintain good relations with an important trading partner.

Although the South Pacific promised to retain its strategic significance for New Zealand, it should be noted that public controversy during the early 1980s over how best to provide for na-

tional defense had cast uncertainty over the nation's future de-
fense posture. An official call in 1982 for public debate on this
topic brought forth several suggestions, including withdrawal
from the ANZUS alliance, opting for armed or unarmed neutral-
ity, or becoming nonaligned. Opponents of current defense pol-
icy expressed fear that membership in the ANZUS alliance might
make New Zealand a target for nuclear attack. Many noted that
the nation has never faced a direct threat, and none was foreseen
developing. The defense debate was closely related to very strong
antinuclear sentiments in the nation and to associated public sup-
port for the proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone in the South
Pacific. These were not new issues. During the 1972–75 period it
was official government policy to close the nation's ports to
nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered vessels. Ship visits were again
permitted after a change in government, but support for
reinstituting the ban was very strong in the early 1980s. In 1982
and 1984 bills to do just that were defeated by only one vote in
parliament. The outcome of this debate was indeterminate as of
mid-1984 but could have serious implications for the ANZUS al-
liance and for the South Pacific security setting.

France
    Unlike the ANZUS allies, France was not a Pacific nation and
considered the region neither vital to French national security in-
terests nor related to its global strategy except indirectly through
the nuclear testing facility in French Polynesia. Aside from that
program, the strategic significance of the island territories arose
from France's economic stake in New Caledonia and support for
French language and culture in all three of its dependencies.
    The French military presence in Oceania was divided be-
tween New Caledonia and French Polynesia. French forces were
deployed in the Pacific to protect French territories from external
aggression, act as a backup to internal security forces should the
need arise, provide auxiliary logistics and disaster relief assistance
to local governments, and maintain and protect the nuclear
Pacific Test Center (Centre d'Expérimentation du Pacifique),
which was located in French Polynesia.
    French forces in New Caledonia operated under an interser-
vice command structure. Personnel numbered approximately
2,800 as of early 1982. Formations included one marine infantry
regiment of the French army as well as air force, naval air, and
other support units. The French navy had a separate naval com-
mand for the Pacific, the air and communication center of which
was located at Nouméa. The French Pacific Fleet as a rule com-

prised four surface combatants and five amphibious ships. These operated out of both New Caledonia and French Polynesia. Routine maintenance for the fleet was performed at Nouméa. Near Nouméa, at Tontouta, was an airfield where naval air detachments flew supply and liaison missions and a small air force unit was equipped with Puma helicopters used in a transport capacity.

Most French forces in French Polynesia were assigned to the nuclear test facility. Total military strength was approximately 5,000 as of early 1982. Personnel served under an interservice command, which comprised one marine and one infantry regiment of the French army as well as air force and naval air units. The headquarters of the nuclear test facility and a support base were located at Papeete on Tahiti. The air force also maintained a small number of light aircraft and helicopters there. A small naval air unit flew P-2H maritime patrol aircraft out of Papeete. A forward support base for the nuclear testing facility was located at Hao in the Tuamotu Archipelago, which had a deep-water port and an air strip equipped with a few helicopters. The nuclear test sites themselves were at Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls. These were chosen because they were uninhabited, located in an area crossed by few shipping lanes, easiily accessible, sizable enough to accommodate requisite scientific equipment, and believed to be geologically stable (see The Nuclear Issue, this ch.).

The Soviet Union

Oceania has never been an area of primary strategic interest for the Soviet Union and as of mid-1984 appeared ullikely to become so in the foreseeable future. Most Soviet strategic interest in the Pacific has been focused on areas to the north and east of Oceania, and the closest Soviet bases to the area were located some 3,000 kilometers west of the Palaus in Vietnam and over 5,000 kilometers northwest of the Northern Marianas in Vladivostok. There have been occasional and, it appears, isolated sightings of Soviet submarines in various parts of the region, but Oceania has remained essentially outside the normal deployment area of the Soviet navy and other military forces.

The Soviet Union is, however, a global power, and as such no area of the world is completely void of strategic significance to it. It was generally assumed that the Soviet Union had subsidiary strategic interests in Oceania that related to the sea-lanes of communication running through it and to the United States military presence in Guam and Hawaii. There has also been speculation

that the Soviets might be interested in Oceania as a place where strategic submarines could be deployed to escape detection. This has been subject to debate, however, it being difficult to determine whether such action would be necessary or efficacious given the highly classified ratings assigned to state-of-the-art submarine technology. It has also been suggested, again not without dispute, that over the long term the Soviet Union might be interested in developing mid-range bases in Oceania to support operations in Antarctica.

The Soviet Union had very limited political and economic interests in Oceania, and there was little indication that these could grow sufficiently over the short or medium term to assume strategic significance. Soviet diplomatic influence among island states was very shallow; relations with Tonga and Western Samoa were conducted through resident missions in New Zealand and relations with Fiji and Papua New Guinea through resident missions in Australia. Vanuatu, which did not maintain relations with the Soviet Union, established diplomatic relations with Cuba in July 1983, but as of mid-1984 this had not appeared to have resulted in any increase in local Soviet influence.

There have been several reasons for the Soviets' lack of political influence in the area. The island states were basically pro-Western, and Marxist-oriented movements had little support. What diplomatic contacts the Soviets have had with the island states have at times been conducted in a style that provoked resentment among senior officials and diplomats in Oceania. Decisionmaking, both within and among island states, has been characterized by slow consensus building and courteous and careful attention to each party's viewpoint. The Soviets were seen as heavy-handed and unwilling or unable to conform to this "Pacific Way" of doing business. At the same time, the Chinese and the ANZUS nations have been adept at making a case for their own anti-Soviet outlook.

Soviet economic interests in Oceania were limited to fishing, merchant shipping, and cruise line operations. Only the first of these appeared capable of much expansion. Even there, however, most Soviet fishing in Oceania was done in the cold waters off New Zealand. The Soviets gave no military or economic aid to Oceania. Even including trade with Australia, trade with the region has at most accounted for under 2 percent of total Soviet foreign trade.

Notwithstanding the fact that it had few developed interests in the area, the Soviet Union's demonstrated willingness to attempt low-risk advances in other parts of the globe has kept the

ANZUS nations and several island states alert to the possibility of
a Soviet probe in the area. Analysis of Soviet actions and inten-
tions was open to subjective assessment, but there was little
doubt that the buildup of Soviet military forces in the Pacific,
which had been under way since the mid-1970s, has greatly en-
hanced the Soviet capability to operate in Oceania. A major factor
in the buildup has been the explosive growth of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet. Under Soviet military doctrine the navy functions not only
as a defensive instrument in wartime but also as an agent of
peacetime state policy. In the latter role it was to be used to pur-
sue international objectives and project political influence. Ac-
cess to port facilities and airfields in Vietnam, although still far
distant from Oceania, has enhanced the Soviet capacity to project
a presence in the area.

During the early 1980s there was a noticeable increase in the
local operation of Soviet hydrographic research vessels, increas-
ing numbers of which have been alleged to carry naval rather than
civilian personnel. The research effort, sometimes conducted by
aging submarines or disguised fishing vessels, formed part of a
worldwide Soviet drive to advance knowledge of maritime condi-
tions in general. The Soviets are recognized experts in the field.
Because such knowledge had a clear military utility, however,
especially regarding submarine operations, the ANZUS and is-
land governments have tended to take a dim view of Soviet re-
seach in Oceania.

Soviet diplomatic behavior has contributed to their cool re-
ception. In late 1980 the Soviet research vessel *Kalisto* offered its
services to a committee associated with the UN Economic and So-
cial Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) at a meeting on
Tarawa in Kiribati. The proposal that *Kalisto* would carry out a
survey of the EEZs of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and
Vanuatu on behalf of ESCAP was initially greeted favorably by
the scientists and development officers attending the meeting.
The three nations in question, however, were convinced by the
ANZUS nations that security complications favored acceptance of
a counteroffer under which a United States vessel would under-
take the research. That decision was then endorsed by the South
Pacific Forum in 1981. The *Kalisto* nonetheless began operations,
to the displeasure of local states. Representatives of these states
were also displeased by the efforts of the Soviet delegate to
an ESCAP meeting in 1983 to have inserted into the ESCAP
minutes a note saying that the Soviet government had offered
data to ESCAP collected by the *Kalisto* in South Pacific island
areas. Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands protested the

move, inserting in the minutes an additional note saying that the Soviet Union had "persisted in pressing its offer of marine research on [the ESCAP committee] members though these offers were clearly unwelcome."

The Nuclear Issue

Most of the strong antinuclear sentiment exhibited in the region has been focused on the French nuclear testing program. It was rooted in opposition to nuclear weapons per se and in fears of radiation contamination spreading from French Polynesia to the rest of Oceania. It was believed that no matter how isolated the test site, the movement of ocean currents made the Pacific the backyard of all islands, rendering distance no guarantee of safety. Opposition to testing has been intensified by resentment that the Pacific was being used by an extraregional state for purposes deemed too dangerous for its own home territory. The general perception that the French were insensitive to local opposition and intransigent or even arrogant in their dealings on the issue has also helped deepen antinuclear sentiment.

Nuclear testing in the area dates back to the initial United States testing program in the Marshall Islands, which began in 1946 with an explosion on Bikini Atoll and after 1947 used Eniwetok Atoll as well. By 1962, when the program was ended, tests had also been conducted on the uninhabited Johnston Atoll, a United States dependency in the central Pacific. In addition, both Britain and the United States had conducted tests on Kiritimati (formerly Christmas) Island in Kiribati. The United States has provided compensation to the Marshall Islanders for damage to their health and property. The terms of part of this compensation were incorporated into the text of the Compact of Free Association Between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the United States (see Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, ch. 3). The long-term effect of the tests on islanders' health has not been determined. Bikinians were permitted to resettle on their atoll in 1971 after it was cleared and declared safe, but tests in 1977 revealed that the atoll was still dangerously contaminated, and Bikinians were again forced to move. Residents of Eniwetok returned to their homes in 1976, but a nuclear waste dump on the atoll was projected to remain contaminated for several thousand years. There were reports in the early 1980s that residents of two atolls over 120 kilometers distant from the test sites were developing an unusually high incidence of thyroid tumors, a condi-

tion commonly associated with exposure to radiation.

France announced in 1963 that it was moving its testing program to French Polynesia. During the 1966–83 period it was estimated to have conducted over 100 individual test blasts there, the large majority on Mururoa Atoll and the remainder on nearby Fangataufa Atoll. Atmospheric testing was halted in 1975, but the switch to underground blasts did not defuse opposition to the program. In fact, several incidents in the interim have helped keep concern alive. Among these was an accident in 1979 in which two French workers were killed in an explosion in an underground laboratory. Less than three weeks later, part of Mururoa collapsed in the wake of a nuclear test explosion, causing a tidal wave. In March 1981 a hurricane was reported to have swept nuclear waste stored on Mururoa into the lagoon of the atoll and then out into the Pacific. Stories in the international press, denied by France, claimed that the atoll had been rendered geologically unstable by the repeated blasts. Hurricanes again hit the islands in 1982 and 1983, raising fears of similar accidents.

As of mid-1984 there was every indication that France would continue to use French Polynesia as a nuclear testing site. According to a statement in 1983 by the French ambassador to Fiji, France decided in 1962 that French independence and security required the nation to maintain nuclear armament sufficient to dissuade any aggressor. The only way this would be effective, however, was if the national nuclear capacity remained current, and that required continuous testing. Under these circumstances the French stated it was impossible to set a fixed date for ending the program. Official French statements have emphasized that there was constant and detailed monitoring of all test sites. France has flatly denied reports in the international press that there has been an increased incidence of cancer in the local population. In 1983 it released figures indicating that the cancer rate in French Polynesia was lower than that in Australia, New Zealand, or metropolitan France.

By the early 1970s the hostile reaction in the region to nuclear testing had led the island states to place greater scrutiny on the related issue of nuclear weaponry. This culminated in suggestions that a nuclear weapons-free zone be established in the Pacific in which nuclear weapons and nuclear testing would be banned. The idea was first officially put forward in the election policy of the New Zealand Labour Party government in 1972 but achieved prominence in 1975 when Fiji endorsed the idea. The proposition was then considered favorably by the South Pacific Forum, which agreed that the matter should be raised in the UN.

Later in 1975 Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and other island states urged support for the issue in the UN General Assembly. By 1976, however, the governments in Australia and New Zealand had both changed, and representatives of the new governments were able to lobby successfully for the forum to attach qualifications to the nuclear weapons-free proposal. These greatly watered down its terms and ensured that the United States could continue to operate in the area and that there would be no interference with the ability of the ANZUS partners to exchange port calls and conduct military exercises together. Under the new arrangement the forum declared that the proposed zone would not interfere with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas nor would it be developed in any way that would make it incompatible with "existing security arrangements."

That position was still officially in effect as of mid-1984, but the issue has been far from dormant in the intervening years. Reports in 1979 that Japan and the United States had considered using uninhabited islands in the Pacific as temporary storage sites for nuclear waste provoked widespread opposition and drew the condemnation of the South Pacific Forum. The United States and Japan insisted that they had no intentions of using any Pacific island for such purposes. Nonetheless, in 1980 Fiji protested the matter in the UN General Assembly and again called for a nuclear-free zone to be established in the Pacific. The same year Fiji also declared that, lacking the capacity to monitor radiation, it would have to close its ports to nuclear vessels. Fiji reversed that ban in 1983, however, stating that although it was still strongly opposed to nuclear weapons and to nuclear testing, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea required that ports and sea passages be open to free maritime transit. The decision was also officiallly linked to Australian and New Zealand suggestions that the use of Fiji's ports by ANZUS vessels would enhance the ability of the alliance "to meet the security needs of the region in times of conflict"—a goal Fiji's government also shared.

Other states have also taken concrete measures to demonstrate their antinuclear sentiments. In 1982 Vanuatu refused entry to two United States ships that, following United States policy, refused to confirm or deny whether they were carrying nuclear weapons. The United States and certain of its allies considered such a move tantamount to identifying targets for potential adversaries. In early 1984 it was reported that Solomon Islands declared it would no longer permit vessels to enter its ports or transit its waters unless it received a commitment in writing that the vessel was neither nuclear-armed nor nuclear-powered. Pro-

visions in the Constitution of Palau that bar use, testing, storage, or disposal of nuclear weapons in its territory helped create an impasse over how to end the trusteeship arrangement over the TTPI.

Appendix A

Selected Events of World War II
Involving the Pacific Ocean

Date	Event
1941	
December 7–10	Japanese forces land on the east coast of Malaya; attack Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong, Guam, and Wake and Midway islands; conduct air strikes on the Philippines; bomb Nauru and Ocean Island (present-day Banaba); land on the north coast of Luzon in the Philippines; capture Guam
December 16	Japanese forces land on Borneo
December 18	Japanese forces land on Mindanao in the Philippines
December 19	Japanese forces move into Burma in strength
December 24	Japanese forces occupy Wake Island
December 25	Hong Kong falls
1942	
January–March	American forces begin arriving in Australia
January 2	Japanese forces occupy Manila
January 11	Japanese forces take Kuala Lumpur; land on Celebes in the Netherlands East Indies
January 23	Japanese forces land at Rabaul on the island of New Britain and on the island of New Ireland; begin building a major base at Rabaul
February 1	American naval forces shell Gilbert and Marshall islands
February 3	Japanese aircraft bomb Port Moresby on the island of New Guinea
February 15	Singapore falls
February 19	Japanese aircraft bomb Darwin, Australia
February 23	President Franklin D. Roosevelt orders General Douglas A. MacArthur to leave the Philippines for Australia
February 24	American naval air strike on Wake Island

February 27–28 . . . . .   Battle of the Java Sea; Japanese
                            forces invade Java in the Netherlands
                            East Indies

March 3 . . . .   Australian air strike on New Britain;
                            Japanese air strike on Port Moresby and sites
                            in northern Australia

March 8 . . . .   Japanese forces land at Lae and
                            Salamaua on New Guinea

March 9 . . . .   Dutch and other Allied forces in Java
                            surrender

March 10 . . . .   Japanese forces land on Buka in the
                            Solomon Islands

March 17 . . . .   MacArthur appointed supreme commander,
                            Allied forces, Southwest Pacific;
                            Admiral Chester W. Nimitz appointed commander
                            in chief, Pacific Ocean areas

April 18 . . . .   Air raid on Tokyo and other Japanese cities

May 3–8 . . . .   Japanese forces occupy Tulagi in the
                            Solomons; Battle of the Coral Sea ends Japanese
                            attempt at a seaborne invasion of Port Moresby

May 6–9 . . . .   Filipino and American resistance in
                            the Philippines ends

June 4 . . . .   Battle of Midway; Japanese fleet heavily
                            damaged by Allied fleet

July 6 . . . .   Japanese forces land on Guadalcanal
                            in the Solomons

July 21–29 . . . .   Japanese forces land at Gona on
                            New Guinea and advance to capture Buna and
                            then Kokoda

August 7–9 . . . .   American forces land on Guadalcanal
                            and Tulagi; capture Tulagi; naval battle of Savo
                            Island isolates American forces on Guadalcanal

August 11 . . . .   Japanese Combined Fleet relocates
                            eastward from Japan to Truk Island in the
                            Caroline group

August 23–25 . . . . . .   Naval battle in the eastern Solomons
                            prevents reinforcement of Japanese on Guadalcanal

August 23 . . . .   Japanese forces occupy Nauru and
                            Ocean Island

August 26 . . . .   Japanese forces land at Milne Bay in
                            New Guinea in an attempt to outflank Port Moresby,
                            but American and Australian defenders force
                            their withdrawal

September 5 . . . .   Japanese troops begin night landings
                            of reinforcements on Guadalcanal

September 11 . . . . . .   Japanese advance halts 50 kilometers
                            north of Port Moresby

September 13 . . . . . .   Battle of Bloody Ridge, Guadalcanal

September 23 . . . . . .   Australian forces counterattack
                            against Japanese forces north of Port Moresby

October 11–
  November 30 . . . . .   Series of naval battles for control

	of waters around Guadalcanal; Japanese eventually repulsed
October 13–16	Japanese heavy artillery and bombers pound American positions on Guadalcanal
November 1	American counteroffensive on Guadalcanal begins
December 2	First controlled nuclear chain reaction initiated at the University of Chicago
December 14	Japanese reinforcements land at Buna

1943

January 2	Australian and American forces capture Buna
February 1	Japanese evacuate Guadalcanal; withdraw from Wau on New Guinea
March 2–5	Battle of the Bismarck Sea thwarts Japanese attempt to reinforce New Guinea from Rabaul
March 25	American forces bomb Japanese airfield on Nauru
April 18	Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander in chief, Japanese Combined Fleet, killed
May 18	Australian forces capture Mubo on New Guinea
June 22–30	American forces take Woodlark and Trobriand (Kiriwina) islands to set up airfields
June 29–30	American forces land at Nassau Bay on New Guinea to set up supply bases; land on Rendova and New Georgia, both in the Solomon Islands, to begin assault on Munda airfield on New Georgia
July 5–16	Japanese reinforce New Georgia from New Britain; naval battles of Kula Gulf and Kolombangara Island
August 5	Munda airfield captured
August 13–18	American air raids on Balikpapan on Borneo and Wewak on New Guinea
August 15	American and New Zealand forces land on Vella Lavella in the Solomons to set up airfields
September 4–16	Australian and American forces land at Lae and Nadzab on New Guinea; advance to capture Salamaua
September 18	American naval air strike on Tarawa in the Gilberts
September 22– October 2	Australian forces attack

	and take Finschhafen on New Guinea
October 5	American air strikes on Wake Island
October 6–7	American forces land on Kolombangara in the Solomons; naval battle during Japanese evacuation of Vella Lavella
October 20	Japanese forces begin reinforcement of Rabaul
October 27– November 6	New Zealand forces take Treasury Islands in preparation for assault on Bougainville in the Solomons
November 1	American forces land on Bougainville to establish airfields
November 5–11	Air strikes on Rabaul
November 12	Surviving Japanese carrier planes and warships withdrawn from Rabaul to Truk
November 20–23	American forces take Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts; heavy losses on both sides; begin to build airfields
December 4	American air strikes on Kwajalein in the Marshalls
December 8	American battleships shell Nauru
December 15–30	American forces land on New Britain, capture Cape Gloucester airstrip, and establish control over Vitiaz and Dampier straits
1944	
January 2	American forces land at Saidor on New Guinea to establish airfields
January 31– February 1	American forces land at Kwajalein and Majuro atolls in the Marshalls
February 10	Japanese Combined Fleet relocates westward from Truk to the Palau Islands
February 15	Australian and New Zealand forces take Green Islands near New Ireland
February 17–22	American forces attack and secure Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshalls
February 29– March 9	American forces land in the Admiralty Islands north of New Guinea and begin construction of a major naval base on Manus
March 20	American forces land in the Bismarck Archipelago to complete the ring of airfields around Rabaul
March 30	American naval air strikes against the Palau Islands

April 22–26 . . . .   Preceded by weeks of air strikes,
                               American forces land at Hollandia in
                               West New Guinea and Aitape in
                               northeastern New Guinea; secure
                               airfields at Hollandia; Australian
                               forces build airfields at Aitape
May 17–18 . . . .   American forces land
                               at Arare in West New Guinea
                               and on offshore island of Wakde
May 27 . . . .   American forces invade Biak in the
                               Netherlands East Indies, where
                               Japanese forces are deeply dug in
June 11–15 . . . .   American forces bomb,
                               then invade Saipan in the Marianas
June 19–21 . . . .   Battle of the Philippine Sea
                               deals severe blow to the
                               Japanese Combined Fleet
July 2 . . . .   American forces land on
                               Noemfoor off New Guinea
                               to seize airfields
July 7–9 . . . .   American forces secure Saipan
                               after suicide assault by Japanese
July 10–13 . . . .   Japanese counteroffensive
                               at Aitape on New Guinea met
                               by Australian and American forces
July 21 . . . .   American forces land on Guam
                               after extensive naval
                               bombardment of the island
July 24 . . . .   American forces land on Tinian
                               in the Marianas
July 28 . . . .   Organized Japanese resistance on
                               Biak ends
July 30–31 . . . .   American forces land at Sansapor
                               to complete the occupation
                               of the northern coast of New Guinea
                               and to set up airfields to strike
                               the northern Philippines and the
                               Netherlands East Indies
July 31 . . . .   American forces secure Tinian
August 10 . . . .   Japanese forces withdraw from
                               Aitape toward Wewak on New Guinea;
                               American forces begin bombardment
                               on Iwo Jima
August 12 . . . .   Guam secured
September 15–20   American forces land on
                               Peleliu and Angaur islands in the
                               Palau group; meet fierce resistance
September 23 . . . . . .   American forces occupy
                               Ulithi Atoll in the Carolines
                               to build naval base
October 10–21 . . . . . .   Regular naval air strikes
                               commence on Philippines,

	Formosa, and Ryukyus
October 17–25	American forces land on
	Philippine island of Leyte
	to begin work on airfields;
	Battle of Leyte Gulf demolishes
	core of the Japanese fleet despite
	the first organized use
	of kamikaze attacks
November 24	American forces begin first B-29
	raids on Tokyo and other
	Japanese cities
November 25	Organized Japanese resistance
	on Peleliu ends
December 25	American forces secure Leyte

1945

January 9	American forces land on Luzon
February 19	American forces land on Iwo Jima
	after prolonged air and naval
	bombardment; meet stiff resistance
March 3	Japanese resistance in Manila ends
March 15	American forces secure Iwo Jima
April 1	American forces land on Okinawa
April 2	President Roosevelt dies;
	President Harry S Truman
	assumes office
May 11	Battle of Wewak, the last Japanese
	stronghold on the northern coast
	of New Guinea
June 22	Organized resistance on Okinawa ends
July 4	MacArthur announces the liberation
	of the Philippines
July 16	First atomic bomb tested
	in New Mexico
August 6	United States drops atomic bomb
	on Hiroshima
August 9	United States drops atomic bomb
	on Nagasaki
August 14	Japan surrenders unconditionally
September 2	Surrender formally signed

Note—Accepted dates may vary according to observer's location relative to the international date line. See figures 1, 5, 7, 8, 14, and 22 for locations of place-names.

Appendix B

Regional Organizations

South Pacific Commission

Headquarters and Secretariat: Nouméa, New Caledonia

Origin: The South Pacific Commission was established by Australia, Britain, France, the Netherlands (which withdrew in 1962), New Zealand, and the United States under an agreement signed in Canberra, Australia, on February 6, 1947, effective July 29, 1948. The purpose of the commission is to advise and assist the participating governments and territorial administrations in promoting the economic, medical, and social development of the peoples of Oceania. The commission's work program includes such fields as agricultural development, conservation, cultural exchanges and preservation, development of marine resources and research, English-language teaching, environmental health, epidemiology, fisheries, nutrition, plant diseases and protection, prevention of fish poisoning, regional communications, statistical training, sanitation, and youth and community work. In recent years rural development and regional integration and planning received increasing attention.

Membership:

American Samoa	Niue
Australia	Northern Mariana
Britain	Islands
Cook Islands	Palau
Federated States	Papua New Guinea
of Micronesia	Pitcairn Islands
Fiji	Solomon Islands
France	Tokelau
French Polynesia	Tonga
Guam	Tuvalu
Kiribati	United States
Marshall Islands	Vanuatu
Nauru	Wallis and Futuna

New Caledonia   Western Samoa
New Zealand

Organization: The principal decisionmaking body of the commis-
sion is the South Pacific Conference, which meets annually in dif-
ferent locations and is attended by delegates from the member
countries and territories. The conference adopts the rules of pro-
cedure, approves the agenda for each annual session, discusses
matters of common interest, and makes recommendations to the
commission on such matters. Decisionmaking is by consensus;
unless all efforts at consensus building have been exhausted, vot-
ing on substantive issues is forbidden. Should consensus building
fail, a decision would require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of
all commission members present and voting.

The commission's annual budget is financed by contributions
assessed according to per capita income in the case of the insular
governments and territorial administrations. Australia, Britain,
France, New Zealand, and the United States contribute accord-
ing to the prospective national interest and benefit from the work
of the commission and the administrative responsibilities of the
respective states. About 93 percent of the 1984 budget of US$3.4
million was borne by the five remaining original members:
Australia, 34 percent; the United States, 17 percent; New Zea-
land, 16 percent; France, 14 percent; and Britain, 12 percent.
The remainder came from contributions by other members.

The chief executive officer of the commission is the secretary
general, who is elected by members of the commission. Since
1969 this post has been held by islanders, testament to the grow-
ing participation by the insular countries of Oceania.

South Pacific Forum

Secretariat: Suva, Fiji.

Origin: The South Pacific Forum was inaugurated on August 15,
1971, in Wellington, New Zealand, as a conference of the heads of
government of the independent and self-governing states of the
South Pacific. Founding members had grown disenchanted with
the nonpolitical South Pacific Commission. The forum meets an-
nually in the capitals of the member states for informal discussions
on political, economic, and other common issues. It is unique in

that it has operated without a written constitution or agreement and without any formal rules governing its activities and membership. All decisions have been made by consensus rather than by formal vote. In the early 1980s the organization's work program included such matters as trade promotion, transport, telecommunications, tourism, agriculture, industrial development, fisheries and seabed resources, the environment, and energy.

Membership:

Australia	New Zealand
Cook Islands	Niue
Federated States of	Papua New Guinea
Micronesia	Solomon Islands
(observer)	Tonga
Fiji	Tuvalu
Kiribati	Vanuatu
Nauru	Western Samoa

Organization: In 1972 the forum established the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) to promote regional cooperation and consultation on trade, economic development, transport, tourism, and other related matters within the South Pacific. In 1975 SPEC became the official secretariat of the forum. In 1977 SPEC established the Pacific Forum Line as a joint-venture regional shipping line. Two years later the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency was set up to facilitate mutual cooperation and assistance in fisheries and in policing the 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (see Glossary) of each of the member states. Other affiliated organizations are the Association of South Pacific Airlines (for cooperation among the member airlines) and the South Pacific Trade Commission (for development of export markets in Australia), both established in 1979, and the Tourism Council, set up in 1983. Two-thirds of the forum's annual budget comes from Australia and New Zealand—each contributing one-third—and the balance is shared equally by the other forum members.

Appendix C

Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

Article I

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The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the

archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

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Glossary

Australian dollar ($A)—Australian currency, divided into 100 cents. On average, $A1 was equivalent to US$1.14 in 1980, US$1.15 in 1981, US$1.02 in 1982, US$0.90 in 1983, and US$0.92 in April 1984.

cargo cult—One of a series of movements that have appeared in Melanesia since the late 1800s and that combine traditional religio-magic elements with Christian and Western secular themes. They are often based on the expectation that material goods or other cargo will soon come from the ancestors via some magic ship or airplane or from an ill-defined source. Noncooperation with the government is common among adherents, as is destruction or consumption of all the community's goods while awaiting the millennium.

CFPF—Cours du Franc Pacifique franc. Currency of French Polynesia and New Caledonia, divided into 100 centimes. US$1 equaled CFPF138.7 in June 1983.

Exclusive Economic Zone—A 200-nautical-mile belt of sea and seabed adjacent to a state's 12-nautical-mile territorial sea where the state claims preferential fishing rights and control over the exploitation of mineral and other natural resources.

Fiji dollar (F$)—Fiji currency, divided into 100 cents. On average, F$1 was equivalent to US$1.22 in 1980, US$1.17 in 1981, US$1.07 in 1982, US$0.98 in 1983, and US$0.96 in April 1984.

gross domestic product (GDP)—The value, in market prices, of all final goods and services for consumption and investment (excluding those intermediate to the production process) produced in an economy in a given period, usually a year. GDP is "gross" because it does not deduct depreciation costs and is "domestic" because it excludes income earned abroad and includes that earned by foreigners in the country. GDP is sometimes calculated at "factor cost" by deducting indirect taxes and adding subsidies.

gross national product (GNP)—Gross domestic product (q.v.) plus the income earned by domestic residents abroad (including investment income) less the income earned in the domestic economy by foreigners. These earnings are referred to as factor payments.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz-

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ing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

kina (K)—Papua New Guinea currency, divided into 100 toea. On average, K1 was equivalent to US$1.26 in 1977, US$1.41 in 1978 and 1979, US$1.49 in 1980 and 1981, US$1.36 in 1982, US$1.20 in 1983, and US$1.16 in April 1984.

Lomé Convention—The first Lomé Convention (Lomé I) came into force in 1976. Lomé II came into effect in 1981, and Lomé III was scheduled to start in 1985 after negotiations were completed in 1984. The convention covers economic relations between the members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and their former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). The convention allows most ACP exports to enter the EEC duty-free or at special rates and, among other things, provides funds to offset adverse fluctuations in the prices of ACP exports.

New Zealand dollar ($NZ)—New Zealand currency, divided into 100 cents. On average, $NZ1 was equivalent to US$0.97 in 1980, US$0.87 in 1981, US$0.75 in 1982, US$0.67 in 1983, and US$0.66 in April 1984.

shifting cultivation—Farming characterized by the rotation of fields rather than crops, the use of short cropping periods and long fallow periods, and the maintenance of fertility by the regeneration of natural vegetation on fallow land. Clearing of newly or previously cropped land is often accomplished by burning. Also called slash-and-burn, swidden, or land rotation agriculture.

Solomon Islands dollar (SI$)—Currency of Solomon Islands, divided into 100 cents. On average, SI$1 was equivalent to US$1.15 in 1979, US$1.20 in 1980, and US$1.16 in June 1983.

SPARTECA—South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement. A nonreciprocal trade agreement between the members of the South Pacific Forum requiring Australia and New Zealand to offer duty-free, unrestricted, or special access for specified products made by other members of the forum (see Appendix B).

Tongan pa'anga (PT)—Tongan currency, divided into 100 seniti. The Tongan pa'anga is at par with the Australian dollar (*q.v.*).

Vanuatu vatu (VT)—Vanuatu's currency. As of June 1983, US$1 equaled VT99.41.

Western Samoa tala (WS$)—Western Samoan currency, divided into 100 sene. On average, WS$1 was equivalent to US$1.22 in 1979, US$1.09 in 1980, US$0.96 in 1981, US$0.83 in 1982, US$0.65 in 1983, and US$0.62 in April 1984.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—*q.v.*).

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